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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION, a corporation, and
BINGHAM and GARFIELD RAILWAY COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiffs,

Case No.
8091

vs.
THE STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Defendant.

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT
This is a certiorari proceeding to review the lawfulness of a decision of defendant, dated July 23,1953, that
there is owing by plaintiff deficiencies of corporation
franchise tax for the years 1942 to 1950, inclusive, of
$3,568,041.92. Interest calculated on such deficiencies to
June 15, 1953 was in the amount of $1,283,647.81, a total
of $4,851,689.73.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Plaintiffs' brief does not mention what the deficiencies in tax should be under plaintiffs' theory of the case.
However, on page 3 of plaintiffs' brief before the Tax
Commission it is stated ". . . the taxpayer's contention
as to the correct determination of the tax is set forth in
Schedule 2 of Petitioner's Exhibit 56 (2)." Turning to
this Exhibit, we find plaintiff admitted a corrected tax
liability for the period here involved of $4,028,608.40.
Tax paid under the returns as filed was in the total
amount of $2,952,562.91. This would thus leave deficiencies owing, according to plaintiff, of $1,076,045.49,
excluding interest.
From the correct deficiencies finally determined to
be due, including interest thereon, by the Court on this
appeal will be taken into account certain cash amounts
heretofore deposited by plaintiff with defendant in connection with perfecting its appeal in Case No. 7298,
involving the year 1942 and again involved here, together
with the amount heretofore paid to defendant under stipulation filed with this court following the hearing by this
Court on plaintiff's motion to enlarge the time within
which to file its brief on the ground that it did not know
what, if any, issues in the case it was required to brief
and argue before the Court.
In reviewing the case, the Court will be called upon
to decide whether the decision of defendant in its dollar
and cent amount should be affirmed or modified. Plaintiff in its writ asks that the decision be modified by

r^iBS * . d e f i e s to zero wd

gmting

,

c k k
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3
refund against the state in the sum of $3,205,443.06 because the imposition of any franchise tax whatsoever on
plaintiff contravenes the commerce clause of the Federal
Constitution. Presumably, if overruled on this point
which is not pressed in its brief, plaintiff asks for a
modification of the decision to an amount equal to 3 per
cent of the net income shown on its Exhibit 56 (2).
Defendant on this appeal asks the court to affirm its
decision but if modified that the deficiencies be increased
to an amount equal to 3% of 100% of plaintiff's Utah
division net income in accordance with the reservation
of jurisdiction and claim therefor asserted at the hearing
under the provisions of Sec. 80-13-39, U.C.A. 1943. Such
total income in the amount of $232,570,086.66 (line 1 Tax
Computation Schedule) at 3% would give a total tax
liability of $6,977,102.60. Subtracting the total taxes
paid under the returns as filed in the amount of $2,952,562.91 would make deficiencies presently owing for the
years involved in the amount of $4,024,539.69, excluding
interest.
The primary issue presented on this appeal is
whether under the mandate of the court and the applicable statutes and authorities, plaintiff may apportion
any net income of its Utah Division outside Utah and, if
so, how much. Secondary questions relate to the propriety
of defendant's calculation of plaintiff's depletion deductions, whether plaintiff in any event is entitled for the
year 1942 to apportion 66.926 per cent to Utah and 33.074
per cent outside under the Court's mandate in Case No.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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7298 and finally whether the assessment of interest at
the statutory 6 per cent rate on any deficiencies to be
found herein constitutes an unlawful abuse of discretion
on the part of defendant.
Put simply, the Court in No. 7298 decided, first, with
one judge dissenting, that plaintiff's tax is to be calculated not on the basis of the statutory formula, but on
the basis of the separate accounts of the Utah Division,
and, second, that in computing plaintiff's depletion deductions some of its net income must be allocated to postmining operations. The case was then remanded with
instructions to determine and enter a deficiency judgment in accordance with the views expressed in the
opinion.
No. 7298 was presented to the Court by both plaintiff
and defendant on the basis that "principles" were to be
adjudicated, not figures. The Court accepted that
approach and, after deciding the principles, remanded
the case to determine the deficiency. The mandate thus
required a continuation of the hearing on the matter to
get more facts pertaining to how much, if any, of the net
income reflected on the separate accounts of the Utah
Division was attributable to business done outside Utah
and how much of the net income should be allocated to
post-mining operations before computing depletion.
The Court is respectfully requested on this occasion,
if it be possible to do so, and based on the more complete
record before it to anchor all principles to be readjuDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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dicated herein down into specific dollars and cents.
A judgment with figures would appear to have a better
chance of finally disposing of this seemingly never-ending
controversy.
Under the heading "Varying Positions Taken by the
Commission" in its brief (pp. 14-19), plaintiff outlines
somewhat chronologically "the various and inconsistent
positions which the Commission has taken with Kennecott over a period of years." The events described merely
represent the difficulties which are involved in any tax
litigation of this magnitude. The record will show that as
the controversy has developed, new facts have come to
light.

The only matter of importance is the correct

determination of the tax imposed annually by law for
plaintiff's privilege as a corporation of operating at
Bingham, Utah, the world's largest copper mine. This
mine, with a capacity of 500,000,000 pounds of copper
a year, accounts for around 30 per cent of the total annual
production of copper in the United States and approximately 10 per cent of the reported annual primary production of copper in the world. From the Bingham ore
is produced, not only copper, but gold, silver, platinum,
palladium and molybdenite as well. Plaintiff's various
operations make it the largest producer of copper, the
second largest producer of gold, the third or fourth
largest producer of silver, and the second largest producer of molybdenite, in the United States.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The backbone of plaintiff's vast industrial enterprise
is the Utah Mines Division. Some conception of the size
of this division's operation can be gained when it is noted
that the total gross revenues from the metals produced
from the ores of the Bingham Mine, before any expenses,
during the years 1942 to 1950, inclusive, were greatly
in excess of the total gross revenues of the State of Utah,
including all taxes collected by the State Tax Commission
and all property taxes collected in the state by municipalities, counties and school districts.
The tax returns filed annually since 1931 by plaintiff
seem, in the light of the facts now of record, to have been
consistently understated with respect to the net income
attributable to plaintiff's Utah operations. On the basis
of these facts they appear to have been incorrect to begin
with as to the Utah Copper Company and incorrect after
1936 as to plaintiff.
Both the individual income and corporation franchise
tax laws of the state are based on the fundamental principle of self-assessment. This means that each taxpayer,
familiar with the facts of his own business and with the
law, is required to compute his tax correctly in the first
place. Where this is not done, it would appear quite
immaterial how many changes of position the taxing
authority must take to secure a correct computation.
With all of the forces at its command, plaintiff over the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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years since 1931 appears to have been quite skillful in
resisting any computation of tax other than of its own
interpretation of the statute. The lack of consideration of
important facts, ability to prolong the controversy, lack
of any penalty in the process, periodic changes in defendant's personnel, the need for revenue in the Uniform
School Fund, are merely some of the factors which have
operated in plaintiff's favor to make its strategy successful.
To get a rough idea of what plaintiff did in filing
its returns, let us turn to the Utah Division 1942 return
as an example. Showing a gross income from its Utah
Division operations of about 86 millions, plaintiff subtracted 44 millions of total direct and indirect expenses
of operations. This left a net income of 42 millions to
the Utah Division before Federal taxes, depletion, and
exclusion of net income attributable to out-of-state
activities, if any.
From this 42 millions of Utah Division net income,
plaintiff subtracted 20 millions of Federal taxes (plaintiff as a whole paid 22 millions). This cut the 42 millions
down to 22 millions of net income.
Plaintiff next subtracted about 13 millions for depletion. This cut the 22 millions down to 9 millions of net
income.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Plaintiff next cut the 9 millions down one-third by
applying an "apportionment formula" to the nine millions
of 66.926 per cent. This cut the 9 millions down to 6
millions of net income (actually about 5.8 millions).
These three adjustments which adjusted 42 millions
of net income of the separate Utah Division, after all
direct and indirect expenses of operations, down to less
than 6 millions of adjusted taxable income to Utah, represent the problem which faced the Court in No. 7298. The
Court was also faced with plaintiff's request that any
attempt by defendant to adjust the above adjustments of
plaintiff, entitled plaintiff to file an amended return
for 1942 on the statutory formula covering all of its
operations and not merely those of its Utah Division.
Under this amended return as filed 3.4 millions were
assigned by plaintiff to Utah (Ex. QQ(2) ).
Defendant's decision here on appeal assigns 16.8
millions of net income to Utah for 1942, using an apportionment fraction slightly over 93 per cent. A 100 per
cent apportionment would assign 18 millions to Utah.
As compared with its original 1942 Utah Division
return assigning 5.8 millions and its amended corporate
return on the statutory formula assigning 3.4 millions to
Utah, plaintiff in Petitioner's Ex. 56(2) at the hearing
conceded a total net income assignable to Utah (Line 7)
of 10.4 millions for 1942, using an apportionment fraction
of 64.676 per cent. However, on this appeal and listed as
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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a separate contention is the argument that this Court
by its mandate in Case No. 7298 directed defendant to
use the arbitrary 66.926 per cent apportionment fraction
which had been used by defendant in filing its 1942 Utah
Division return.
Plaintiff's appeal in Case No. 7298 covering 1942 had
been preceded by an earlier appeal to this Court in Case
No. 6324 covering the years 1935 and 1936. This latter
appeal was dismissed as a part of the settlement
compromising all of the years 1935 to 1941, inclusive.
This compromise is now past history and comment thereon at this time is unnecessary. It is material to
point out, however, that the arbitrary apportionment
fraction of 66.926 per cent was used in this compromise.
This figure seems to have been arrived at somewhat on
the following basis:
Plaintiff had very stubbornly insisted from the
beginning on its right under the statute to use the statutory formula on its Utah Division separate accounts and
to consider no payment to the state which did not recognize that all of its gross receipts from sales should be
allocated outside the State. Allocating 100 per cent of
the property of the Utah Division to Utah and 100 per
cent of the payroll of the Utah Division to Utah and 100
per cent of the gross receipts of the Utah Division outside
Utah, gives a straight fraction of 66% per cent. Under
the compromise, in return for the Commission's concession that all sales receipts could be allocated outside the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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State, plaintiff conceded that all of the property and
payroll of the Utah Division could be allocated to Utah,
together with certain miscellaneous small receipts admitted by plaintiff to be assignable to the state. These
miscellaneous small receipts account for the difference
between 66% per cent and the 66.926 per cent figure.
Also, under the compromise, plaintiff was allowed
to take depletion deductions from gross income equal to
one-third of the total Utah Division net income for the
period. Such amount was arrived at before any deduction for Federal taxes and without any reference to a
value on plaintiff's mill concentrates which would take
into account the principle that some net income must be
allocated to post-mining operations before computing
depletion.
It is out of this background that plaintiff's argument
of long-standing administrative construction emerges in
its effort to validate the franchise tax returns involved
here.
Perhaps, at this point, a few remarks concerning the
course of the trial or hearing below might be helpful to
the Court. Following receipt of the remittitur and the
Court's mandate in No. 7298, defendant was faced with
the necessity of making a computation of tax for 1942
and the intervening years.
On the one hand, the Court had decided the tax
should be calculated not on the statutory formula as
applied to plaintiff as a whole, but on the basis of the
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separate Utah Division accounts under the so-called subdivision (8) provision of the law. (Sec. 80-13-21 (8)
U.C.A. 1943). Under this provision, defendant is required
in lieu of the statutory formula to make such allocation
as is fairly calculated to assign to this state the portion
of net income reasonably attributable to the business
done within this state and to avoid subjecting the taxpayer to double taxation. At the same time, the Court
had decided that in computing the depletion deduction
some net income must be allocated to plaintiff's postmining operations. On the brief and sketchy record
before it, the Court was in no position to determine what
portion of the net income of the Utah Division was
attributable to business done outside the State, nor was
it prepared without more to put its final stamp of
approval on the cost allocation formula used by defendant in allocating some of plaintiff's net income to postmining operations for depletion purposes. Extensive
discussions with plaintiff, following the remittitur,
seemed to indicate plaintiff took quite a contrary view
from defendant of what the Court had decided in Case
No. 7298. Plaintiff continued to insist that it derived no
net income from post-mining operations for depletion
purposes and that no adjustments should be made to the
separate Utah divisional accounts which did not allocate
(1) some property outside (inventory), (2) some payroll
outside (New York administrative expense) and (3) all
sales outside.
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Defendant had hired Messrs. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
& Co., independent certified public accountants, to assist
it in computing the tax. Solely from the accounting
standpoint, this firm did not regard as unreasonable
apportioning the net income of the Utah Division ratably
to the costs of the successive stages of mining, smelting,
transportation, refining and selling for both depletion
and allocation. This basis had several features to coinmend it. In the first place, profit or net income is
what is left over after the costs or expenses of the business are paid or incurred. In a practical way, either profit
or loss is tied down to all the costs incurred, not just to
some costs. In the second place, it made an assessment
inwardly consistent in that "net income from the property" (mining) could be used for the depletion deduction
and it only became necessary to add to this figure the
net income attributable to the next activity in Utah
(smelting) to get the total net income assignable to Utah.
The net income assignable to the transportation, refining
and selling outside the State became out-of-state nontaxable income. Depletion "net income" was thus incapable of overrunning the state line and exceeding the net
income assignable to the State. Roughly speaking, this
method allocated about 70 per cent of the net income of
the Utah Division to the mine for the depletion deduction
and 80 per cent to Utah for taxation. In the third place,
this basis had some practical precedent in the construction business where a building job may require two or
more annual periods to complete. In these circumstances,
an acceptable basis for tax reporting prior to completion
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is to apportion that proportion of the estimated total
profit to be realized to a particular year that the costs
of the particular year bear to the total estimated costs
of the whole job. In fact, the formula worked even better
in the present case for the reason that defendant was
not apportioning an estimated future profit but a definite, presently known and ascertained profit.
This apparently liberal formula was to plaintiff very
objectionable. As the hearings got under way, plaintiff's
witnesses analyzed the formula and criticized its legal
applicability to the case. I t was algebraic; it gave a distorted picture because the higher the costs, the higher the
profit; it had no warrant in the statute, etc, A large p a r t
of this criticism was valid and persuasive and impressed
the Commission insofar as it was directed against the
apportionment of net income within and without the
State. It became clearly apparent that the determination
of the "net income reasonably attributable to the business
done within this state" for apportionment purposes was
one thing and determination of the "net income from the
property" for depletion purposes another thing. They
rested on different footings in the statute.
Aside from the numerous prejudicial imperfections
of the formula pointed out by plaintiff, the Commission
also realized as the facts developed that its use for
apportionment purposes could not be justified under
the Court's mandate of computing the tax on the Utah
Division's separate accounts. The effect of the formula
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was to automatically apportion net income reflected on
the Utah Division accounts to an out-of-state source
merely because out-of-state expense was being incurred
and irrespective of whether such out-of-state expense
constituted out-of-state business. For example, a Utah
ranch company may ship cattle to the Omaha market
unloading the stock intransit in Colorado for feed and
water. The incurring of such transportation and feeding
expense may be out-of-state expense but it is not attributable to out-of-state business requiring an apportionment
of income within and without the state. The expense
is outside but the business is inside. Furthermore, the
formula, from another point of view, was in effect converting a franchise tax law on the privilege of doing
business into an income tax and making source of the
income rather than value of the corporate franchise the
criteria for the tax.
On the other hand, the formula had a legally useful
application on the depletion question. The problem here
was not to determine where the business was being done
but merely to determine the gross income from the mine
before the mill product entered the post-mining furnace
and metallurgical treatment stages. The mining expenses
were known so that to compute the net income from the
property, the gross income need only be determined. This
represented primarily a valuation problem which would
take into account the Court's mandate of allocating some
net income to the post-mining operations. The formula
was retained but viewed by the Commission through the
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Court's opinion with considerable caution and merely as
a means for getting at a correct figure. The formula, it
must be admitted, allocated some net income to postmining operations. Whether it allocated too much or too
little remained to be determined. The Commission waited
patiently for plaintiff to come forward with its own
experts or formulas and allocate some income, even a
little bit, to post-mining operations. It is still waiting.
The reams of testimony of plaintiff on the depletion
question were directed solely to showing the Court's
decision in No. 7298 to be erroneous. The testimony,
however, merely fortifies the good common sense of the
Court's judgment. In fact, the evidence leaves one with
the impression that a formula which puts a value on a
mineral product of 70 per cent of the total net income
ultimately derived after this product is smelted, transported, refined and sold, is excessive. This is perhaps
because statutory depletion and Federal taxes were allowed and included by defendant as mining costs under
the formula. Defendant, in these circumstances, had no
other recourse than to sit tight on its depletion values.
The apportionment problem, on the other hand, took
an interesting turn during the trial because the evidence
as it developed had taken an odd and surprising turn.
Abandonment of the cost allocation formula for apportionment purposes on the persuasive testimony and insistence of plaintiff required a redetermination of the
net income of plaintiff's Utah Division reasonably
attributable to the business done within Utah which would
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
fit the new facts in the record. The deficiency letters
using the cost formula had initially been sent out in a
preliminary way and on the best information and advice
then available to defendant following the remand of No.
7298. The hearings, however, had developed a lot of
facts, some of them very interesting indeed.
At the outset, plaintiff, vigorously rejecting the
cost formula's apportionment of a mere 20 per cent of
net income of the Utah division outside the State, claimed
the right to use the statutory formula on its Utah divisional accounts. Under its interpretation of the formula,
which it insisted was applicable, from 91.270 to 98.106
per cent of property is assigned to Utah, the balance
outside; from 96.582 to 98.150 per cent of payroll is
assigned to Utah, the balance outside; from 00.004 to
00.779 per cent of gross receipts is assigned to Utah, the
balance outside. Average of the three factors thus ranges
from 63.192 to 65.198 per cent to Utah. Thus, approximately 36 per cent of the net income of the Utah division
is claimed to be attributable to out-of-state business.
To justify exclusion of 36 per cent of the Utah
divisional net income from the Utah tax base, plaintiff
felt called upon at first to present a picture of large and
extensive business activities in the New York Equitable
Building Office. These activities were described under
the headings of operational, development, purchasing and
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selling matters. No stress was placed on activities at the
mine, nor on the supervisory activities of plaintiff's
administrative staff in the Salt Lake Kearns Building
Office.
This testimony went on at considerable length
describing plaintiff's operations everywhere, including
those in and out of Utah, as one continuous, indivisible,
closely integrated operating unit with indivisible, continuous and uninterrupted operations from the mining
of the crude ores through the smelting and refining stages
to the ultimate sale, distribution and delivery of the
marketable products to the customer. The income from
such a unified business was claimed to be incapable of
separate partition and was exactly what the statutory or
Massachusetts formula was invented to cover. Activities
of plaintiff's sales office in New York were given especial
importance and significance as contributing to the production of plaintiff's income because without sales, no
cash. Everything prior to the sale was merely expenses.
The sale was the important thing. It put the income in
the bank and the sale was not made in Utah.
However true the picture of the one indivisible,
continuous, uninterrupted, integrated operating unit may
be in a broad economic sense, it collapsed completely
under the facts pertinent to our statute.
In the first place, it appeared that plaintiff never
sold any copper or molybdenite at all but merely produced them. Plaintiff's sales subsidiary, Kennecott Sales
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Corporation, made all sales to customers in the regular
course of the subsidiary's business and in the name of the
subsidiary. The customer paid his money and dealt with
the sales subsidiary exclusively.
In the second place, it appeared that title to the
copper and molybdenite was transferred from producer
parent to sales subsidiary, contemporaneously with the
sale from subsidiary to customer, under an intercompany
contract at the actual market price realized by the subsidiary less certain expenses and a commission of $1.00
per net ton of copper and $3.50 per net ton of molybdenite. The evidence clearly showed that this inter-company
contract price was arms-length, fair and reasonable.
In the third place, it appeared that not being legally
entitled to file a consolidated return with its sales subsidiary because such subsidiary has never done or qualified to do business in Utah, plaintiff's Utah tax returns
have nevertheless ignored completely both the separate
corporate identity of and the fair and reasonable intercompany contract with the sales subsidiary. The separate
net income derived by the sales subsidiary under its
intercompany contract was treated in the Utah tax
returns of plaintiff as the net income of plaintiff even
though consolidated returns were not and could not be
filed and n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g that such separate net income
was the source of the payment of dividends aggregating
$1,240,000.00 by the sales subsidiary to plaintiff during
the years here involved.
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In the fourth place, it appeared that 25 per cent of
the total copper produced by the Utah Division was not
sold out on the market, but was transferred on an intercompany basis through the sales subsidiary at fair
market prices to plaintiff's fabricating subsidiaries,
Chase Brass and Copper Company and Kennecott Wire
and Cable Company for fabrication and sale by the
fabricating subsidiaries to their customers. As in the
case of the sales subsidiary, neither fabricating subsidiary did or was qualified to do business in Utah.
In the fifth place, it appeared that the one-third of
the net income of the Utah Division which plaintiff was
seeking to apportion outside Utah as attributable to
business done in New York was not being and never had
been picked up for taxation by New York as business
done in New York under its similar franchise tax statute.
No question of double taxation was therefore involved
under the subdivision (8) provision of our statute.
In the sixth place, it appeared that the business of
refining Utah blister copper by American Smelting and
Eefining Company under contract at its Baltimore, Maryland refinery or elsewhere, was not business done by
plaintiff at Baltimore, but business done by A. S. & E. at
Baltimore for plaintiff.
In the seventh place, it appeared that historically
speaking the producing function has always been separated from the selling function. In the years prior to
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1920, A. S. & K. did the selling. From 1920 to 1934,
Guggenheim Bros, did the selling. From 1934 to the
present, the sales subsidiary has done the selling.
In the eighth place, it appeared that the sales subsidiary maintained joint offices with plaintiff, its parent,
in New York and actually paid its full proportionate
share of the rent and other New York office expenses.
In the ninth place, it appeared that from 1931, when
the Utah tax law became effective, to 1936, when Utah
Copper Company was dissolved to become the Utah
Division of plaintiff, Utah Copper Company's New York
Office was at 25 Broad Street, whereas the offices of
Guggenheim Bros, and Kennecott Sales Corporation
were at 120 Broadway. Thus, to begin with and covering
the period involved in No. 6324 before this Court
(covering 1935 and 1936 and later compromised and dismissed), plaintiff did not even have the benefit of the
producing company or division sharing joint office premises with the selling firm or company to give argumentative support to its present position that the sales subsidiary is an "-agent" operating in plaintiff's behalf in
premises owned or rented by plaintiff outside Utah.
In the tenth place, it appeared that the separate
books of account of the Utah Division of plaintiff, the
sales subsidiary and the fabricating subsidiaries properly
and truly reflected the net income from the business and
operations of the Utah Division and each of the sales
and fabricating subsidiaries.
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In the eleventh place, it appeared that the Utah
Division was charged with its fair and proportionate part
of plaintiff's New York office administrative expense,
including salaries and office expenses, and that such
sums were deducted as expense on the Utah tax returns.
These significant facts, among many others, set forth
in the Findings, put an entirely different complexion on
the case. In fact, in its bare essentials, all there is here
is a company producing fruit in Utah, having it sorted,
packed and graded under contract by an independant
firm in Idaho and sold to an independent broker, commission merchant or distributing company in Wyoming
for resale outside Utah. The fact that the Utah producer also establishes an office in the same state, or in
the same town, or in the same office building, or on the
same floor does not make the broker's or commission
merchant's activities his activities. The only inquiry
under our statute is to ascertain the nature and extent
of the out-of-state office activities of the taxpayer in the
light of its intercorporate arrangements and the way it
keeps its books of account to determine whether such
out-of-state activities, if any, require an apportionment
of Utah net income out-of-state in addition to being
allowed as an expense deduction to the business done
within the state.
Unless the separate corporate entity *and selling
operations of the sales subsidiary are ignored, all the
Court is faced with here is the existence of an out-of-state
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management office in New York concerned with worldwide operations, superimposed on a management office
in Salt Lake more directly concerned with operating
problems of the Western Divisions, including the Utah
Division. The activities of the New York office are
extremely important, of course, and should not be minimized. Corporate housekeeping duties, plans and policies, investments, financial matters, directors' and stockholders' meetings are important corporate functions.
The problem here, however, is the extent to which these
out-of-state over-all management services require an
out-of-state apportionment of the income of its Utah
Division where already a fair share of the applicable
expense of these services has been deducted on the division's separate accounts and served to reduce by that
amount the net income attributable to the business of the
Utah Division. The allowance of the substantial expense
of the New York management services as a deduction on
the Utah returns itself allocates outside Utah, on this
record, the full value of such services to the production
of net income by the Utah Division. Furthermore, it has
to be remembered that the income being earned by the
Utah Division is not from New York housekeeping duties
or management services but from the production of metal
by the Utah Division.
We ask the Court to keep constantly in mind the fact
that the Utah copper and molybdenite product is transferred from the Utah Division directly to the sales subDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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sidiary at a fair price (market less fair and reasonable
commissions, together with certain expenses). The Utah
Division is credited with its fair price by the sales
subsidiary.
The molybdenite, which accounts for approximately
8 per cent of total sales, is fully marketable in Utah,
requires no further processing, and is moved directly
out of Utah to out-of-state customers by the sales subsidiary. Plaintiff conducts no activity or business outside
Utah with respect to molybdenite whatsoever. It is produced here and sold outside by another company.
What about the copper, platinum, palladium, gold
and silver? Is any of the net income derived from these
products earned from or attributable to out-of-state
business. No, even though a slightly different factual
situation is presented from that pertaining to the
molybdenite.
Plaintiff's Utah mills turn out along with the
marketable molybdenite, copper concentrates which are
smelted in Utah for plaintiff's account by A. S. & E.
These copper concentrates were smelted by A. S. & B. at
cost plus a fee of $1.35, then $1.00 and now 85c per ton
of dry product to produce blister copper. This blister,
although 99 plus per cent pure copper, has mixed up with
it small but very valuable amounts of gold, silver,
platinum and palladium. These "impurities" were refined out of the blister by A. S. & E. at its Baltimore or
other refinery at cost plus a fee of $1.50 per ton of
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returnable refined copper. The refined copper as produced was sold by the sales subsidiary to customers out
of A. S. & E.'s yard at the refinery. Copper is thus in
exactly the same boat as molybdenite except that the
Utah blister on its way to market must be stopped in
transit in Maryland for some additional processing, not
by plaintiff or by the sales subsidiary, but by an independent third party, A. S. & E. This out-of-state processing of the Utah product is not out-of-state business of
plaintiff, but the business of A. S. & E.
The platinum and palladium product is again in the
same boat as the molybdenite and the copper but with
the difference that this product is sold not by the sales
subsidiary, but by A. S. & E. for an agreed fee not to
exceed $5.00 per ounce less certain costs and expenses.
Plaintiff does not ask, as in the case of its sales subsidiary, that the separate corporate entity of A. S. & E.
be set aside. These receipts are merely so small in the
over-all picture as to require no comment.
Defendant in its final decision allocated all receipts
from gold and silver outside the Sta:te after having at
the hearing in Ex. P P P (2) attributed them to Utah
business. Was this out-of-state assignment proper? The
deficiencies were cut down substantially by this action
because these receipts account for about 12 per cent of
total sales. For one month (May, 1950,) for example,
they ran over $900,000.
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The problem on the gold and silver is somewhat
unique. As set forth in Salt Lake County v. Utah Copper
Co., 93 Fed. (2) 127 (1937) (CCA10), in the years from
1909 to 1932, the Copper Company shipped its copper
concentrates to the smelter where they were sampled,
assayed, purchased and paid for by the smelter except
for the copper which was returned in kind out-of-state
on payment of the smelting and refining toll charges, the
smelter being unable to purchase such large quantities
of copper. Effective January 1, 1933, the Copper Company made a new smelting contract wThereby gold and
silver were no longer purchased in Utah by the smelter,
but were thereafter delivered back in kind out-of-state
to the copper company along with the blister copper.
The early testimony at the trial below on the gold
and silver was, to say the least, garbled, contradictory
and confused with respect to what happens after the
delivery back in kind. (See F. pp. 83 et seq.) The fair
conclusion at this time, however, was that the "sales"
to the Federal government wTere effected by A. S. & R.
as an independent sales agent, and not by plaintiff or by
the sales subsidiary, on about the same basis as the
platinum and palladium. For this reason they were
claimed in Ex. PPP(2) as Utah business. Also, to be
noted is that, at that time, there was in evidence the basic
agreement of November 29, 1940, (Ex. 111(2)) between
plaintiff and A. S. & E. calling for the delivery back in
kind of the copper and the gold and silver as well. The
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witnesses were clear enough on what happened to the
copper but the circumstances surrounding the delivery of
the gold and silver to the government were not clear.
This mystery was solved at later hearings by Mr.
Gervin, assistant to plaintiff's president, who introduced
in the evidence another agreement, hitherto unheard of,
and dated the 29th of November, 1940, under which plaintiff did not on taking delivery sell the gold and silver to
the government itself. After being constructively delivered up in kind by A. S. & R. at the refinery to plaintiff, plaintiff concurrently and constructively delivered
back and sold the gold and silver to A. S. & R. On its
face, this contract had been negotiated and executed in
the New York offices of plaintiff and A. S, & R.
The sale price to A. S. & R. for the month of May,
1950 of $908,416.12 of Utah Division gold and silver
was $901,185.28, A. S. & R. thus realizing a net gain on the
purchase and resale of $7,230.84, or roughly eight-tenths
of one per cent.
It might be asked whether this sale of gold and silver
is not in substance exactly the same situation as prevailed
on a net smelter return basis prior to January 1, 1933.
For example, what difference did the new arrangement
make in shifting from a sale of the gold and silver in the
concentrates on a net smelter return basis in Utah to a
delivery up in kind to plaintiff outside Utah if simultaneously with the new delivery up in kind agreement there
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was executed a separate agreement under which
A. S. & K. from the moment of the delivery of the concentrates in Utah became legally entitled by contract to the
product, merely postponing passage of title and payment
until the gold and silver were stripped out of the blister
outside the state by A. S. & R. Again, for example, what
difference would it make taxwise if wool on the sheep is
sheared after the sheep are driven across the state line if
grown on the sheep in Utah. Furthermore, if, as here,
the out-of-state shearing is done by the purchaser, the
shearing is not out-of-state business of the Utah ranch
owner and the net income attributable to the growing of
the wool in Utah would be attributable in full to Utah
business.
Other features pertaining to the gold and silver gave
defendant considerable difficulty. For example, Mr.
Lenz, President of the Sales Subsidiary, testified (F. p.
85):
u

You see, to me — while they are precious
metals — they have in my opinion no commercial
value. In other words, we spend no time on the
sale of them, it is automatic."
In other words, no sales effort or marketing problem is
involved with respect to gold and silver. The "sale" to the
Federal government does not contribute to the earning
of the income. From this testimony it conclusively
appears that the income is solely in the production of the
metal.
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Another thing was whether the one letter contract of
sale, dated November 29, 1940, negotiated and executed,
it is true, in the respective New York Offices of A. S. & R.
and plaintiff at 120 Broadway, but covering the complete
inter-company transfer of all future production of gold
and silver, was of such a character that all gross receipts
from such transfers year after year should be attributable to New York business solely by reason of initial formal execution of the agreement in New York. This difficulty was accentuated when it is borne in mind that the
full amount of the gross receipts from the transfers of
gold and silver in the Utah blister to A. S. & R. at the
Baltimore refinery wrere reflected in the separate accounts of the Utah Division and attributed to the business
of the Utah Division. Again and of paramount importance is the fact that in substance and effect the transfers
of the gold and silver to A. S. & R. differ not one whit
from the transfers of platinum and palladium to A. S.
& R. and the transfers of copper and molybdenite to the
sales subsidiary. All are for resale. The Utah Division
is merely a producer. A. S. & R. and the sales subsidiary
are the marketing instrumentalities.
Notwithstanding the Court's mandate to compute
the tax under subdivision (8) on the separate accounts
of the Utah Division and not on the basis of the statutory
three-factor formula as applied to plaintiff and notwithstanding that jurisdiction had been reserved and
claim made at the hearing to assess the tax on the full
net income shown and reflected on such separate accounts, Defendant
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(a) Allocated in the gross receipts fraction all
receipts of gold and silver outside the State, such
receipts comprising about 12 per cent of total
sales.
(b) Allocated in the payroll fraction all New
York administrative expense as payroll outside
the State, such expense comprising roughly about
3 per cent of total payroll.
(c) Allocated in the property fraction all inventories in transit or in process or on hand at the
refinery awaiting sale as tangible property outside
the State, such outside property comprising
roughly about 6.5 per cent of total property.
(d) All property and payroll in Utah were allocated to Utah. All receipts from sales of copper
and molybdenite collected by plaintiff from the
sales subsidiary following sales by the latter to
customers and from platinum and palladium collected from A. S. & E. following sales by the latter
to customers, were included as Utah business for
the reason that such sales were not made by and
in the name of plaintiff but by and in the name of
the sales subsidiary and A. S. & R. and in the
regular course of the latters' business and from
the latters' premises.
This decision may be erroneous. I t is erroneous,
however, only if the tax should be laid under the mandate of this Court on the full separate net income of the
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Utah Division and in accordance with Sec. 80-13-16 (1),
U. C. A. 1943, which requires the net income to be computed upon the basis of the taxpayer's annual accounting
period in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed in keeping the books of such taxpayer.
The net income from the intercompany transfers to
A. S. & E. of Utah gold, silver, platinum and palladium
is earned from Utah business. The net income from
intercompany transfers of Utah copper and molybdenite
to the sales subsidiary at a fair price is earned from
Utah business. The full value of the New York management services has been allowed as an expense deduction
against Utah business and inventory in transit outside
the State to market may be interstate business but it is
not out-of-state business requiring apportionment.
Defendant, in its decision, faced the choice of assessing the tax on the full net income of the Utah Division or,
on the theory that these separate accounts reflected in
part net income from some out-of-state business, applying
the formula to the separate accounts merely as a discretionary adjustment under subdivision (8) and not as a
matter of statutory right to the taxpayer. The discretionary adjustment to the accounts first made by plaintiff based on the cost allocation formula did not assign
enough (only about 20 per cent) net income outside the
state according to plaintiff. Application of the formula
as an adjustment, however, applied literally, assigned
from 6 to 10 per cent outside.
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An interesting, and perhaps amusing, sidelight of
the attack on the original cost allocation assignment by
defendant is that even if the sales subsidiary's business
is treated as plaintiff's business and the formula applied
as plaintiff insists here, the receipts from the sales of
25 per cent of total production of Utah copper to the
fabricating subsidiaries in no event should be excluded
from the sales numerator. Such intercompany sales,
under the regular practice of the Commission, cannot
for obvious reasons have the formula applied to them.
This is Utah business, separately accounted for. If the
sales numerator here instead of being substantially zero,
as plaintiff contends, includes the receipts from the 25
per cent of copper production to the fabricating subsidiaries, it is interesting to note how close the figure
comes to the assignment of income to Utah under defendant's original cost allocation formula which proved to be
such anathema to plaintiff.
Plaintiff in its brief devotes pages 4 to 13, inclusive,
and more particularly pages 6 to 13, to the "facts" and
pages 14 to 19 to the "Varying Positions Taken by the
Commission". The "facts" set forth are not the facts
in the Findings or in the record. This is apparently because of plaintiff's desire, contrary to the rules of this
Court, not to "burden this Court by pointing out the
many instances where the findings of fact by defendant
are not supported by the testimony and evidence presented before it." How better to present the picture
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grated operation than to ignore completely the Findings
and record which show that the production, sales and
fabricating functions have been separately broken down
and incorporated, corporate-wise and accounting-wise.
The record below made it abundantly clear to defendant that plaintiff has been playing both ends against the
middle. The sales subsidiary was incorporated and has
been utilized for valid business purposes as a marketing
or sales outlet for plaintiff's entire production of copper
and molybdenite. The value at which this production
was transferred from plaintiff, as producer, to sales
subsidiary, as seller, by intercompany contract was fair
and reasonable. Nothing in the record would permit defendant to move in on this contract and have it set aside
by this Court as a fraudulent device to siphon out of Utah
income earned here. Defendant must recognize and accept it; plaintiff also. Use of a sales subsidiary gave
plaintiff the practical benefits of limited liability and,
more especially, prevented plaintiff from subjecting its
tremendous income to the risk of income or franchise
taxation in New York and in the various states and foreign countries where the product is sold every day. By
giving the sales subsidiary a relatively small but at the
same time fair and reasonable profit on the sales, it
was the subsidiary's profit, not plaintiff's, which became
subject to the risk of an apportionment of income to the
place of sale. Furthermore, the allocation of a larger
profit to the subsidiary or having plaintiff do its own
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selling, would have taken a larger share of income now
allocated by plaintiff to Utah out of Utah but at the same
time allocated it to New York. This would be jumping
from the frying pan into the fire because New York with
a franchise tax rate of 5% per cent before Federal taxes
has a much stiffer rate than the modest Utah rate of 3
per cent after the heavy Federal tax has been deducted.
The authorities establish the right of a state to rest
the tax on the income apportioned by the taxpayer to
business done within the state on the taxpayer's separate
books of account. Indeed, if such allocation made by
the taxpayer properly reflects net income and excludes
the net income of operations in other states, the state
must accept it. Allocation by separate accounting fairly
and accurately made precludes the use of the statutory formula. In the absence of a showing of the income
attributable to the business done within the state by
separate or segregated accounts, the formula merely represents a crude, rough approximation which Courts
have been reluctant to set aside except where it reaches a
palpably arbitrary and unreasonable result. No taxpayer
is entitled of right to the statutory meat-chopper where
his own segregated bookkeeping system meticulously,
precisely and fairly with a sharp pen-knife carves out of
the whole of the taxpayer's net income everywhere derived, that portion which reasonably reflects the true extent of business done within the taxing state.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34
The present case is the most important case ever to
come before the defendant below. It involves a large sum
of money it is true, but even more important is the fact
that it involves the relationship of the State to the State's
largest business enterprise and a matter of principle of
general application, that is to say, the tax status of
production within and sale without the State. Adjudication of the question involved here will have large
and far reaching significance involving as it does production in Utah by one company and the sale of the
product outside the State by other independent marketing instrumentalities. Utah with its natural resources and small population is, and for many years
will probably remain, a producing rather than a
consuming state. Its tax laws, as we will see, have been
designed around and take cognizance of these economic
facts. Much of the state's agricultural and livestock production is marketed outside the state through brokers,
commission merchants or other independent marketing
instrumentalities. Our statute does not contemplate attributing sales outside the state to out-of-state business
where the selling function has been by contract taken over
by some third person acting independently and in the
regular course of his own business. To exclude the outof-state sale from Utah business, it is necessary that the
taxpayer producing the article of sale sell his product outside the state out of his own office by his own agents or
employees and in his own name and behalf and in the
regular course of his own business.
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The picture is made even more clear when looked
at in the reverse. We find, for example, that if the Bingham pit were in New York and if plaintiff and its sales
subsidiary occupied joint offices not in the Equitable
Building, New York City, but in the Kearns Building in
Salt Lake City, our statute would not in the case of plaintiff purport to allocate to Utah the gross receipts from
sales of metal produced out-of-state but marketed here
nation-wide by the sales subsidiary, a separate corporation from plaintiff. The sales here by the sales subsidiary
would not be the plaintiff's sales. Utah would have the
right, of course, to assess a franchise tax on the sales
subsidiary but it would be a tax based upon the separate
net income of the sales subsidiary realized under its contract with its parent.
In order to prevent any possible misunderstanding
and misinterpretation of defendant's position on this
appeal, may we restate the position as follows:
Defendant first asks that its decision be affirmed.
It makes this suggestion to the Court on the ground that
there is not the slightest showing here that defendant has
reached outside the state to tax $1.00 of net income of
the Utah Division attributable to business done by this
Division outside the State. At the same time, it asks
the Court to consider the facts of record and contained
in the Findings in the light of the pertinent legal authorities hereafter to be discussed and increase the tax to the
applicable 3 per cent rate of the full net income shown
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and reflected on the separate accounts of plaintiff's Utah
Division, if in the Court's judgment such authorities so
require. Jurisdiction and claim to make this increase
of deficiency were appropriately reserved at the hearing
and defendant asks the Court to exercise this jurisdiction
and direct the assessment of tax on such basis if the law
so requires. This Court under the statute in these circumstances, has the authority and jurisdiction to inquire
into and determine the lawfulness of defendant's decision
and to modify such decision to the extent required by
the law and the facts, whether such modification result
in an increase or a decrease of the deficiency in tax.
SUMMABY OF FACTS
Plaintiff, a New York Corporation, owns and operates four mining properties in the United States and
through a wholly owned subsidiary, Braden Copper
Company, a fifth property in the Republic of Chile. The
four United States properties are known as the Western
Mining Divisions and consist of Utah Mines Division,
Nevada Mines Division, Chino Mines Division (New
Mexico) and Ray Mines Division (Arizona). In Nevada,
New Mexico and Chile (through Braden Copper Company), plaintiff operates its own smelters. Mill concentrates produced by plaintiff in Arizona are smelted under
contract by American Smelting and Refining Company
at the latter's smelter in Arizona. The mill concentrates
produced by the Utah Division are smelted under contract by A. S. & R, at its Garfield Utah Smelter.
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The blister copper produced by the Utah, Nevada,
Chino and Kay Mines Divisions, during the period here
involved, was shipped back to A. S. & B.'s Baltimore,
Maryland refinery or other out-of-state refinery where
the copper was all smelted up together and refined. From
this refining process are produced copper, gold, silver,
platinum and palladium. In the case of the Utah Division, during plaintiff's mill operation to produce copper
mill concentrate for shipment to the A. S. & E. smelter in
Utah, is also produced a fully marketable molybdenite
concentrate requiring no further processing prior to sale.
The foregoing divisions of plaintiff are operated as
separate departments and separate books of account are
kept and maintained for each division which segregate
and properly reflect the business done by and the net income of each division.
Plaintiff has three wholly owned subsidiary companies, among others, known as Kennecott Sales Corporation, Chase Brass and Copper Company and Kennecott Wire and Cable Company.
Kennecott Sales Corporation, the sales subsidiary,
is engaged in the business of selling all of the copper
and molybdenite produced by the four United States mining divisions and the copper produced by plaintiff's subsidiary, Braden Copper Company, in Chile. The sales
subsidiary's offices are in New York City, shared jointly
with plaintiff, and all sales are made by and in the name
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of and in the regular course of business of the sales subsidiary. Plaintiff itself makes no sales of copper and
molybdenite but transfers the same to the sales subsidiary, at the time of sale by the sales subsidiary to the
customer, at the market price actually realized less certain expenses and a commission of $1.00 per net ton of
copper sold and $3.50 per net ton of molybdenite sold.
The price received by plaintiff from its sales subsidiary
by such intercompany contract is fair and reasonable and
the terms of such contract were arrived at upon an armslength basis.
Chase Brass and Copper Company and Kennecott
Wire and Copper Company are wholly owned subsidiaries engaged in fabricating refined copper into various
marketable fabricated forms. 25% of the total production
of the four United States Mining Divisions and more particularly 25% of the production of copper of the Utah
Division are transferred by the sales subsidiary to the
fabricating subsidiaries at the prevailing market prices
at time of transfer.
Separate books of account for each of the fabricating
subsidiaries and the sales subsidiary are kept and maintained which segregate and properly reflect the business done by and the net income of each such wholly
owned subsidiary.
The sales subsidiary occupied joint offices with its
parent, plaintiff, in the Equitable Building, 120 Broadway, New York City under lease arrangements entered
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into by plaintiff with the Equitable Office Building
Corporation, authorizing premises to be used and occupied by plaintiff "as Executive and Sales Offices for itself and subsidiaries." For convenience all disbursements and records pertaining to the New York office
were handled by the "Disbursing Department" of plaintiff. The Disbursing Department each month sent a bill
to the sales subsidiary for the subsidiary's proportionate
share of the New York Office expense, including rent as
a separate item.
The sales and fabricating subsidiaries were operated
as separate, distinct and independent corporations. Plaintiff from time to time received dividends from its subsidiaries and in the case of the sales subsidiary during
the period here involved received dividends aggregating
$1,240,000.00.
Plaintiff maintained a subordinate administrative
office in the Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, supervising generally the operations of its Western Mining
Divisions and supervising more particularly operations
of its Utah Division. The Utah Division had approximately 5,000 employees. Plaintiff owned and operated
by virtue of its franchise from the State of Utah large
and extensive properties, which include mines, mills,
improvements, equipment and machinery, town sites,
power plants, dumps, tailing ponds, etc. Real estate
owned is about 30,000 acres.
The copper mill concentrates produced by the Utah
Division were smelted by A. S. & E. on a toll or cost-plus
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a fixed fee basis. The smelting charge was on the
basis of cost plus $1.35 per ton of dry product for the
period up to January 1, 1948, such fee being reduced to
cost plus $1.00 per ton for the period 1948 to 1952 and
being reduced further to cost plus 85c per ton beginning
January 1, 1953. The smelting facilities of A. S. & E.
in Utah are substantially all dedicated to the smelting
of plaintiff's concentrates, there being no other substantial production of high grade copper ores or concentrates
in the area, Payments by plaintiff to A. S, & E. are called
for convenience "Smelting Charge," "Freight Charge,"
"Lighterage Charge," "Eefining Charge," and certain
amortization charges covering costs of plant improvements payable monthly. The freight charge represents
the reimbursements to A. S. & E. of freight paid by
A. S. & E. on Utah blister shipped from A. S. & E.'s Garfield smelter to its Baltimore, or other refinery, including insurance. The lighterage charge covers certain
charges in connection with movements of Utah blister to
the Baltimore Eef inery by water. On shipping the blister
to its Baltimore Refinery the bills of lading are stamped
by A. S. & E. with plaintiff's name and plaintiff is shown
as both shipper and consignee.
Upon receipt of the blister at the refinery, the gold,
silver, platinum and palladium are separated from the
copper by electrolytic means. A. S. & E. charges plaintiff a refining charge equal to cost plus a fee of $1.50 per
ton of returnable refined copper.
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By arrangements between plaintiff, its sales subsidiary and A. S. & B., all copper is made available to
the sales subsidiary for sale to customers by the latter
in the regular course of its own business and in its own
name and behalf. (See F. page 71, for form of contract
of sale.) The platinum and palladium are transferred by
plaintiff to A. S. & E, for sale by the latter for plaintiff's
account at the best price obtainable less an agreed commission not exceeding $5.00 per ounce and certain other
costs and expenses (See F., page 79). Such proceeds
realized by A. S. & B. of such prices are periodically paid
by A. S. & E. to plaintiff covering the production of
platinum and palladium. The gold and silver are transferred by plaintiff to A. S. & E. for resale by the latter
to the Mint. The amounts paid for such gold and silver
are determined under a formula tied into the official Mint
prices less certain agreed deductions. (See F., page 93.)
During the month of May, 1950, for example, $908,416.12
of Utah gold and silver were transferred by plaintiff
to A. S. & E. for $901,185.25, A. S. & E. thus realizing a
net gain on the month's transaction of $7,230.84, or
roughly eight-tenths of one percent.
Thus, under the arrangements described in the
record and set forth in the Findings, plaintiff transfers
all platinum and palladium and gold and silver to A. S.
& E. for resale by the latter in the regular course of
the latter's business. Such intercompany transfers from
plaintiff's Utah Division to A. S. & E. are at fair and
reasonable prices. Also, all copper and molybdenite proDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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duced by plaintiff's Utah Division are transferred to the
sales subsidiary for resale by the latter in its own name
and behalf and in the regular course of its own business.
The amounts paid by the sales subsidiary to plaintiff
for copper and molybdenite produced by the Utah Division under the intercompany contracts in force were fair
and reasonable. 25 per cent of the copper produced by the
Utah Division was in turn resold by the sales subsidiary
at fair market prices to the fabricating subsidiaries,
Chase Brass and Copper Company and Kennecott Wire
and Cable Company. Neither the sales subsidiary nor the
fabricating subsidiaries have done nor have they been
qualified to do business in the State of Utah. The sales
and fabricating subsidiaries file separate Federal income
tax returns.
Plaintiff in filing its Utah corporation franchise tax
return ignored the separate corporate entity of the sales
subsidiary and the intercompany contractual arrangements in force between plaintiff and its sales subsidiary.
Although the separate books of account of the Utah
Division reflected the regular and systematic deduction
of the full amount of commissions paid to the sales subsidiary, in filing its Utah returns such commissions were
added back for tax purposes into the net income of the
Utah Division. In lieu of such commissions actually
paid, there were deducted instead amounts which were
estimated to have been the expenses incurred by the
sales subsidiary in selling the copper and molybdenite
produced by the Utah Division. This 'adjustment' was at
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variance with the regular practice followed and maintained in keeping the separate books of account of the
Utah Division. It was apparently done in an effort to
put plaintiff in a better argumentative position to claim
that the out-of-state sales of copper and molybdenite were
negotiated and effected by plaintiff itself instead of by
the sales subsidiary as was actually the case.
The Utah tax returns as filed for the years 1942 to
1948, inclusive, purported to be and were consolidated
returns of plaintiff's Utah Division and plaintiff's wholly
owned subsidiary, Bingham and Garfield Eailway Company. The returns from 1949 to 1950, because of the
dissolution of the railway company in 1948, purported to
be and were the separate return of plaintiff's Utah Division. None of the returns for the period here involved
were or purported to be, nor could they be, consolidated
returns of plaintiff's Utah Division, the separate sales
subsidiary or the separate fabricating subsidiaries.
Neither the sales or fabricating subsidiaries have done
or qualified to do business in Utah. The Utah Division's
proportionate share of the New York administrative expense was deducted as expense on the Utah Division's
separate books of account. Such expense was also deducted on its Utah tax returns and allowed by defendant
The separate corporate entity of the sales subsidiary
and the intercompany contract between plaintiff and
sales subsidiary covering the transfer of copper and
molybdenite, were not recognized or given any force or
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effect on the Utah tax returns. This was done notwithstanding the copper and molybdenite products of the
Utah Division were transferred to the sales subsidiary
at a fair value (market price less fair and reasonable
commissions and certain expenses).
The only out-of-state activity with respect to the
molybdenite produced and fully marketable in Utah, was
the out-of-state sale by the sales subsidiary. The only
out-of-state activity with respect to the blister copper,
produced entirely in Utah, was the out-of-state sale of
the refined copper by the sales subsidiary following the
out-of-state separation by A. S. & K. of the commingled
gold, silver, platinum and palladium. This out-of-state
separation by A. S. & R. of the products commingled in
the blister copper merely constituted out-of-state processing of products in transit to market. The out-of-state
business of separating the commingled products was the
business of A. S. & R. done for but not by plaintiff or its
Utah Division. This out-of-state refining or separation
expense including freight, was deducted as expense on
the Utah divisional accounts and was deducted and
allowed also on the Utah tax returns.
As in the case of the copper and molybdenite product
transferred to the sales subsidiary at a fair value for
resale, the gold, silver, platinum and palladium products
were transferred to A. S. & R. also at a fair value for
resale. Thus, the entire product, consisting of copper,
molybdenite, gold, silver, platinum and palladium produced by plaintiff's Utah Division, was transferred to
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the sales subsidiary and A. S. & E. at fair value for resale
by and in the name of and in behalf of and in the regular
course of business of the sales subsidiary and A. S. & E.
The full amount of the gross proceeds as collected by
plaintiff from the sales subsidiary and A. S. & E. was
credited on the separate accounts as gross income of the
Utah division. Such gross proceeds less the out-of-state
freight, refining, administrative and selling expense
properly reflect the fair market value of the molybdenite
and blister copper produced in Utah by the Utah Division prior to departure from the State destined for outof-state markets in inter-state commerce. Such proceeds
less all of the mining, milling, freight and smelting expenses within the state and the freight, refining, administrative, and selling expenses outside the state (together
with other deductions allowed by the statute) constitute
and reflect the separate taxable net income of the Utah
Division. Such net income attributable entirely to business done within the state reflects the value to plaintiff of
exercising its corporate franchise in Utah.
The transfer of 25 per cent of the copper produced
by the Utah Division from plaintiff to the sales subsidiary at a fair value and from the sales subsidiary to the
fabricating subsidiaries at a fair value must also be
classed as arms' length transactions. The separate entity
and intercompany arrangements between plaintiff and
sales subsidiary are to be recognized to the same extent
as plaintiff, on its returns, recognized the separate entity
and arrangements with the fabricating subsidiaries. The
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profits allocated by intercompany contracts between producer, seller and fabricator reflect the profits and true
net income of each.
Each of the Western Divisions, including the Utah
Division, is a separate department or unit to itself. Each
is engaged in the integrated business of mining, smelting
and refining of copper and other products. Each is a
producing unit. Neither plaintiff nor any of these divisions, however, undertakes to sell the products. The
operation is a unity up to but not including the sale. The
sales are handled by A. S. & R. and the sales subsidiary,
separate and distinct corporations from plaintiff and its
producing units. Production is in one compartment, sales
in another compartment and fabrication in still another
compartment. Each compartment has been separately
incorporated and represents an independent function.
The separate accounts for each function reflect the
proper net income attributable to each function. The
compartments deal with each other a t arms' length and
on fair and reasonable terms.
Plaintiff in this proceeding makes no claim that any
p a r t of the full net income shown and reflected on its
Utah Division separate accounts would be or is taxable
as business done or earned in New York or any other
state or foreign country.
QUESTIONS P R E S E N T E D
On pages 2 to 4 of its brief, plaintiff sets forth five
questions which it feels are presented to the Court on
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this appeal. Defendant raises no objection to the form
of questions 2, 4 and 5. Question 2 is whether the taxes
imposed are constitutional. Question 4 is whether defendant is required for the year 1942 to use the arbitrary
allocation factor of 66.926 per cent under the Court's
mandate in Case No. 7298. Question 5 is whether defendant is empowered to assess statutory interest on any
deficiencies to be found herein as a result of this appeal.
Objection is taken, however, to the phrasing of question 3 relating to the depletion deduction. Plaintiff states
the question to be whether the term "net income from
the property" means the net income derived from the
sale of the mineral production obtained from the property, less all costs and expenses incurred in the production and sale of such products. This may have been the
question in Case No. 7298 but it is not the question now.
The question now is whether in allocating some net
income to post-mining operations in the calculation of the
depletion deduction, as required in the next to the last
paragraph of this Court's opinion in Case No. 7298,
defendant allocated too much or too little or just the
right amount of net income. On the other hand, if we construe the question as a petition for rehearing for the
year 1942 and as a request to relitigate the issue for subsequent years, the question as phrased is still objectionable in that it refers to the matter as a sale of "mineral
production." Except for the molybdenite mineral mill
concentrate, plaintiff sells none of its crude ore or mill
concentrates which is the "mineral" production. The
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thing sold is not the mineral mined but the metals extracted from the mineral in the post-mining smelting and
electrolytic refining stages. Mineral is associated with
mining and metal with the post-mining operations. As
this Court has already decided, depletion is on the
mineral, not on the metal.
Objection is also taken to the phrasing of question 1
which seeks to limit the question on appeal here to
whether defendant may attribute to Utah as the amount
of plaintiff's gross receipts from business assignable to
Utah the gross receipts from sales of copper, molybdenite, platinum and palladium produced by its Utah Copper Division and sold outside of Utah. This question as
phrased is merely one aspect of the larger question
involved here of whether defendant's decision on the law
and the facts has imposed a tax which is too low, too high
or in the right amount. The case is here for an overall
appraisal and plaintiff cannot, it is suggested, accept the
favorable rulings on the property and payroll fractions
and exclusion of receipts from gold and silver and then
isolate for attack what defendant did with respect to the
copper, molybdenite, platinum and palladium. The decision of the Commission must be reviewed as a whole.
Also involved is whether this court is required under the
facts and pertinent authorities to modify defendant's
decision by imposing the tax on the full net income of the
U t a h Division as reflected on the separate accounts of
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such division. In other words, the lawfulness of the whole
decision is here, not just the portion plaintiff wishes to
contest.
We take up the case from the standpoint, first, of
the constitutionality of a franchise tax measured by the
fair value of the molybdenite and blister copper product
produced in Utah but sold outside the state, second,
whether any net income of the Utah Division may be
apportioned outside the state, third, whether if some
must be apportioned outside the state, defendant's decision is erroneous, fourth, whether defendant's depletion
values were arbitrary, fifth, whether for 1942 this Court's
decision in No. 7298 requires the apportionment of 33.074
per cent of the net income of the Utah Division outside
the state and finally, sixth, whether the assessment of
interest on deficiencies is proper.
STATUTES INVOLVED
Eeferences are to Utah Code Annotated, 1943, as
amended.
80-13-1

(2)

"The term 'taxpayer* means any bank or
corporation as hereinafter defined subject to the
tax imposed by this chapter."
80-13-1

(5)

"The term 'doing business' includes any
transaction or transactions in the course of its
business by a bank or corporation created under
the laws of this state, or by a foreign corporation
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qualified to do or doing intrastate business in this
state, and shall include the right to do business
through such incorporation or qualification."
80-13-3
"Every bank or corporation, other than a
national bank and corporation exempted in Section 80-13-5, for the privilege of exercising its
corporate franchise or for the privilege of doing
business in the state, shall annually pay to the
state a tax equal to three per cent of its net income
for the preceding taxable year computed and allocated to this state in the manner hereinafter provided, or one-twentieth of one per cent of the fair
value during the next preceding taxable year of
its tangible property in this state, which ever is
greater; but in no case shall the tax be less than
$10;***."
80-13-6 (1)
" 'Gross income' includes gains, profits and
income derived from services, of whatever kind in
whatever form paid, or from trades, businesses,
commerce or sales, or dealings in
property,
whether real or personal, growing out of the
ownership or use of or interest in such property;
also from interest, rent, dividends or securities,
or the transaction of any business carried on for
gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever."
80-13-8 {9) {b)
"The allowance for depletion shall be thirtythree and one-third per cent of the net income
from the property during the taxable year, computed without allowance for depletion, or on the
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payer may elect. The basis which the taxpayer
elects under this subsection shall be the basis
used in subsequent accounting periods and shall
be changed thereafter only with the consent of
the tax commission."
80-13-16

(1)

"The net income shall be computed upon the
basis of the taxpayer's annual accounting period
(fiscal year or calendar year as the case may be)
in accordance with the method of accounting
regularly employed in keeping the boohs of such
taxpayer; but if no such method of accounting has
been so employed, or if the method employed does
not clearly reflect the income, the computation
shall be made in accordance with such method as
in the opinion of the tax commission does clearly
reflect the income. If the taxpayer's annual accounting period is other than a fiscal year, or if
the taxpayer has no annual accounting period or
does not keep books, the net income shall be computed on the basis of the calendar year."
80-13-18

"In any case of two or more corporations
{whether or not organized or doing business in
this state, and whether or not affiliated) owned or
controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the tax commission is authorized to distribute, apportion or allocate gross income or deductions between or among such corporation, if it
determines that such distribution, apportionment
or allocation is necessary in order to prevent
evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income
of any of such corporations."
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80-13-21

"The portion of net income assignable to
business done within this state, and which shall
be the basis and measure of the tax imposed by
this chapter, may be determined by an allocation
upon the basis of the following rules:
(1) Rents, interest and dividends derived
from business done outside this state less related
expenses shall not be allocated to this state.
(2) Gains from the sale or exchange of
capital assets consisting of real or tangible personal property situated outside this state less
losses from the sale or exchange of such assets
situated outside this state shall not be allocated
to this state.
(3) Rents, interest and dividends derived
from business done in this state less related expenses shall be allocated to this state.
(4) Gains from the sale or exchange of
capital assets consisting of real or tangible personal property situated within this state less
losses from the sale or exchange of such assets
situated in this state shall be allocated to this
state.
(5) If the bank or other corporation carries
on no business outside this state, the whole of the
remainder of net income may be allocated to this
state.
(6) If the bank or other corporation carries
on any business outside this state, the said remainder may be divided into three equal parts:
(a) Of one third, such portion shall be attributed to business carried on within this state
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as shall be found by multiplying said third by a
fraction whose numerator is the value of the corporation's tangible property situated within this
state and whose denominator is the value of all
the corporation's tangible property wherever
situated.
(b) Of another third, such portion shall
be attributed to business carried on within this
state as shall be found by multiplying said third
by a fraction whose numerator is the total amount
expended by the corporation for wages, salaries,
commissions or other compensation to its employees and assignable to this state and whose
denominator is the total expenditures of the corporation for wages, salaries, commissions or other
compensation to all of its employees.
(c) Of the remaining third, such portion
shall be attributed to business carried on within
this state as shall be found by multiplying said
third by a fraction whose numerator is the amount
of the corporation's gross receipts from business
assignable to this state, and whose denominator
is the amount of the corporation's gross receipts
from all its business.
(d) The amount assignable to this state
of expenditures of the corporation for wages,
salaries, commissions or other compensation to its
employees shall be such expenditures for the taxable year as represents the compensation of employees not chiefly situated at, connected with or
sent out from, premises for the transaction of
business owned or rented by the corporation outside this state.
(e) The amount of the corporation's gross
receipts from business assignable to this state
shall be the amount of its gross receipts for the
taxable year from
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(1st) Sales, except those negotiated or
effected in behalf of the corporation by agents or
agencies chiefly situated at, connected with or
sent out from premises for the transaction of
business owned or rented by the corporation outside this state, and sales otherwise determined by
the tax commission to be attributable to the business conducted on such premises,
(2nd) Kentals or royalties from property
situated, or from the use of patents, within this
state.
(f) The value of the corporation's tangible property for the purpose of this section shall
be the average value of such property during the
taxable year.
(7) In the allocation of net income, gain or
loss shall be recognized and shall be computed on
the same basis and in the same manner as is provided in this chapter for the determination of net
income.
(8) If in the judgment of the tax commission the application of the foregoing rules does
not allocate to this state the proportion of net
income fairly and equitably attributable to this
state, it may with such information as it may be
able to obtain make such allocation as is fairly
calculated to assign to this state the portion of net
income reasonably attributable to the business
done within this state and to avoid subjecting the
taxpayer to double taxation,
80-13-23

(1)

"Every corporation subject to taxation under
this chapter shall make a return, stating specifically the items of its gross income and the deducDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tions allowed by this chapter. The return shall be
sworn to by the president, vice president or other
principal officer and by the treasurer or assistant
treasurer. * * # "
80-13-24
(1) "An affiliated group of banks and/or
other corporations shall, subject to the provisions
of this section, have the privilege of making a consolidated return for any taxable year in lieu of
separate returns. The making of a consolidated
return shall be upon the condition that all the
corporations which have been members of the
affiliated group at any time during the taxable
year for which the return is made consent to all
the regulations under subsection (2) of this section prescribed prior to the making of such return; and the making of a consolidated return
shall be considered as such consent. In the case
of a bank or other corporation which is a member
of the affiliated group for a fractional part of
the year, the consolidated return shall include the
income of such bank and/or other corporation
for such part of the year as it is a member of
the affiliated group.
(2) "The tax commission shall prescribe
such regulations as it may deem necessary in
order that the tax liability of an affiliated group
of banks and/or corporations making a consolidated return and of each corporation in the group,
both during and after the period of affiliation,
may be determined, computed, assessed, collected
and adjusted in such manner as clearly to reflect
the income and to prevent avoidance of tax liability.
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(3) "In any case m which a consolidated
return is made the tax shall be determined, computed, assessed, collected and adjusted in accordance with the regulations under subsection (2) of
this section prescribed prior to the date on which
such return is made."
80-13-39
"The tax commission shall have
jurisdiction
to redetermine the correct amount of the deficiency even if the amount so redetermined
is
greater than the amount of the deficiency, notice
of which has been mailed to the taxpayer, and to
determine whether any penalty, additional amount
or addition to the tax should be assessed; provided, that at the hearing or prior thereto claim
therefor is asserted"
80-13-46
"Every decision of the tax commission shall
be in writing, and notice thereof shall be mailed
to the taxpayer within ten days, and all such
decisions shall become final upon the expiration
of thirty days after notice of such decision shall
have been mailed to the taxpayer, unless proceedmgs are thereafter taken for review by the supreme court upon writ of certiorari as hereinafter provided, in which case it shall become final,
(1) when affirmed or modified by the judgment
of the supreme court; (2) if the supreme court
remands the case to the tax commission for rehearing, when it is thereafter determined as hereinabove provided with respect to the initial proceedings"
80-13-47
"Within thirty days after notice of any decision of the tax commission, any party affected
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thereby may apply to the supreme court for a
writ of certiorari or review for the purpose of
having the lawfulness of such decision inquired
into and determined. Such writ shall be made
returnable not later than thirty days after the
date of the issuance thereof, and shall direct the
tax commission to certify its record, which shall
include all the proceedings and the evidence taken
in the case, to the court. Upon the hearing no
new or additional evidence may be introduced, but
the cause shall be heard on the record before the
tax commission as certified to by it. The decision
of the tax commission may be reviewed both upon
the law and the facts, and the provisions of the
code of civil procedure relating to proceedings
in the supreme court shall, so far as applicable
and not in conflict with this chapter, apply to the
proceedings in the supreme court under the provisions of this section"
80-13-48
"No court of this state, except the supreme
court, shall have jurisdiction to review, reverse
or annul any decision of the tax commission, or to
suspend or delay the operation or execution thereof."
80-13-58
"Upon making a record of its reasons therefor, the tax commission shall have the power, in
its discretion, to waive or reduce any of the penalties or interest provided in this chapter or to
compromise the same."
80-13-63
"Any person who attempts or purports to
exercise any of the rights, privileges or powers of
any such domestic corporation, or who transacts
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or attempts to transact any intrastate business in
this state in behalf of any such foreign corporation, is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be
punished by a fine of not less than $250 and not
exceeding $1,000, or by imprisonment in the
county jail not less than fifty days or more than
five hundred days, or by both such fine and imprisonment. Jurisdiction of such offense shall be
held to be in any county in which any part of such
attempted exercise of such powers, or any p a r t
of such transaction of business, occurred. Every
contract made in violation of this section is" unenforceable by such corporation or person."
Regulation

No. 4

Article 2 (b)
"The term 'affiliated group' includes the common parent corporation and every other corporation for the period during which such corporation
is a member of the affiliated group within the
meaning of section 80-13-24 (4) of the Act; but it
does not include any corporation which is not
subject to tax under the Act, nor does it include
a corporation commencing to do business in this
state for the period which is the basis of computing its first and second years' taxes under section
80-13-22."
Article 10 (a)
"The privilege of making a consolidated return for any taxable year of the affiliated group
must be exercised at the time of filing the return
of the parent corporation. Under no circumstances can such privilege be exercised at any time
thereafter, If the privilege is exercised, separate
returns cannot thereafter be filed for such year
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(see, however, Article 16 (b), relating to the improper inclusion in the consolidated return of the
income of a corporation)."
Article 12 (Jo)
"Each of the subsidiary corporations must
prepare two duplicate originals of Form 22, consenting to these regulations and authorizing the
filing of a consolidated return on its behalf for
the taxable year and authorizing the filing of a
consolidated return on its behalf (as long as it
remains a member of the group) for each year
thereafter for which, under Article 11, the filing
of a consolidated return is required. One of such
forms shall be attached to the consolidated return
as a part thereof and the other shall be filed, at
or before the time the consolidated return is filed.
No such consent can be withdrawn or revoked at
any time after the consolidated return is filed."
Article 16 (b)
"If a consolidated return includes a corporation not a member of the affiliated group as defined herein during the consolidated return period, the tax liability of such corporation will be
determined upon the basis of a separate return.
If a corporation commencing to do business in
this state has been included in a consolidated
return, its liability will be separately computed
in accordance with sections 80-13-22 of the Act.
(See Article 2 (b) ). The consolidated return shall
be considered as including only the corporations
which were members of the affiliated group during such period, and the income and deductions
of the corporation whose liability is separately
computed shall be entirely excluded in arriving at
the consolidated net income of the affiliated group
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for the consolidated return period (See Article
31 (a) ). Transactions with the excluded subsidiary for the consolidated return period shall
not be considered as 'intercompany transactions'
within the meaning of the regulation."
AEGUMENT
POINT NO. I
A STATE MAY CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPOSE A FRANCHISE OR OCCUPATION TAX ON THE PRIVILEGE OF DOING A LOCAL BUSINESS MEASURED BY THE GROSS OR
NET VALUE OF THE GOODS PRODUCED WITHIN THE
STATE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT ALL OR SUBSTANTIALLY ALL OF SUCH GOODS ARE SHIPPED AND SOLD
OUT OF THE STATE IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

The question whether a state in the imposition of a
tax has imposed a burden on interstate commerce and
denied the taxpayer equal protection and due process
of law, in contravention of the Federal constitution, has
come before the Courts in a great variety of situations.
The cases involve many different types and kinds of
taxes such as ad valorem general property taxes, sales
taxes, use taxes, gross receipts taxes, capital stock taxes,
corporate net income taxes, excise, franchise, privilege
or occupation taxes, etc. The cases also involve many
different types and kinds of businesses such as merchandising concerns, banks, finance companies, manufacturing
establishments, pipe lines, air lines, railroads, ferries,
mining companies, telegraph and telephone companies,
etc., etc. We also see the cases involving situations in
which the company may be engaged exclusively in inter-
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state commerce or, on the other hand, doing some local
business in addition to its interstate business. In these
circumstances, to prevent the discussion from wandering
into fields not pertinent to the issue here, we refer the
Court to those cases involving primarily the question of
production within and sale outside the state, involving
also an occupation tax or a franchise tax measure by
value of or the net income from the products produced
within the state and the extent to which an apportionment
of the value or net income within and without the state
is necessary to meet the requirements of both the commerce and due process clauses of the constitution.
Plaintiff makes no suggestion that Utah's corporation franchise tax law is unconstitutional as it stands
in the books. The claim is merely that the statute as applied to plaintiff is unconstitutional. The deficiencies
in tax are first claimed to be invalid by reason of defendant's erroneous construction of the statute and that the
statute as so construed is unconstitutional. Secondly, it
is claimed in the petition that plaintiff's mining and
natural resources business in Utah is exclusively an
interstate business and that any tax, including the tax
already paid, is invalid. A refund of $3,205,443.06, together with interest as provided by law, is requested
as an overpayment.
The definition of "doing business" in the Utah statute refers to the qualification to do or the doing of intranstate business by a foreign corporation. (Sec. 80-13-1(5)
U.C.A. 1943). The penalties of suspension or forfeiture
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of corporate rights prescribed in Sec. 80-13-62 refer to the
forfeiture of rights to do intrastate business. The misdemeanor prescribed in Sec. 80-13-63 refers to the transaction of or the attempt to transact intrastate business
in this state.
Sec. 80-13-3 prescribes that every corporation "for
the privilege of exercising its corporate franchise or for
the privilege of doing business in the state, shall annually pay to the state a tax equal to three per cent of its net
income for the preceding taxable year computed and allocated to this state in the manner hereinafter provided,
or one-twentieth of one per cent of the fair value during
the next preceding taxable year of its tangible property
in this state, whichever is greater; but in no case shall
the tax be less than $ 1 0 ; . . . "
The tax has been construed by this Court to be not
a property tax, nor an organization tax, nor an income
tax, but a tax on the privilege of exercising the corporate privilege.
"The net income of the taxpaying corporation to be allocated to Utah is merely the measure of the amount of the tax. The tax is imposed
on the privilege of exercising the corporate franchise or on the privilege of doing business in
Utah." American Investment Corp. v. Commission, 101 Utah 189 (1941).
"The more net income realized from doing
business in Utah, the more valuable the privilege
and the higher the tax." J. M. & M. S. Browning
Co. v. Commission, 107 Utah 457 (1945).
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"Though not an income tax, the amount of
the franchise tax a corporation must pay in Utah
is based on the income yielded from exercising
the privilege of doing business or exercising the
corporation franchise in Utah." Emerald Oil Co.
v. Commission, 267 P. 2d 772 (1954).
The minimum tax of $10 is thus payable where the
net income is less than $333 and the fair value of tangible
property in the State is less than $20,000. The statute
by its terms and as construed and administered by defendant does not purport to impose a tax on the privilege
of conducting an exclusive interstate commerce business.
Plaintiff, a New York corporation, is qualified in
Utah to do an intrastate business. Whether this privilege
alone, even if not exercised, would support a tax measured by some portion of its receipts exclusively derived
from interstate commerce but fairly allocated to the
business done within the State is not involved here. Plaintiff's returns show the difficulty of owning and operating
properties of the size and magnitude owned and operated
in Utah without engaging in some local business even
were we to assume that its mining and metal activities
are exclusively interstate commerce. Each of plaintiff's
returns assign some net income or loss specifically to
business done within Utah before attempting to allocate
the bulk of the Utah Division's net income within and
without the State under its interpretation of the formula.
(See T.C. Ex. MMM(2), and Line 2, Schedule F.,
page 193.) However, it is unnecessary to rest the
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validity of a franchise tax on plaintiff on the fact that
it has the privilege and in fact does some local intrastate
business consisting of holding and managing mining
properties and collecting royalties therefrom or selling
locally various miscellaneous items of property or that
the Bingham and Garfield Eailway Company under the
consolidated returns may have been engaged in some
local intrastate commerce.
The validity of a franchise tax on plaintiff in this
proceeding rests squarely and solidly on the simple proposition that mining or manufacturing within the state
is not interstate commerce. It is local commerce. Interstate commerce commences only when, after the manufacture or production of the molybdenite and blistercopper in Utah, the products are loaded on cars for shipment and sale out-of-state. Local manufacture is intrastate commerce. A state may tax the privilege of engaging in local manufacture even though the entire product
is subsequently sold out-of-state in interstate commerce.
Furthermore, a state may impose a tax on the privilege
of local manufacture measured by the full value of the
product within the state and even though such value is
measured by the actual cash receipts from sales outside
the state. We take up at this point the development of
this doctrine by the Federal Supreme Court,
American Manufacturing Company v. St. Louis, 250
U.S. 459 (1919), upheld, as applied to a foreign West
Virginia corporation, an ordinance of the City of St.
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Louis imposing a license tax on the privilege of conducting a manufacturing business in the city measured by the
amount of sales of the manufactured goods, whether sold
within or without the state and whether in domestic or
interstate commerce. The tax was in addition to the ad
valorem property tax and was at the rate of $1.00 on each
$1,000 of sales made. Suit was brought by the taxpayer
against the city to recover so much of the tax as was
measured by sales of goods manufactured by the taxpayer in the city afterwards removed to storage warehouses outside of the state and later sold from these
warehouses to purchasers in states other than Missouri.
The opinion quotes from the opinion of the State Supreme Court as follows:
"We hold that the tax in question is a tax
upon the privilege of pursuing the business of
manufacturing these goods in the City of St,
Louis; that when the goods were manufactured
the obligation accrued to pay the amount of the
tax represented by their production and it should
be liquidated by their sale by the manufacturer;
that their removal from the City of St. Louis and
storage elsewhere, whether within or without the
state, worked no change in this obligation; that
their sale by the respondent wherever they may
have been stored at the time, whether it was done
through its home office in New York or the office
of its factory in St. Louis, should have been reported in its return to the license collector of the
City of St. Louis and the amount included in fixing the amount payable on account of its license
tax."
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The opinion of the Court by Mr. Justice Pitney then
states:
"The admitted facts show that the operation
and effect of the taxing scheme now under consideration are correctly described in what we
have quoted from the opinion of the state court.
No tax has been or is to be imposed upon any sales
of goods by plaintiff in error except goods manufactured by it in St. Louis under a license conditioned for the payment of a tax upon the amount
of the sales when the goods should come to be sold.
The tax is computed according to the amount of
the sales of such manufactured goods, irrespective of whether they be sold within or without
the State, in one kind of commerce or another;
and payment of the tax is not made a condition of
selling goods in interstate or in other commerce,
but only of continuing the manufacture of goods
in the City of St. Louis.
"There is no doubt of the power of the State,
or of the city acting under its authority t o impose
a license tax in the nature of an excise upon the
conduct of manufacturing business in the city.
Unless some particular interference with federal
right be shown, the States are free to lay privilege
and occupation taxes. (Citing cases.)
"The city might have measured such tax by a
percentage upon the value of all goods manufactured, whether they ever should come to be sold
or not, and have required payment as soon as,
or even before, the goods left the factory. I n
order to mitigate the burden, and also, perhaps
to bring merchants and manufacturers upon an
equal footing in this regard, it has postponed ascertainment and payment of the tax until the
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manufacturer can bring the goods into market.
A somewhat similar method of postponing payment has been pursued for many years by the
Federal Government with respect to the internal
revenue tax upon distilled spirts. (Citing cases.)
"To the suggestion that the tax burdens the
mercantile rather than the manufacturing business, because it would be possible for one to manufacture goods to an unlimited extent and pay no
tax unless they were sold, or to sell goods and be
required to pay the tax although they were not
manufactured by the seller, it is sufficient to say
—answering the second point first—(a) that, according to the state law as laid down by the court
of last resort in this case, a manufacturer has no
right to sell goods except those of his own manufacture; and (b) it is not to be supposed that, for
the purpose of evading a tax payable only upon
the sale of his goods, a manufacturer would pursue the ruinous policy of making goods and looking them up permanently in warehouses. In the
outcome the tax is the same in amount as if it
were measured by the sale value of the goods
but imposed upon the completion of their manufacture. The difference is that, for reasons of
practical benefit to the taxpayer, the city has postponed payment until convenient means have been
furnished through the marketing of goods.
"In our opinion, the operation and effect of
the taxing ordinance are to impose a legitimate
burden upon the business of carrying on the manufacture of goods in the city; it produces no direct
burden on commerce in the goods manufactured,
whether domestic or interstate, and only the same
kind of incidental and indirect effect as that which
results from the payment of property taxes or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

68
any other and general contribution to the cost of
government. Therefore, it does not amount to a
regulation of interstate commerce. And, for like
reasons, it has not the effect of imposing a tax
upon the property or the business and hence does
not deprive plaintiff in error of its property without due process of law."
In the Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Company case,
260 U.S. 245 (1922), the Supreme Court in an opinion
by Mr. Justice McKenna upheld a tax imposed by Pennsylvania on each ton of anthracite coal mined "washed
or screened, or otherwise prepared for market," in Pennsylvania equal to "one and one-half per cent of the value
thereof when prepared for market." The statute also
provided that the tax should be assessed at the time when
the coal had been subjected to the indicated preparation
"and is ready for shipment or market."
The opinion refers to the assertion that the bulk of
the anthracite production, or 80 per cent, was shipped
into other states. The Governor of the state was quoted
as having urged the tax because in effect the tax would
be borne by consumers in other states. The Attorneys
Generals of nine consuming states appeared before the
court in an attempt to have the tax declared illegal and
an attempt to regulate interstate commerce. In sustaining the tax the Court stated as follows:
"If the possibility, or indeed, certainty, of
exportation of a product or article from a state,
determines it to be in interstate commerce before
the commencement of its movement from the state,
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it would seem to follow that it is in such commerce
from the instant of its growth or production; and
in the case of coals, as they lie in the ground. The
result would be curious. I t would nationalize all
industries; it would nationalize and withdraw
from state jurisdiction and deliver to Federal
commercial control the fruits of California and
the South, the wheat of the West and its meats,
the cotton of the South, the shoes of Massachusetts
and the woolen industries of other states at the
very inception of their production or growth; that
is, the fruits unpicked, the cotton and wheat ungathered, hides and flesh of cattle yet 'on the
hoof/ wool yet unshorn, and coal yet unmined,
because they are, in varying percentages, destined
for and surely to be exported to states other than
those of their production."
The decision of the Court was placed mainly on the
old decision in Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517, which had held
that timber cut in the forests but intended for exportation
in interstate commerce and partially prepared for that
purpose was nevertheless subject to tax like other property within the state.
In Oliver Iron Mining Company v. Lord, 262 U.S.
172 (1923), the Supreme Court sustained, in the face of
strong constitutional attack, the validity of a tax imposed
by Minnesota on all who are "engaged in the business
of mining or producing iron ore or other ores" within
the state. The statute provided that the "occupation tax"
so imposed should be equal to 6% of the value of the ore
mined or produced during the preceding year, such tax
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to be in addition to all other taxes. The statute likewise
directed that the tax be computed on the value of the ore
at the place where it is "brought to the surface of the
earth" less certain deductions. The opinion by Mr. Justice VanDevanter states:
"The chief contention is that mining, as conducted by the plaintiffs, if not actually a part of
interstate commerce, is so closely connected therewith that to tax it is to burden or interfere with
such commerce, which a state cannot do consistently with the commerce clause of the Constitution
of the United States.
"The facts on which the contention rests are
as follows: The demand or market within the
state for iron ore covers only a negligible percentage of what is mined by the plaintiffs. Practically
all of their output is mined to fill existing contracts with consumers outside the state and passes
at once into the channels of interstate commerce.
Three fourths of it is from open-pit mines and
one fourth from underground mines. At the openpit mines empty cars are run from adjacent railroad yards into the mines and there loaded. Steam
shovels sever the ore from its natural bed and lift
it directly into the cars. When loaded the cars
are promptly returned to the railroad yards,
where they are put into trains which start the
ore on its interstate journey. The several steps
follow in such succession that there is practical
continuity of movement from the time the ore is
severed from its natural bed. The operations
within the mine and the movement of the cars into
and out of the mine are conducted by the plaintiffs. The subsequent transportation is by public
carriers. At the underground mines the plaintiffs
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dig the ore, bring it to the surface through shafts,
and put it in elevated pockets where it readily can
be loaded into cars. The subsequent movements
are much the same as at the open-pit mines, but
their continuity is not so pronounced. Some of the
ore from both kinds of mines—between 10 and
20 per cent—is concentrated by washing or beneficiated after coming out of the mine and before
starting out of the state; but our conclusion respecting the usual operations renders this deflection immaterial. Plainly the facts do not support
the contention. Mining is not interstate commerce,
but, like manufacturing is a local business, subject to local regulations and taxation."
In Lacoste v. Department of Conservation, 263 U.S.
545 (1924), the Court sustained a severance tax levied
by Louisiana of 2c "on the dollar on and of the value of
all skins or hides taken from any wild furbearing animals
or alligators within this state, which severance tax shall
be paid by the dealer." The Louisiana statute declared all
wild furbearing animals and alligators in the state and
their skins to be the property of the state until such tax
shall have been paid. A dealer was defined to be one
who buys such skins and hides from either a trapper or
a buyer and ships them from the state or sells them for
manufacture into a finished product in the state or one
who ships or carries them out of the state. The opinion
by Mr. Justice Butler states as follows :
"In their argument here, plaintiffs in error
stated that skins and hides are not manufactured
into finished products in Louisiana, and that all
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

72
jection to the tax. The state's power to tax property is not destroyed by the fact that it is intended
for and will move in interstate commerce. Such
skins and hides may be taxed while in the hands
of dealers before they move in interstate commerce. Failure to levy and enforce the tax before
the skins and hides reach the dealers does not
make the necessary operation and effect of the
law an interference with interstate commerce. The
imposition of the tax on the skins and hides while
in the hands of the dealers is calculated to make
certain that all will be found for taxation. No
interference with interstate commerce results
from the enforcement of the act. It is not repugnant to the commerce clause of the Constitution."
In Hope Natural Gas Company v. Hall, the Court affirmed a decree by the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia, sustaining a tax imposed by West Virginia upon the natural gas produced by the plaintiff based
upon the value thereof within the state and before it
enters interstate commerce. The opinion states that the
chief objection was rested upon the direction of the statute that "the measure of this tax is the value of the entire
production in this state, regardless of the place of sale
or the fact that deliveries may be made to points outside
the state." The trial court had held that the tax would
substantially burden and interfere with interstate commerce and ordered an appropriate injunction. The Supreme Court of the state, however, upheld the tax, stating
that a state may take into consideration the gross proceeds of a commodity produced in the state and sold in
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another state for the purpose of determining the value
of such commodity within the state and before it enters
interstate commerce. The opinion of Mr. Justice McKeynolds states:
"The chief business of plaintiff in error is
production and purchase of natural gas in West
Virginia and the continuous and uninterrupted
transportation of this through pipe lines into
Pennsylvania and Ohio, where it is sold, delivered
and consumed. The corporation owns 3,178 producing wells located in twTenty-five counties of
West Virginia, from which it took in the year ending June 30, 1925, more than 23 billion cubic feet
of gas. And during the same period it purchased
from other producers more than 25 billion cubic
feet. Most of this passed into interstate commerce
by continuous movement from the wells.
"Here it has been argued that the challenged
act burdens interstate commerce and therefore
conflicts with Par. 8, article 1, of the Federal
Constitution. Also, that to enforce the act would
deprive plaintiff in error of property without due
process of law and deny equal protection of the
laws.
"Counsel admit that without violating the
commerce clause the state may lay a privilege or
occupation tax upon producers of natural gas
reckoned according to the value of that commodity
at the well. American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250
U.S. 459, 63 L. ed. 1084, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 522;
Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 67
L. ed. 237, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 83; Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172, 67 L. ed. 929, 43
Sup. Ct. Rep. 526. But they insist that, accepting
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the statute under consideration as construed by
the highest court of the state, plaintiff in error
will be subjected to an unlawful direct tax upon
gross receipts derived from interstate commerce.
This argument rests chiefly upon certain language
excerpted from the opinion below. But we review
the final decree and must accept the statute as
authoritatively construed and applied. The plain
result of the opinion and final decree is to require
that the tax be computed upon the value of the
gas at the well, and not otherwise. If, hereafter,
executive officers disregard the approved construction and fix values upon any improper basis
appropriate relief may be obtained through the
courts."
In Utah Power & Light Company v. Pfost, 286 U.S.
165 (1932), the Court sustained a license tax of one-half
mill per kilowatt hour measured at the place of production levied by the State of Idaho against any person engaged in the generation, manufacture or production of
electricity and electrical energy for barter, sale or exchange, notwithstanding that instantaneously with the
generation of the electricity in Idaho, the power was conveyed by transmission lines across the boundary into
Utah and sold to various consumers.
The issue involved was stated to be a upon the facts
of the present case, is the generation of electrical energy
like manufacture or production generally, a process
essentially local in character and complete in itself;
or is it so linked with the transmission as to make it an
inseparable p a r t of the transaction in interstate comDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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merce!" The court stated that, while conversion and
transmission are substantially instantaneous, they were
essentially separable and distinct operations. I t was said
"The fact that to ordinary observation there is no appreciable lapse of time between the generation of the product and its transmission does not forbid the conclusion
that they are nevertheless successive and not simultaneous acts."
The opinion of Mr. Justice Sutherland also stated:
"The point is stressed that in appellant's system electricity is not stored in advance but produced as called for. The consumer in Utah, it is
said, by merely turning a switch, draws directly
from the water-fall in Idaho, through the generating devices, electrical energy which appears instantaneously at the place of consumption. But
this is not precisely what happens. The effect
of turning the switch in Utah is not to draw electrical energy directly from the water-fall, where
it does not exist except as a potentiality, but to
set in operation the generating appliances in
Idaho, which thereupon receive power from the
falling water and transform it into electrical energy. In response to what in effect is an order,
there is production as well as transmission of a
definite supply of an article of trade."
In Federal

Compress

and Warehouse

Company

v.

McLean, 291 U.S. 17 (1934), the court upheld a Mississippi excise tax against commerce clause objections.
The statute imposed an annual license tax for the privilege of operating a cotton compress graduated according
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to the number of bales of cotton compressed each year.
The statute also levied a similar additional tax upon each
person operating a warehouse whether in conjunction
with a compress or not, graduated according to the storage capacity of the warehouse. In this case it appeared
that cotton purchased locally after it was ginned was
transported to appellant's warehouse for storage and
compression. Upon delivery appellant issued its negotiable warehouse receipts for the cotton. All but a negligible p a r t of the cotton so stored was ultimately shipped
to points outside the state. The opinion by Mr. Justice
Stone states:
"A non-discriminatory tax upon the business
of storing and compressing the cotton, which is not
itself the subject of a movement in interstate commerce, is not forbidden. Most articles, before
their shipment in interstate commerce, have had
work done upon them which adapts them to the
needs of commerce and prepares them for safe
and convenient transportation, but that fact has
never been thought to immunize from local taxation either the articles themselves or those who
have manufactured or otherwise prepared them
for interstate transportation. American Mfg. Co.
v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459, 63 L. ed. 1084, 39 S. Ct.
522; Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 257
U.S. 129, 66 L. ed. 42 S. Ct. 42; Oliver Iron Min.
Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172, 67 L. ed. 929, 43 S. Ct.
526; Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284,
71 L. ed. 1049, 47 S. Ct. 639; Utah Power & Light
Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165, 76 L. ed. 1038, 52 S. Ct.
548. Here the privilege taxed is exercised before
interstate commerce begins, hence the burden of
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the tax upon the commerce is too indirect and remote to transgress constitutional limitations. See
Nashville, C. & St. L. K. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S.
249, 77 L. ed. 730, 53 S. Ct, 345, 87 A.L.E. 1191.
The case, therefore, stands on a footing different
from those in which local regulations of the business of purchasing a commodity within and shipping it without the state have been deemed to impede or embarrass interstate commerce in those
commodities."
In Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Company, 303 U.S. 604 (1938), the Court sustained the validity of a Louisiana statute imposing a privilege tax on the
production of mechanical power as applied to an engine
used to supply mechanical powrer to a compressor thereby increasing the pressure of natural gas for transportation to purchasers in other states. The statute provided
that every person engaged within the state in any business which uses in the conduct of that business electrical
or mechanical power of more than ten horse-power and
does not procure all the power from a taxpayer subject
to sections 1 or 2 of the act "shall be subject to the payment of an excise, license or privilege tax of One Dollar
($1.00) per annum for each horse-power of capacity of
the machinery or apparatus known as the 'prime mover'
or 'prime movers' operated by such person for the purpose of producing power for use in the conduct of such
business or occupation."
The taxpayer was engaged within Louisiana, Arkansas and Texas in the business of producing and buying,
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transporting and selling natural gas. The gas was obtained from the Monroe and Richland Fields in Louisiana
and transported through the taxpayer's twenty inch pipeline which extended from Sterling, Louisiana to Blanchard, Louisiana where one branch went West into Texas
and the other North into Texas and Arkansas up to Little
Rock. 96.6% of the gas through this line during the year
ended July 31, 1933, was delivered outside the State of
Louisiana. Transmission of this gas through the pipeline required application of pressure. This pressure was
supplied by 10 pumps or natural gas compressors directly
connected to 10 4-cylinder 1,000 horse-power Cooper
Bessemer internal combustion gas burning engines. There
were also involved two 250 horse-power gas burning engines for general power service at the station. In upholding the tax, the Court's opinion by Mr. Justice Reed
states:
"The language of the state statute makes it
quite certain that this privilege tax falls alike on
those engaged in interstate or in intrastate commerce, or in both. While a privilege tax by a state
for engaging in interstate business has frequently
met the condemnation of this Court as a regulation of commerce, privilege taxes for 'carrying on
a local business,' even though measured by interstate business, have been sustained. (Citing cases)
The present case falls well within the line of state
tax authority.
"Taxation by the states of the business of interstate commerce is forbidden only because it is
deemed an interference with that commerce, the
uniform regulation of which is necessarily reservDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ed to the Congress. (Citing cases) As this source
of revenue, even if treated in a non-discriminatory
manner, is withdrawn from local reach by inference from the delegated grant, the exempting
of those engaged in interstate commerce from the
taxation others bear should not be extended beyond the necessity of keeping that commerce free
from interference. Consequently, property taxes
on the instrumentalities or net income taxes on the
proceeds of interstate commerce are upheld. (Citing cases).
"Privileges closely connected with the commerce may be regarded as distinct for purposes
of taxation. So, local privilege taxes on storage
in transit, compressing or dealing in cotton, already moving in its interstate journey from plantation to mill, are validated as imposed upon operations in connection with a commodity withdrawn from the transportation movement. (Citing
cases) And similar taxes are upheld for the privilege of mining ores or producing gas, notwithstanding the 'practical continuity' of the taxes productive operation and the interstate movement."
The opinion states further:
"Other factors also show that the tax here
does not interfere with interstate commerce. The
tax is without discrimination in form or application as between inter and intrastate commerce and
it cannot be imposed by more than one state. The
course of interstate commerce is clogged by taxes
designed or applied so as to hamper its free flow.
Section three, however, bearing equally on all use,
is only complementary to the taxes of sections one
and two. (Citing cases) It bears generally on all
use of power and is not discriminatory. It obviDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ously adds to the cost of the interstate commerce.
But increased cost alone is not sufficient to invalidate the tax as an interference with that commerce."
Although Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946),
invalidated the Indiana gross income tax under the commerce clause as applied to the receipt by a person domiciled in the state of the proceeds of a sale of securities
sent out of the state to be sold, the Court's opinion with
respect to the issue involved in the present proceeding
stated as follows:
"This case . . . involves a tax imposed by the
state on the seller on the proceeds of interstate
sales. To extract a fair tithe from interstate commerce for the local protection afforded to it, a
seller state need not impose the kind of tax which
Indiana here levied. As a practical matter, it can
make such commerce pay its way, as the phrase
runs, apart from taxing the very sale. Thus it can
tax local manufacture even if the products are
destined for other states. For some purposes
manufacture and the shipment of products beyond
a state may be looked upon as an integral transaction. But when accommodations must be made between state and national interests, manufacture
within a state though destined for shipment outside is not a seamless web so as to prevent a state
from giving the manufacturing part detached relevance for purposes of local taxation. (Citing
American Mfg. Company and Utah Power &
Light Company cases)."
In International Harvester v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416
(1947), the Court upheld the validity of the Ohio franDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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chise tax upon a foreign corporation doing business in
the state as applied to goods produced within Ohio but
shipped and sold to customers outside the state. The
Ohio statute provided that each foreign corporation authorized to do business in the state must pay a tax or fee
for the "privilege of doing business" or "owning or using
a part or all of its capital or property" or "holding a certificate authorizing it to do business in the state." The
taxpayer corporation held a certificate to do business in
Ohio during the years involved and owned and operated
two large factories at Springfield, Ohio which "produced
millions of dollars worth of goods." It also operated
four branch selling establishments associated with four
warehouses and fourteen retail stores all located at various places in Ohio which stored and sold goods produced
at the Ohio factory. It also appeared that the taxpayer
owned and operated sixteen factories, nearly 100 selling
agencies and numerous retail stores in other states. Goods
produced at these Ohio factories were not only sold in
Ohio, but in addition were shipped for storage out of
Ohio warehouses to be sold by out of Ohio selling agencies
to out of Ohio customers. Some were shipped directly to
out of Ohio customers on orders from out of Ohio selling
agencies. Conversely, goods manufactured by the taxpayer out of Ohio would be shipped to its Ohio warehouses and sold by its Ohio selling agencies to Ohio customers. The taxpayer contended that a tax assessed by
Ohio had been determined in such a manner that a part
of it was for sales made outside Ohio and another part
for interstate sales. These consequences were alleged
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to result from the formula used by Ohio in determining
the amount in value of Ohio manufacturing and sales
as distinguished from interstate and out-of-state sales.
The Ohio statute prescribed a formula to be used in
determining what p a r t of the taxpayer's total capital
stock represents business and property conducted and
located in Ohio. To determine this the total value of the
issued capital stock is divided in half. One-half is then
multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which is the
value of all the taxpayer's Ohio property and the denominator of which is the total value of all its property
wherever owned. The other one-half is multiplied by another fraction whose numerator is the total value of the
"business done" in the state and whose denominator is
country-wide business. The tax rate of 1/10 of 1% is then
applied to the addition of these two products. In the
"business done" numerator the state included as a p a r t
of Ohio business an amount equal to the sales proceeds
of a large p a r t of the goods manufactured at the taxpayer's plants in Ohio no matter where the goods had
been sold or delivered.
In sustaining the tax as assessed by the state of Ohio,
the Court in an opinion by Mr. Justice Black said as follows :
"A part of the measure of the tax is consequently an amount equal to the sales price of
Ohio-manufactured goods sold and delivered to
customers in other states. Appellant contends that
the State has thus taxed sales made outside of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Ohio in violation of the due process clause. A
complete answer to this due process contention
is that Ohio did not tax these sales. Its statute
imposed the franchise tax for the privilege of doing business in Ohio for profit. The State supreme court construed the statute as imposing
the tax on corporations for engaging in business
such as that in which taxpayer engaged. One
branch of that business was manufacturing. I t has
long been established that a state can tax the
business of manufacturing. The fact that it chose
to measure the amount of such a tax by the value
of the goods the factory has produced, whether
of the current or a past year, does not transform
the tax on manufacturers to something else."
The Court stated further:
"Furthermore, this Court has long realized the
practical impossibility of a state's achieving a perfect apportionment of expansive, complex business
activities such as those of appellant, and has declared that 'rough approximation rather than precision' is sufficient. (Citing cases) Unless a palpably disproportionate result comes from an apportionment, a result which makes it patent that the
tax is levied upon interstate commerce rather than
upon an intrastate privilege, this Court has not
been willing to nullify honest state efforts to
make apportionments, (citing cases) A state's
tax law is not to be nullified merely because the
result is achieved through a formula which includes consideration of interstate and out-of-state
transactions in their relation to the intrastate
privilege. Since it has not been demonstrated that
the apportionment here achieves an unfair result,
(citing cases) and since it is assessed only against
the privilege of doing local Ohio business of manuDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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factoring and selling, we do not come to the question, argued by appellant, of possible multiplication of this tax by reason of its imposition by
other states. None of them can tax the privilege
of operating factories and sales agencies in Ohio."
We also invite the Court's attention to the same rule
as declared by the Supreme Court with respect to state
income taxes.
In U.S. Glue Co. v. Town of Wolf Creek, 247 U.S. 321
(1918) the Court sustained the validity of the Wisconsin
income tax law as applied to the net income derived from
goods manufactured within the state but sold and delivered to customers outside the state.
Under the Wisconsin law the net income of a corporation engaged in business within or without the state
(other than certain items specifically assigned to the
state) is taxed under an apportionment formula "under
which the gross business in dollars of the corporation in
the state, added to the value in dollars of its property
in the state, is made the numerator of a fraction of which
the denominator consists of the total gross business in
dollars of the corporation both within and without the
state, added to the value in dollars of its property within and without the state." Under the law the resulting
fraction was taken as representing the proportion of the
income which was deemed to be derived from business
transacted and property located within the state. A controversy before the U. S. Supreme Court involved the inclusion in the numerator of two items designated (b) and
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(c). Item (b) consisted of "$65,000 from goods sold to
customers outside the state and delivered from its factory." Item (c) involved about "$31,000 from goods sold
to customers outside of the state, the sales having been
made and goods shipped from plaintiff's branches in
other states and the goods having been manufactured
at plaintiff's factory and shipped before sale to said
branches."
The court in an opinion by Mr. Justice Pitney said
that "stated concisely, the question is whether a state,
in levying a general income tax upon the gains and
profits of a domestic corporation may include in the computation the net income derived from transactions in interstate commerce without contravening the commerce
clause of the constitution of the United States." It was
further stated:
"Such a tax, when imposed upon net income
from whatever source arising, is but a method of
distributing the cost of government, like a tax
upon property, or upon franchises treated as property; and if there be no discrimination against
interstate commerce, either in the admeasurement
of the tax or in the means adopted for enforcing
it, it constitutes one of the ordinary and general
burdens of government, from which persons and
corporations otherwise subject to the jurisdiction
of the State are not exempted by the Federal Constitution because they happen to be engaged in
commerce among the States.
"And so we hold that the Wisconsin income tax
law, as applied to the plaintiff in the case before
us, cannot be deemed to be so direct a burden upon
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

86
plaintiff's interstate business as to amount to an
unconstitutional interference with or regulation
of commerce among the States. It was measured
not by the gross receipts, but by the net proceeds
from this part of plaintiff's business, along with a
like imposition upon its income derived from other
sources, and in the same way that other corporations doing business within the State are taxed
upon that proportion of their income derived from
business transacted and property located within
the State, whatever the nature of their business."
Also pertinent here is the leading case of Shaffer v.
Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920). I t sustained over commerce clause, due process and other objections the validity of the Oklahoma income tax law as applied to a nonresident owning and operating oil and gas producing
lands within the state of Oklahoma but managed from
outside the state. The Oklahoma law, in addition to levying a tax against the net income of residents, also levied
a tax "upon the entire net income from all property
owned, and of every business, trade or profession carried
on in this state by persons residing elsewhere." Plaintiff
wras a non-resident of Oklahoma and a citizen of Illinois
and a resident of Chicago. During the years involved he
was engaged in the oil business in Oklahoma and during
the year 1916 received net income from his oil and gas
properties exceeding $1,500,000. The Court in sustaining
the tax stated in the opinion by Mr. Justice Pitney as
follows:
"In well-ordered society, property has value
chiefly for what it is capable of producing, and
the activities of mankind are devoted largely to
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making recurrent gains from the use and development of property, from tillage, mining, manufacture, from the employment of human skill and
labor, or from a combination of some of these;
gains capable of being devoted to their own support, and the surplus accumulated as an increase
of capital. That the State, from whose laws property and business and industry derive the protection and security without which production and
gainful occupation would be impossible, is debarred from exacting a share of those gains in
the form of income taxes for the support of the
government, is a proposition so wholly inconsistent with fundamental principles as to be refuted
by its mere statement. That it may tax the land
but not the crop, the tree but not the fruit, the
mine or well but not the product, the business but
not the profit derived from it, is wholly inadmissable.
"Income taxes are a recognized method of distributing the burdens of government, favored because requiring contributions from those who
realize current pecuniary benefits under the protection of the government, and because the tax
may be readily proportioned to their ability to
pay. Taxes of this character were imposed by
several of the States at or shortly after the adoption of the Federal Constitution....
"The rights of the several States to exercise
the widest liberty with respect to the imposition of
internal taxes always has been recognized in the
decisions of this court."
A paragraph of special significance to the present
proceeding is the following statement:
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"The fact that it required the personal skill
and management of appellant to bring his income
from producing property in Oklahoma to fruition,
and that his management was exerted from his
place of business in another State, did not deprive
Oklahoma of jurisdiction to tax the income which
arose within its own borders. The personal element cannot, by any fiction, oust the jurisdiction
of the State within which the income actually
arises and whose authority over it operates in
rem. At most, there might be a question whether
the value of the service of management rendered
from without the state ought not be allowed as
an expense incurred in producing the income; but
no such question is raised in the present case,
hence we express no opinion upon it.
" I t is urged that, regarding the tax as imposed upon the business conducted within the
State, it amounts in the case of appellant's business to a burden upon interstate commerce, because the products of his oil operations are shipped out of the State. Assuming that it fairly
appears that his method of business constitutes
interstate commerce, it is sufficient to say that the
tax is imposed not upon the gross receipts as in
Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292,
but only upon the net proceeds, and is plainly
sustainable even if it includes net gains from interstate commerce. U. S. Glue Co. v. Oak Creek,
247 U.S. 321. Compare Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247
U.S. 165."
F o r articles of general interest relating to the constitutionality of state taxes, we refer the Court to the following :
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44 A.L.R. 1228:
"Excise tax on foreign corporation engaged
exclusively in interstate commerce measured by
net income from business within the taxing state."
71 A.L.R. 256:
"Constitutionality of tax on corporations in
nature of, or purporting to be, excise or privilege
tax measured by income or receipts."
105 A.L.R, 11:
"State excise, privilege, or franchise tax upon foreign corporations as affected by commerce
clause."
139 A.L.R. 950:
"State excise, privilege, or franchise tax upon
foreign corporations as affected by commerce
clause."
130 A.L.R. 1183:
"State income tax in respect of business that
extends into other states."
167 A.L.R. 943:
"What constitutes doing business, business
done, or the like, outside the state for purposes
of allocation of income under tax laws."
54 Harvard Law Review 949 :
"State Taxation In a National Economy."
As we look at the Supreme Court cases referred to
above, it will of course be quite obvious to the Court
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why the position of unconstitutionality taken in plaintiff's petition for certiorari has been to a large extent
abandoned in its brief now on file with the Court. The
petition (paragraph 9) claims that no franchise tax on
plaintiff is valid under the Federal constitution and asks
for a refund of $3,205,443.06, with interest.

Paragraph

17(b) further alleges that defendant's allocation on which
the deficiencies here involved have been computed, is
likewise repugnant to the Federal Constitution.
Turning from the petition to the brief? we see about
six pages of apparently miscellaneous constitutional discussion and indiscriminate citation of cases, the relevance
of which to the case at bar is not shown. The only case
in which the facts are given is the Hans Bees case which
merely held that the North Carolina one factor
formula

statutory

was invalid where by separate accounting evi-

dence the taxpayer was able to segregate and show the
proper amount of net income attributable to its business
activities in North Carolina. The taxpayer's sales office
in New York was its own office where its own sales employees were selling merchandise in the taxpayer's own
name add behalf.

Not involved was manufacture in

North Carolina and transfer of the product at a fair price
to a sales subsidiary or other company for resale. The
taxpayer showed by separate accounting and the Court
recognized from such evidence that some profit should
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be allocated to the sales activity in New York. In the
case at bar the sales profit of the sales subsidiary and
A. S. & K. has been fairly allocated by contract outside
Utah.
Plaintiff's argument under this branch of the case
adds up, we suggest, merely to an assertion that there are
generally speaking constitutional restraints on a state's
power of taxation. By reason of this, it is urged, the
statute should be construed in such a way that any consideration of these restraints as applied to the case at bar
may be avoided. In other words, the mere existence of
constitutional restraints is suggested to justify the exclusion of more than one-third of the net income of the
Utah Division outside Utah, even though such net income
has been separately computed on the Utah books after
deducting the sales subsidiary's and A. S. & E.'s fair
selling profit, the Utah Division's fair share of plaintiff's New York administrative expenses, and other outof-state expenses.
Defendant rests its case squarely on the Supreme
Court cases cited heretofore. These cases show conclusively that local manufacture or mining is local business.
A state has the power to tax the privilege of engaging
in such a local occupation or business. No question of
double or multiple taxation is involved. No other state
can tax the privilege of engaging in a mining or manufacturing occupation or business in Utah.
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The only constitutional problem presented here is
whether in measuring the value of the privilege of operating the Bingham pit and producing molybdenite and
blister copper in Utah, net income from operations conducted by plaintiff in other states or foreign countries
and having no connection with Utah has crept into the
measure. Defendant took extreme care to see that the net
income base included only operations of the Utah Division. None of the net income of the Nevada Mines Division, Bay (Arizona) Mines Division, Chino (New Mexico) Mines Division or Braden Copper (Chile) operations
has been included. Not a dollar of plaintiff's large investment income has been included, such income having been
specifically assigned to the New York Office. Nothing
has been included except net income of the Utah Division from business attributable entirely to Utah.
In the American Manufacturing Co. case the Supreme Court permitted the excise on local manufacturing
to be measured by "$1.00 on each $1,000 of sales made"
even though involved in the action were "sales of goods
manufactured by plaintiff in the city, afterwards removed
to storage warehouses outside of the state, and later sold
from these warehouses to purchasers in states other than
Missouri. . ." Such out-of-state proceeds were held to be
a proper measure of a tax on the prior local manufacture
of the goods within the state. Such sales proceeds were
regarded as a proper substitute for value of the product
at completion of production. Postponement of payment
of the tax until financial returns were in was said to be
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"a practical benefit to the taxpayer." It was further
stated that u in the outcome the tax is the same in amount
as if it were measured by the sale value of the goods,
but imposed upon the completion of their manufacture."
This case, involving a gross receipts and not a net income
measure represents the farthest outpost in the field. It
goes much further than is necessary to sustain a tax based
upon the full net income, separately accounted for, of the
Utah Division. The Utah franchise measure is one on net
income. All of the out-of-state transportation, refining
and marketing expenses have been deducted before computing the tax. As indicated in the U. S. Glue Co. v.
Oak Greek, and Shaffer v. Carter cases a tax upon gross
receipts affects each transaction more directly than
a tax on net incomes. Inclusion of net gains from interstate commerce is plainly includible, either under a net
income or a franchise tax, and inclusion of out-of-state
sales is likewise clearly permissible in computing the
value of the local franchise as the International Harvester v. Evatt case recently reaffirmed.
. By reason of the Utah statute resting upon a plainly
taxable subject, that is, the privilege of engaging in local
business (mining and manufacture), the tax could be
measured by the gross value or the net Value of the locally
manufactured product. In the American Manufacturing
Co. case the out-of-state gross proceeds of sales were used
as the tax base and without any deduction whatsoever for
out-of-state transportation, selling or other expenses. The
out-of-state proceeds were treated as the equivalent of
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the value of the product on completion of manufacture
within the state. In the Heisler case, the taxing authorities were required to value the coal "when prepared for
market." In the Lacoste case, the authorities were required to determine the value of the skins or hides from
the fur-bearing animals or alligators in the hands of the
Louisiana dealers. In Hope Natural Gas Co. the measure
of the tax was the gross receipts from sales which were
at or beyond the state line. In overruling the trial court,
the West Virginia Supreme Court construed the law as
taking gross receipts only to determine value at the
mouth of the well. I t indicated that to find such value
there should be deducted from the gross receipts the cost
of transportation. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court,
Mr. Justice McReynolds stated "The plain result of the
opinion and final decree is to require that the tax be
computed upon the value of the gas at the well, and not
otherwise. If, hereafter, executive officers disregard
the approved construction and fix values upon any improper basis appropriate relief may be obtained through
the courts." The state court decision was affirmed.
In the Oliver Iron Miming Co. case the 6 per cent rate
was applied to the "value of such ore at the place wxhere
the same is brought to the surface of the earth" less the
costs of mining and certain other deductions. In arriving
at such "value" at the mouth of the mine, the Minnesota
tax authorities in practice take as their starting figure
the published prices for iron ore on the Lower Lake Ports
and subtract therefrom the loading and unloading
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charges, rail and water freight and other transportation
charges. Defendant, following receipt of the mandate of
this Court in Columbia Iron Mining Co. v. Iron County,
230 P . 2d 324 (1951), now uses these same mouth-of-the
mine values for corporation franchise, mining occupation
and net proceeds tax purposes in the case of Utah's
iron mines.
In the light of these authorities, a Utah franchise tax
measured by the full net income derived from the molybdenite and blister copper product mined and manufactured in Utah but sold outside is clearly proper. From
the gross proceeds from the out-of-state sales negotiated
and effected by the sales subsidiary and A. S. & K. have
been deducted the out-of-state profit and expenses of
the marketing companies, the out-of-state refining expense and the out-of-state transportation expense. Subtraction of these items gives us the gross value of the
Utah molybdenite and blister copper product in Utah
prior to the departure of such product from the state in
interstate commerce. From this gross value, in arriving
at taxable net income of the Utah Division should be
further deducted the mining, milling, transportation and
smelting expenses in Utah together with statutory depletion, Federal taxes and a fair proportion of New York
administrative expenses. Such net income as so separately computed represents the proper constitutional and
statutory base for the tax and not any lesser percentage
thereof.
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These same authorities likewise sustain the validity
of the Utah mining occupation tax and the mines valuations based on net annual proceeds. The same gross
proceeds, or value, constitute the proper starting point
in computing plaintiff's tax base under the franchise tax
law, the occupation tax law and the net proceeds law.
As will be discussed hereafter under Point II the gross
proceeds, or their equivalent, derived from the out-ofstate sales of the Utah Division's molybdenite and blister
copper product less the out-of-state marketing, refining
and transportation expenses, constitute the basis from
which under all three statutes the value of plaintiff's
mine, the value of its mining occupation privilege and the
value of its privilege as a foreign corporation to exercise its corporate franchise in Utah, less the specific deductions allowed by each statute, are to be determined.
POINT II.
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO APPORTION NONE OF
THE NET INCOME REFLECTED ON THE SEPARATE
BOOKS OF ACCOUNT OF ITS UTAH DIVISION OUTSIDE
UTAH AND THE DEFICIENCIES IN TAX HERE INVOLVED
SHOULD BE INCREASED AND TAX ASSESSED ON THE
BASIS OF THE FULL AMOUNT OF NET INCOME REFLECTED ON SUCH SEPARATE BOOKS OF ACCOUNT.
Under this branch of the case, we will undertake to
show that if there be error in defendant's decision, it is
that the tax under the Utah statute should be based on the
full 100% net income shown and reflected on the sepaDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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rate books of account of plaintiff's Utah Division and
not on any lesser percentage thereof. Defendant's argument on this proposition will include a discussion on the
following:
The net income shown on the separate books of account of the Utah Division is atttributable entirely to
business done in Utah and assessment of the tax on this
basis will involve no question of double taxation. In
lieu of the allocation of income to Utah under the statutory formula, the tax must be based on the income directly
allocated to Utah by the separate accounting method employed by plaintiff.
Judicial precedent has already been established with
respect to this plaintiff showing that the separate income
of its Utah Division reflects Utah business exclusively
and should be used for corporation franchise, mining
occupation and net proceeds tax purposes.
The intercompany contracts between plaintiff and its
sales subsidiary and A. S. & E. covering the transfer of
the Utah product for resale by the latter companies, at a
fair, reasonable and arms-length price, must be recognized and accepted for tax purposes. Such intercompany contracts between plaintiff and its sales subsidiary and A. S.
& E. being fair, reasonable and arms-length, cannot be set
aside as a fraud on the State of Utah or as an illegal
device to syphon taxable income outside the state.
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The separate corporate entity of the sales subsidiary
which conducts the business of selling in its own name
and behalf all copper and molybdenite must be recognized
and respected for tax purposes.
The operations and net income of an affiliated "subsidiary" company cannot be included in a tax return filed
by the parent company unless a Consolidated Return under the provisions of the statute is filed on behalf of both
parent and affiliated subsidiary company.
This Court has jurisdiction under the statute to
modify defendant's decision by increasing the tax to an
assessment on the full separate and segregated net income of the Utah Division.
At the outset it might be helpful to the court to refer
briefly to the terms "apportionment" or "allocation,"
"unitary and non-unitary businesses," "allocation by separate or direct accounting," and "allocation by formula."
We quote from the annotation in 167 A.L.E. 943 entitled
"What constitutes doing business, business done, or the
like, outside the state for purposes of allocation of income under tax laws" (page 944):
"A preliminary question arises as to the
meaning of the word 'allocate.' The taxing statutes do not ordinarily define it, Webster's New
International Dictionary, 2d ed., defines allocate
as '1. To distribute or assign; allot; apportion.
2. To determine the locality of.' In taxing statutes, an allocation of income seems to mean the
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division or apportionment of income between one
state and the rest of the world. Depending upon
the circumstances, income may be allocated either
directly or by formula. A direct allocation by the
separate accounting method is made where a taxpayer does business in two or more states, but all
of his activities in one state, or all of a certain
type of business in one state, is conducted as a
separate business not connected with activities in
other states. But in most cases a business is unitary, so that a direct allocation is impossible, and
an allocation—sometimes called 'indirect allocation'—must be made under a formula.
"A business conducted in two or more states
is deemed to be unitary where it is impossible to
separate the business done in one state from that
done in another—where there is a unity of use
and management, Butler Bros. v. McColgan
(1941) 17 Cal. 2d 664, 111 P. 2d 334 (affirmed in
(1942) 315 U.S. 501, 86 L. ed. 991, 62 S. Ct, 701."
Again in Prentice-Hall, State and Local Tax Service,
Vol. 1 "All States Unit" at paragraph 91, 400, it is stated :
" 'Allocation,' otherwise referred to as ''apportionment/ is that process whereby corporations, doing business concurrently within the taxing State and other jurisdictions, determine the
amount of income, from all operations which may
properly be attributed to the taxing state, and
upon which the taxing state may impose an income
tax, or base an excise or franchise tax. It is well
settled that such taxes may be imposed on the
basis of such allocated or apportioned income."
Again at paragraph 91, 428, it is stated:
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"Unitary Business—What constitutes.—For
allocation purposes it becomes important to determine whether the business is unitary or nonunitary in nature, in that statutory allocation
formulas are ordinarily applicable to the former,
whereas the latter lend themselves more appropriately to allocation by the use of separate account methods. A unitary business is one in which
the units are closely allied and not capable of
separate maintenance as independent profit making businesses. The business of manufacturing
and selling is ordinarily unitary, and so is that
of an express company, and of utilities such as
telephone companies and railroads. But a business owning disconnected, independent railroad
lines was held non-unitary and separable, and,
likewise, an oil business was non-unitary and separable as to the operations of (a) producing, manufacturing and refining, and (b) selling and distributing. And a corporation with dissociated subsidiaries is conducting a separable business not
subject to unitary allocation. A unitary business
should not include in tax base for allocation purposes any income or losses not connected with such
unitary business."
Again at paragraph 91,430 under the heading "Separate
Accounting" it is stated:
"If the corporation can separate its business into departments, and prove that a separate
department operates in the taxing state and show
what profits are derived from that department,
it has been held entitled to use separate accounting in allocating income to the taxing state. Separate accounting is ordinarily appropriate for business of a non-unitary nature . . . and has been
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applied to an oil business doing all producing,
manufacturing and refining outside the taxing
state, particularly where local sales outlets were
'charged at the market price with all products'
received from the outside producers and refineries. Separate accounting has been held proper in
the case of affiliated corporations for disconnected
railroad lines in different states, although not
adaptable to utilities such as telephone companies."
Again in Paragraph 91,281, it is stated:
"On the other hand, in allocating income of
corporations doing business in more than one
state, much can be done from a bookkeeping standpoint to separate manufacturing and sales so as
to make available the use of separate accounting
methods to reduce income, and to make unnecessary the application of an arbitrary statutory apportionment formula, particularly where the laws
of the taxing state sanction separate accounting in
allocation . . ."
Utah's corporation franchise tax law provides, in the
first place (Section 80-13-16, UCA, 1943), that the "net
income shall be computed . . . in accordance with the
method of accounting regularly employed in keeping the
books of such taxpayer . . ." Section 80-13-21, UCA,
1943, provides that the net income of the corporation may
be assigned on the basis of the three-factor formula consisting of property, payroll and gross receipts, after assigning certain specific items within and without the
state. Sub-paragraph 8 of this section provides, however, as follows:
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"If, in the judgment of the Tax Commission,
the application of the foregoing rules does not allocate to this state the proportion of net income
fairly and equitably attributable to this state, it
may, with such information as it may be able to
obtain, make such allocation as is fairly calculated
to assign to this state the portion of net income
reasonably attributable to the business done within this state and to avoid subjecting the taxpayer
to double taxation."
The above sections when read together in the light
of the applicable authorities, show that the statutory
formula is designed to allocate to Utah a portion of the
total net income of the corporation from all sources and
operations where it appears from the facts and the bookkeeping methods employed that the income attributable
to a particular state cannot be separately and directly
computed. The formula is ordinarily used as a rough
and ready means in appropriate circumstances to allocate
to business within the state that proportion of the corporation's total income from all sources which the corporation's property, payroll and gross receipts assignable to
the state bear to the total. On the other hand, where the
net income attributable to the business within the state
is separately computed on the taxpayer's books of account, the statute commands that the tax be computed
on the basis of the net income reflected on the taxpayer's
books and in accordance with the method of accounting
regularly employed by him in keeping such books. The
provisions of sub-section 8 tie into this command of the
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statute and permit the assessment of the tax on the basis
of the separate accounts employed by the taxpayer if,
in the judgment of the Tax Commission, the income so
separately computed and thereby allocated to the state
fairly assigns to the state the net income reasonably attributable to business within the state.
With this reference to the statutory background, we
now turn to the opinion and decision of this Court in
Case No. 7298, reported in 221 P 2d 857. Although depletion was an important issue presented to the Court
in this case, the primary issue presented and adjudged
was the question whether plaintiff, under the Utah law,
should have its tax computed on the basis of the statutory formula or on the basis of the separate accounts of
its Utah Division. With respect to this issue, we point
out those portions of the opinion relating to this issue.
In the first place, the Court states at page 860 :
"The errors assigned are as follows:
(1) That the Tax Commission erred in refusing
to follow the requirements of Section 80-1321, U.C.A. 1943, which would permit Kennecott to allocate to Utah a proportionate part
of its total income from all sources as distinguished from allocating a proportionate
part of the Utah Division's income to this
state."
The Court after a discussion of the method of accounting
employed by plaintiff in keeping the books of its Utah
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Division "as a separate unit" then discussed the provisions of the statute including sub-division 8 and stated
"petitioner's contention in this respect is over-ruled."
Also of considerable pertinence to the problem here
concerned was the summary rejection by the Court of
plaintiff's contention that subsidies paid by the Federal
Government were improperly included as part of the
gross proceeds realized from the sales or conversion of
ore into metal.
Thus, under the clear mandate of this Court and the
command of the statute, plaintiff's tax must be computed
on the basis of the separate and segregated net income
as computed on the books of account regularly employed
and maintained by plaintiff for its Utah Division. The
original separate account method used by plaintiff in
filing its returns was regarded as controlling. Authority
for this action was placed squarely on sub-division 8
of the statute after distinguishing the California Packing
case. In addition, the Court in refusing plaintiff the
right to use the statutory formula stated "In addition
it might unjustly discriminate against this state or the
taxpayer in that the tax assessed might bear no reasonable relationship to the value of the ore extracted or the
amount of business done in this state."
The question now before the Court is what, if any,
proportionate part of the Utah Division's income separately computed must be allocated outside the state based
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upon the findings and record in this proceeding. A reading of the opinion shows very plainly and clearly that the
Court was not prepared to determine on the record before
it in No. 7298 what portion of the Utah Division's net income was attributable to out-of-state business. The record in that case on the sales activity was limited to the
following stipulation: "The refined product is then sold
for Kennecott's account by Kennecott Sales Corporation,
which is a wholly owned subsidiary and which receives an
agreed commission for such service." (Page 102 of Record #7298, Ex. QQ 2 of present proceeding.) This statement of agreed fact is repeated in the Court's opinion.
The present proceeding devotes several hundreds
of pages of testimony and exhibits to the method and
character of the out-of-state sales of copper and molybdenite by the sales subsidiary and the out-of-state sales
of gold, silver, platinum and palladium by A. S. & R.
This extensive evidence was necessary and in fact vital
to the question of determining what, if any, out-of-state
business has been conducted by plaintiff with respect
to the sale of products of its Utah Division. With the
extensive and detailed facts now in the record with respect to the out-of-state activities of the sales subsidiary,
it is now somewhat interesting to look back and note
how one carefully drafted and stipulated sentence is
now sought to be used to justify the exclusion of
more than % of the net income of the Utah Division
from the Utah tax base. Additional evidence was of
course required. There is nothing in the one stipulated
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sentence to show how or in what manner, or in whose
name, or from what premises, or to what customers, or
under what arrangements, or at what prices, or under
what terms, or whether individually or representatively,
the sales subsidiary was selling the Utah Division's product. The sentence made no distinction between molybdenite, refined copper, gold, silver, platinum or palladiumI t made no mention of the fact that all sales of the copper
and molybdenite were made by and in the name of and
in behalf of the sales subsidiary and in the regular course
of the sales subsidiary's own business, from its own premises and to its own customers. It made no mention of the
fact that all proceeds of sales to customers were collected
by and in the name of the sales subsidiary and that all
proceeds realized by plaintiff from sales of the Utah
product were collected under intercompany contractual
arrangements by plaintiff from the sales subsidiary.
The present case now requires decision based upon
the facts of record as to what, if any, business of the
Utah Division is conducted outside Utah. The facts show
that the out-of-state sales activity is the sales subsidiary's
business and not the business of plaintiff or its Utah
Division and that all out-of-state New York administrative expenses pertaining to the Utah Division have been
deducted on the separate accounts of the Utah Division.
The question whether the Court's opinion in No. 7298 requires use of the factor of 66.926% as being the proportionate p a r t of the net income of the Utah Division atDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tributable to business done in Utah for the year 1942 is
completely without merit but is considered hereafter as a
separate point. For present purposes our inquiry is
whether the net income of the Utah Division constitutes
in its full 100% amount net income attributable to Utah
business.
With respect to the general problem of when direct
allocation by separate accounting should be used in preference to allocation by statutory formula, we refer the
court to the annotation in 167 A.L.R. 943, entitled "What
Constitutes Doing Business, Business Done or the Like
Outside the State for Purposes of Allocation of Income
Under Tax Laws," where at page 981, it is stated:
"Direct Allocation and Separate Accounting.
Attention is directed to certain rules authorizing or requiring direct allocation where possible.
Where the business conducted by the taxpayer
outside the taxing state is clearly separable from
the business done within the state, the income from
the out-of-state business must be allocated to business done outside the state by making a separate
account of its income and expenses."
Again in annotation in 130 A.L.R. 1183, entitled
"State Income Tax in Respect of Business That Extends
into Other States," it is stated at page 1205:
"Circumstances under which allocation is proper:
1. Generally. Allocation to the taxing state
of a portion of the total income of a business that
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extends into other states, as the basis for computing its state income tax, is proper only when the
income is derived partly from within and partly from without the taxing state . . .
2. When business within state is separable.
Although the income of a business is derived partly from within and partly from without the taxing
state, an allocation to that state of a portion of the
total income, as the basis for computing state income tax, is not ordinarily proper where the business transacted within the state is separable from
that transacted outside the state. The business
within the taxing state has been held to be separable, so as to make an allocation improper, in a
number of cases."
The leading article in this field is entitled "Allocation
of Income by Corporate Contract" by Koswell Magill,
44 Harvard Law Review 935. With respect to the segregation of income by intercompany contract to the state
where the income is actually earned, it is stated as follows at page 950:
"If the contract corresponds with market
prices independently quoted, the allocation so
adopted should be upheld as against an apportionment ratio, for the contract then effects a
proper segregation of the actual income."
Defendant in the administration of the tax laws of
this state, and particularly the corporation franchise tax
law here involved, makes frequent use of the principle
of separate accounting in lieu of the statutory formula
in effecting a fair and reasonable apportionment of net
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income to the business done within this state. Many concrete examples could be cited. Defendant regularly as a
general rule employs separate accounting methods of apportioning net income in the case of banks, finance companies, ranch companies, construction companies and in
other similar instances where the books of account kept
and maintained by the corporation properly reflect the
net income from the operations within this state. The
basic command of the law is to include within the tax base
only the net income attributable to the business done
within Utah. Where the taxpayer's books clearly segregate the income of Utah operations from operations in
other states or foreign countries, the use of such separate
accounts is the proper statutory tax base from which
to compute the franchise tax. The net income earned
and realized from business done in Utah thus stands
on its own footing unaffected by gains, losses or income
earned and derived in other states. For example, if a
corporation owned a cattle ranch in Utah and another
cattle ranch in Wyoming, the tax should be computed on
the basis of the Utah ranch operations separately accounted for and unaffected by the gains, losses or income
of the Wyoming ranching operations. Where, as in the
present case, the out-of-state function or activity has been
separately incorporated the use of separate accounting is, of course, mandatory in the absence of fraud or
an intent to evade the Utah tax.
In the case at bar the net income of the Utah Division in its full 100% amount reflects solely and excluDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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sively the net income from business done in Utah and
nowhere else. The out-of-state administrative expenses
pertaining to the New York Office have been allowed as
a deduction. The out-of-state marketing, refining and
transportation expenses have been allowed as a deduction. With these deductions the value of the Utah molybdenite and blister copper products has been accurately
and fairly valued in terms of actual cash receipts. Such
gross value less the local expenses of mining, milling
and smelting together with a fair proportion of New York
overhead, reflect the net income of Utah business. The
gross value of the Utah molybdenite and blister copper
product so arrived at has already been judicially determined to constitute the gross proceeds from plaintiff's
Utah operations.
The Utah mining occupation tax law imposes an occupation tax on every person engaged in the business of
mining equal to 1% of the gross amount received for or
the gross value of metaliferous ore sold. Under the
provisions of Section 59-5-67 (c) and Section 59-5-68 (4),
U.C.A. 1953, plaintiff arrives at its tax base by deducting from the gross proceeds of sales of the molybdenite,
copper, gold, silver, platinum and palladium product,
the costs of assaying, sampling, smelting, refining, transportation and marketing. Under this law, the mining
(including milling) costs are not allowed as a deduction.
The deduction from the gross proceeds of the out-ofstate marketing, refining and transportation expense
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together with the locally incurred expense of smelting
constitutes the "gross value" tax base on which this tax
is computed.
Arriving at the "net annual proceeds" of the Bingham
mine for ad valorem tax purposes under section 59-5-58,
U.C.A. 1953, is for present purposes done on much the
same basis, except that mining and milling expenses are
also allowed as a deduction, and gross proceeds are determined on a production basis by equivalent market values
rather than cash proceeds of sales. Under the net proceeds law "gross proceeds realized" are defined to be
"from the sale of conversion into money or its equivalent
of all ores from such mine."
Both the net proceeds and mining occupation tax
laws speak of "ores" but cover the special situation of
plaintiff where the ores or minerals themselves are not
sold but the metals extracted from such ores or minerals
are sold. Such metal extraction profit is added into the
tax base. Furthermore, both laws cover the situation
where the ores are sold under a bona fide contract of sale.
Such contracts determine the gross proceeds or its equivalent for tax purposes. Both laws, by 1949 amendments,
now even include a specific provision that sales of ores
between affiliated companies shall not carry the price
specified in the contract, unless such price is proportionate to the reasonable fair cash value.
The net annual proceeds realized by plaintiff from
its Bingham mine to determine the value of that mine,
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the gross value of the Utah Division's mineral and metal
product used in determining the value of conducting its
mining occupation in Utah and the net income of the
Utah Division to be used in valuing its privilege of exercising its corporate franchise in Utah all rest on substantially the same conception. The gross proceeds or
value of the Utah Division's molybdenite and blister copper product represents and is in fact income earned from
business operations in Utah. The out-of-state proceeds
of sale, less the out-of-state expenses, is the proper and
appropriate starting point in computing the income derived by plaintiff from its Utah business operations.
Use of such out-of-state proceeds rests on a secure constitutional footing, as the cases cited heretofore under
Point I clearly indicate.
In Mercur Gold Mining and Millimg Co. v. Spry, 16
Utah 222 (1898), this Court stated, at page 230, that the
"gross yield of minerals and metals" and the "value thereof" were the appropriate measuring rods in determining
the net annual product of the mine.
In Salt Lake County v. Utah Copper Company, 294
F. 199 (1923), the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, speaking through Judge Sanborn, quoted
from the decision of this court in the Mercur Co. case and
at page 205 indicated that so far as the product is concerned nothing can be taxed except the net annual product of the mine, and only that which exists and has been
ascertained as the annual net proceeds of the mine is to be
assessed and taxed.
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In Salt Lake County v. Utah Copper Co., 93 F. 2d
127 (1937) (CCA 10), the Court speaking through Judge
Phillips, sets forth historically the method which has been
used in arriving at the net annual proceeds of the Bingham mine, including the copper, gold and silver product.
The court stated at page 131:
"Blister copper has an established and readily
ascertainable market value, and when the taxing
authorities were apprised of the number of pounds
produced it was a simple matter to appraise its
value in money"
The court also stated:
"The trial court concluded that the phrase
'gross proceeds realized during the preceding calendar year from the sale or conversion into money
or its equivalent of all ores from such mine,' embraced the amount received from sales in such
year of blister copper, gold and silver bullion produced in such year, and the amount of the blister
copper, gold and silver bullion produced in such
year but remaining unsold at the end of the year,
the latter amount to be arrived at by appraisal;
and that the copper company was entitled to have
deducted therefrom the production costs as defined in the statute in determining the net annual
proceeds."
Certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court of the
United States in this case, 303 U.S. 652.
In Salt Lake County v. Kennecott Copper Corporation, 163 F. 2d 484 (1947), the Circuit Court of Appeals
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ments by the Federal government for certain minerals
produced in excess of fixed quotas pursuant to Act of
Congress and the O.P.A. should be added to the proceeds
received from the sale of ores or metals in computing
the base for taxation of mines and mining claims in
Utah. The Court ruled that such subsidy or premium
payments should be included as elements in the yard stick
for measuring the value of mining properties in Utah
for purposes of ad valorem taxation, and that such inclusion did not amount to a tax against the United States
or any of its instrumentalities.
In Kennecott

Copper Corporation v. State Tax Com-

mission, 212 P. 2d 187 (1949), this Court held that Federal subsidies paid to plaintiff were properly included
in the tax base for the purpose of determining the state
net proceeds tax and the mining occupation tax for the
years 1944 and 1945. Justice Latimer speaking for the
Court, stated at page 190:
"Appellant, Kennecott Copper Corporation,
mined and milled its own ores, shipped its mill
concentrates to independent smelting and refining
companies on a contract or toll basis for refining
and marketed its own refined copper after it had
been processed and returned. I t received premium
or subsidy payments for over-quota production,
based upon monthly affidavits showing the company's production of 'returnable' copper, computed on ninety-seven per cent of the copper contained in the company's mill concentrates as determined from assayed samples of its ores."
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The Court held that the premium prices received by
plaintiff had to be included as a part of gross proceeds
in computing the net proceeds and mining occupation
taxes.
From the foregoing cases, it is clear that the gross
proceeds received by plaintiff from the sales subsidiary
and A .S. & E. with respect to the Utah Division's molybdenite and blister copper product, which proceeds are fair
and based on market prices, constitute the gross income
of the Utah Division. Such proceeds less out-of-state
expenses constitute the statutory yardstick for determining the value of plaintiff's Utah mine, its Utah occupation
and its Utah franchise.
Recalling that the separate books of account of the
Utah Division reflect the receipts by plaintiff of the
intercompany transfer at fair prices of copper and molybdenite to the sales subsidiary and gold, silver, platinum
and palladium to A. S. & E., which companies in turn
resell the products in their own name and behalf and in
the regular course of their own business, we turn now to
those cases which require a state franchise tax to be
based upon the net income segregated to the taxing state
and which exclude the financial results of business operations in other states. The sales subsidiary and A. S. & E.,
both separate and distinct corporations from plaintiff,
are the selling companies. Plaintiff's Utah Division is
merely a producing unit. The selling function and activity is thus clearly separable from the producing function
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or activity both corporate-wise and bookkeeping-wise.
Plaintiff is entitled to no apportionment of net income
outside the state by virtue of sales activities conducted
by other companies. Nor obviously does the fact that it
maintains an out-of-state administrative office entitle it
to apportion sales conducted by other companies outside
the state. Moreover, we dispose first of any suggestion
that the mere existence of an administrative office outside the state entitles plaintiff to an apportionment of
net income outside the state. The Utah Division's fair
and proportionate share of the New York administrative
expenses has been allowed as a deduction both on the
separate books of account of the Utah Division and the
Utah tax returns.
We refer again to the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Shaffer v. Carter, supra, upholding
the right of Oklahoma to tax the income from oil and gas
properties derived within the state notwithstanding that
such properties were owned by nonresidents and managed
from outside the state of Oklahoma. The Court stated:
"The fact that it required the personal skill
and management of appellant to bring his income
from producing property in Oklahoma to fruition,
and that his management was exerted from his
place of business in another state, did not deprive
Oklahoma of jurisdiction to tax the income which
arose from within its own borders . . . At most,
there might be a question whether the value of the
service of management rendered from without the
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state ought not to be allowed as an expense incurred in producing the income; but no such question
is raised in the present case, hence, we express no
opinion upon it."
In Cottonwood Coal Company v. Junod, 236 P. 1080
(1925), the Supreme Court of Montana held that a Minnesota Corporation with its principal place of business in
the city of St. Paul, Minnesota, but engaged in the business of mining within the state of Montana was not engaged in business partly within Montana and partly in
Minnesota by reason of the fact that its administrative
office was located in St. Paul. In this case it appeared
that the corporation's plants and mines for the mining of
coal were all located within the State of Montana. With
respect to the corporation's administrative office in Minnesota, it appeared that a majority of the directors and
officers of the corporation resided in Minnesota, that
all of the meetings of stockholders and of the board of
directors were held in Minnesota, that the corporation
had an office in Minnesota, that the business plans and
policies of the corporation were formulated at its principal office in Minnesota, that the business of the corporation carried on in Montana at all times was partially
supervised and directed through its main office in Minnesota, that some of the financial affairs of the corporation
were handled and managed from Minnesota, that some
of the proceeds derived from the business of the corporation in Montana were sent to the main office of the corporation in Minnesota and deposited in certain Minnesota
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banks to the credit of the corporation from which disbursements were made from time to time for the expenses
in operating its business in Montana, that the corporation
received in Minnesota certain interest on bonds and bank
balances owned by it in Minnesota banks. The Court
stated at page 1081:
"From the foregoing statement it is apparent
that the only question for determination on this
appeal is whether the plaintiff during the year
1920 was 'engaged in business' partly within the
state of Minnesota, within the contemplation of
chapter 79, supra."
The court stated further:
"This statute fixed as the measure of the license fee to be exacted from all corporations for
the privilege of carrying on business in this state
1% of their net income derived from the business
carried on in this state, whether engaged in business wholly in this state, or partly in this state and
partly in another, and the sole purpose of sections
2 and 3 is to point out the method of determining
this net income. Beyond that determination, so far
as this statute is concerned, the state has no interest in the business of the corporation. If the
business is strictly Montana business, the net income is ascertained by deducting the expenses
and other statutory allowances from all the gross
income, since the gross income of the business or
occupation of the corporation is thus necessarily
a Montana gross income; and if the gross income
is derived from the business done in Montana and
from business done in another state, then all of the
corporation's gross income is not used in computDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ing the license fee, but only the gross income derived from the part of the corporation's business
wholly carried on in this state. And as only the
Montana gross income is used, so also the Montana expenses will be allowed to be deducted from
this gross income, to reach the net income contemplated in the statute.
"From this it appears that, when the statute
uses the expression 'engaged in business/ whether
in this state or elsewhere, it is speaking in terms
of profit and loss, and does not refer to mere
corporate action, such as holding meetings of the
board of directors, doing clerical work or bookkeeping, formulating the plans of policies, or performing other corporate acts, which do not in and
of themselves result in the production of income,
but does contemplate some kind of business the
conduct of which results in an income—some gainful occupation of the corporation. This purpose
and intent is manifest all through the various
provisions of the statute.
"Necessarily a corporation must do certain
acts with reference to its corporate activity at the
state in which it is incorporated. Usually it must
maintain an office, keep certain records, and hold
annual meetings of its stockholders therein. Doing
these things implies that it is carrying on business to some extent in such state, but by doing
them it is not 'engaged in business' there, within
the purview of the statute, which uses the word
'business' solely in connection with its gainful pursuit, and as a means of determining its net income
as the basis of fixing a license fee. In the statute
under consideration the activity of the corporaDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tion is not made the measure of the license fee,
except as such activity manifests itself in the
production of income."
This decision of the Supreme Court of Montana
involving a mine within the taxing state and with an administrative office outside the state is obviously very
closely parallel to the case at bar. The Court held that
the entire income from the mining business was attributable in its full 100% amount to Montana where the mine
was located and operated. This decision reflects the general principle and approach where the tax is based by
separate accounts strictly to the operations within the
taxing state. The income and business operations are
clearly separable from income and operations in other
states and are clearly separable from the operations of
the administrative office outside the state. The most that
is required under the separate accounting approach is
the allowance of a fair share of the out-of-state administrative expenses as an expense deduction against the
net income attributable to the business within the taxing
state.
Plaintiff's basic contention in the case at bar is that
the entire business commencing with mining and through
the successive stages of smelting and refining and to and
including the sale and distribution of the finished metal
product is a unity of operation and ownership. This contention overlooks the fact that the selling function and
activity together with the fabricating function and activity have been separately incorporated from the producDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ing function and activity. In these circumstances, it is
clear that the operation is a unity up to but not including
the sale or fabrication.
In Adams Express

Co. v. Ohio, 165 U.S. 194 (1897)

involving an early application of the unit rule as applied
to common carriers engaged in interstate commerce, the
Court stated through Chief Justice Fuller at page 222:
"We repeat that while the unity which exists
may not be a physical unity, it is something more
than a mere unity of ownership. I t is a unity of
use, not simply for the convenience or pecuniary
profit of the owner, but existing in the very necessities of the case—resulting from the very nature
of the business.
"The same party own a manufacturing
establishment in one state and a store in another, and
may make profit by operating the twoy but the
work of each is separate. The value of the factory
in itself is not conditioned on that of the store or
vise versa, nor is the value of the goods manufactured and sold affected thereby. The connection between the two is merely accidental and
growing out of the unity of ownership. But the
property of an express company distributed to different states is as an essential condition of the
business united in a single specific use. I t constitutes but a single plan, made so by the very character and necessities of the business."
All defendant contends in the case at bar is that
plaintiff owns a producing establishment in one state
and through its sales subsidiary a store in another. I t
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makes a profit by operating the two but the work of the
Utah Division is separate from the sales subsidiary's
store.
An excellent case as to what constitutes a unitary
business requiring the apportionment method of computing the tax is the decision of the Supreme Court of Oregon in Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Galloway, 154 P 2d
539 (1944). In this case the court held that a Delaware
corporation doing business within the State of Oregon did
not have to have a net overall income before Oregon could
assess a corporation excise tax against it so long as the
corporation's Oregon business yielded a net income.
The Court also held that p a r t of the plaintiff's business
consisting of its ownership of 58,724 shares of the capital
stock of the Continental Coal Company, an operating
coal company, was not such an integral part of its business that the State of Oregon was required to apply
against the corporation's total net income the loss of $4,093,308.27, which resulted when that stock became worthless, under the apportionment formula contained in the
Oregon statute, thus cancelling the profit which the
Oregon tax officials found was earned from and attributable to Oregon business. The stock owned of the coal
company constituted 93.09% of the total outstanding
stock of the coal company. The corporation's excise return included all items of income and deductions from
operations both within and without the state of Oregon.
The loss on the coal company's stock was taken as a deduction on the return on the ground that such stock had
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become worthless within the taxable year. Except for the
stock loss the corporation would have had a net income
of $588,178.00. The Oregon tax officials found that $207,103.53 of this total was earned in Oregon.
The Court in an opinion by Judge Rossman, after referring to the corporation excise tax as a price exacted
for the privilege of doing business in Oregon and of earning a net income in the state, indicated that "the losses
or profits resulting from operations in other states are
immaterial" to the privilege granted by Oregon of earning a net income in Oregon. The Court also referred to
the admonition in the law that "the determination of net
income shall be based upon the business done within the
state" and also to the provision similar to Subdiv. 8 of
the Utah statute which authorized the Commission to permit or require a segregated method of reporting so as
fairly and accurately to reflect the net income of the
business done within the state. The Court stated at page
544:
"Section 110-1507 does not employ the word
'unitary,' but the duty of the defendant to determine whether a corporation which produces income both within and without Oregon is unitary
or multiform is implied. The section, as we have
already indicated, uses the term 'segregated
method' and 'apportionment method.' Before
either of those methods can be employed, the question must first be answered whether the business
is unitary or otherwise in character.
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"Every definition of the word 'unitary' must
of necessity be general, and since such must be
its nature, a repetition of definition cannot be
helpful in the solution of any specific problem.
In determining whether a business is unitary or
otherwise in character, a knowledge of the facts
is essential; in truth, the facts are all important.
F o r instance, in determining whether or not two
or more ventures conducted by a corporation are
divisible or unitary, one might learn much about
their nature by consulting the corporation account
books. If the books intermingle the income produced and the expenses incurred by the several
ventures, a conclusion would possibly be warranted that the enterprises were a single unit. At
any rate, as opposed to the inconvenience of segregating the ventures, one might prefer to deem
the business as unitary. Upon the other hand,
if a separate set of books was kept for each venture, and if overhead was apportioned to each, it
may be that the corporation's business would be
deemed divisible. In other words, collateral facts,
in addition to the nature of the undertaking, may
be entitled to consideration. The determination
of the nature of the business enterprise is essentially a practical matter. Much must be left to
the sound business sense of the tax commission.
Fortunately, the passage of time gains for the
commissioners the accession of experience and out
of the latter there frequently develops expertness.
I t is the fact that findings, such as the one w^hich
the plaintiff now attacks, were written by men
whose judgment was buttressed by experience
which entitles such findings to be accorded a high
degree of respect when attacked in a judicial proceeding."
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Fisher v. Standard Oil Company, 12 F . 2d 744 (1926)
(CCA 8), involved the North Dakota Statute imposing a
tax of 3 % on the net income of corporations derived annually from business conducted within the
state. The corporation was an Indiana company and its
business in North Dakota consisted of selling at wholesale
and retail petroleum products and by-products which it
produced, manufactured and refined wholly outside the
state and shipped into the state for sale in North Dakota
used in selling and distributing its products after bringing them within the state. It appeared inferentially that
as shipments were received they were charged to the
North Dakota selling agency at wholesale prices. 2% was
added as profit to the cost of producing, manufacturing
and refining on receipt of shipments and before sale in
the state.
The North Dakota statute provided that the tax should
apply to that portion of the total net income of the corporation doing business partly within and partly without
the state which the business within the state bore to the
total business within and without the state. The statute
further provided that where such business within the
state is not otherwise 'more easily and certainly separable from such total business' the net income should be
apportioned on the basis of the ratio that the property
within the state bore to the entire property both within
and without the state.
In filing its returns, the corporation computed its
tax on the basis of the income separately computed with
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respect to the North Dakota selling operations. The state
tax commissioner reviewed the returns and made a reassessment of tax. He did not employ, however, the statutory one-factor formula based on property but in lieu
thereof and without statutory authority used a factor
based on gross sales within the state as compared with
total gross sales everywhere. Use of the statutory property factor would have resulted in a smaller tax than that
reported on the returns on the basis of treating the
North Dakota operations as separable from the business of the corporation conducted elsewhere. The Court
speaking through Judge Lewis refused to permit the
reassessment as made and stated, page 747:
"Theories of allocation can have no place in
the inquiry, if net income within the state stands
on its own footing unmixed with outside business
. . . We think it cannot be doubted that the products as brought into the state had an easily ascertainable wholesale market price. We think appellee's business within the state is easily separable from its other business by charging it with
the wholesale price of the products which it sells
in North Dakota. That would put it on an equality
there with those who sell and do not produce and
refine. By strong implication from the language
of sections 10 and 27 business without the state
is to be disregarded, if that within the state is
easily and certainly separable from that without,
thus creating an exception to the methods in each
of the three sections for the ascertainment of net
income."
Standard Oil Co. v. Thoresen, 29 F . 2d 708 (1928)
(CCA 8) again involved the North Dakota tax statute
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but in a modified form from that considered by the court
in the preceding case. The statute in its modified form
provided for the allocation of income under a different
statutory apportionment formula. The statute stated
that there should be allocated as attributable to business
within the state such percentage of the total income of the
corporation as the tangible property and business within
the state bore to the total property and business of the
corporation, the percentage of property and business being separately determined and the two percentages averaged. The business factor in turn was measured by payroll and purchases plus receipts from sales. The statute
further provided that payroll should be assigned to the
office, agency or place of business of the corporation at
which the employee chiefly worked or from which he was
sent out or with which he was chiefly connected. Purchases were assigned to the office, agency or place of
business at or from which such purchases were chiefly
handled and attended to with respect to the negotiation
and execution. Eeceipts from sales were assigned to the
office, agency or place of business of the corporation
at or from which the transaction giving rise to such receipts were chiefly handled and attended to with respect to the negotiation and execution. The statute likewise contained a provision for alternative methods of
allocation somewhat similar to subdivision 8 of the Utah
statute.
The corporation filed a return under the statute not
on the basis of a separate accounting for its North DaDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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kota operations, but on the basis of that portion of its
total income everywhere derived which the North Dakota
statutory formula, as described above, allocated to North
Dakota,
Thereafter, the tax commissioner made an additional
assessment against the corporation "based upon the allocation to that state of a portion of the income made by the
oil company in the business of producing crude oil from
the ground, and in the business of manufacturing and
refining the crude oil, although it neither produced a
barrel of oil in the state of North Dakota nor did it refine
any oil in that state." The Court, in an opinion by District Judge Pollock, stated at page 710:
"The question presented for decision in this
case is this: Does the law of the state of North
Dakota require the plaintiff to pay taxes on its
producing and refining oil business done altogether in states other than that state because of
the fact it is engaged in the business of marketing
refined oil in that state?"
With respect to the contention of the state that the
statutory formula should be applied because the ''lousiness of plaintiff may and should for the purpose of taxation be regarded as a unit m the production, transportation, refining and marketing of oil," the Court con-;
ceded that the unit theory of taxation sought to be applied
by the state "is alright and has been upheld by the supreme court" in such cases as Underwood Typewriter
Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, and Adams Express
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Company v. Ohio, supra. The Court indicated, however,
that such cases were inapplicable to the present situation and stated at page 711:
"There is a unity of use of the different appliances and agencies employed by the express
company and on this ground the tax of Ohio was
upheld; but the right of the plaintiff or any other
corporation or citizen to engage in different character of business in different states, or in the
same state, must be conceded. The plaintiff in this
case is engaged in the production of crude oil in
those states wherein crude oil is found. There
is no crude oil discovered in the state of North
Dakota, The plaintiff has also engaged in the
manufacture and refining of crude oils in many
states, but has not done so in the state of North
Dakota, It has engaged in marketing refined oil
alone in that state. On its properties within the
state of North Dakota employed in the business
of marketing oil, and on the income arising from
the doing of that business within the state of
North Dakota it may be there taxed by the state
and the tax must be paid. On its business of producing and refining oil it should be taxed only by
the state in which this production is found or
refining done. In the manufacture or refining of
crude oil in different states it must be taxed and
pay its taxes within said states; others, not engaged in the production or refining of oils, engage
in the marketing of refined oils in the state of
North Dakota. It is conceded to be a very easy
matter for the state to determine the market value
of refined oils within its borders at any time and
place, and on this, having ascertained the selling
price, to determine the tax necessary to be paid.
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"As tending to the view of the case here taken,
the recent decision of this court in Fisher, State
Treasurer of North Dakota v. Standard Oil Company, 12 F . 2d 744, opinion by Judge Lewis.
" I t follows the decree should be reversed and
case remanded, with directions to enter decree in
favor of the plaintiff in accordance with this opinion."
The problem of allocation by separate accounting
versus allocation by statutory formula was again involved, this time before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in Standard

Oil Co. of Indiana

v. Wisconsin

Tax

Commission, 223 N.W. 85 (1929). In this case it appeared
that the corporation did business within and without the
state of Wisconsin and was engaged in the business of
producing, refining, transporting and marketing petroleum products and by-products in eleven midwestern
states. Its refining operations were centered in Indiana.
I t s property within the state of Wisconsin consisted chief ly of tanks and filling stations required to supply the
Wisconsin demand. Practically no manufacturing was
done within the state of Wisconsin. The Tax Commission, on the theory that the business of the corporation
was a unitary business, made an assessment computed
under the Wisconsin statutory formula based upon the
average of the three factors of tangible property, manufacturing costs and sales. The Wisconsin statute provided that persons engaged in business within and without the state should be taxed only on such income as is
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derived from business transacted and property located
within the state. The statute likewise included a provision similar to subdivision 8 of the Utah statute permitting an allocation by separate accounting when in the
judgment of the tax commission that method would reasonably reflect the income properly assignable to the
state.
The court, in an opinion by Judge Bosenberry, stated
at page 87 :
"The plaintiff contends that its income should
be ascertained by the allocation and separate accounting method by which the Wisconsin business is charged at the market price with all products received by it, with the expense of transacting
the business, including a proper allocation of general or overhead expenses and office accounting;
there should be credited to Wisconsin the gross
amount received from sales of goods within the
state, and that the difference constitutes the taxable income of the plaintiff company."
The position of the state is set forth in extracts from
the argument of the Attorney General of the state contained in a footnote. It was argued that the use of the
separate accounting method would lead to the exclusion
of income and deductions resulting from business activities and property located within Wisconsin. It was,
further argued as follows:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

132
"The appellant's method of accounting does
not clearly separate the Wisconsin business and
income from the entire business and income of the
company. The crude oil is refined by the appellant's refineries and the resultant gasoline, refined oil and by-products, are billed to the sales
department at assigned billing prices. Each department of the company which has a part in the
making or handling of the product, charges a
profit, which profit is treated as a cost to the next
department receiving the product. Thus, the departmental books of the appellant show estimated
fictitious profits on products not yet sold. It is
easy to see that this method of accounting cannot
be used for all purposes, and especially not for
income tax purposes."
The Court rejected the argument of the state and
stated at page 88:
"We regard as unsound the argument submitted to sustain the commission's position in this
case. If the manufacturing profits of the plaintiff
company are increased by means of sales operations in the state of Wisconsin, the converse is
true that the sales operations in Wisconsin benefit
by the manufacturing operations of the plaintiff
corporation in other states. The argument cannot
be applied one way and not the other. If it should
appear that the manufacturing operations were
conducted at a loss in other states, would it be
claimed that some part of that loss might properly
be charged to sales operations in the state of Wisconsin to diminish the Wisconsin income! We
think not. There are some operations which from
their very nature produce an income which cannot
he properly allocated by separate accounting
methods, instances of which are the telegraph,
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telephone, and express companies. They stand
ready to serve whoever may apply for service and
the entire operation constitutes a unit of service.
That is not the case with the manufacturing and
sales business, particularly so where the accounts
are so kept as to be readily separable.
"Nor do we find anything in Underwood
Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain . . . inconsistent
with our conclusion in this case. There was no
separation on the basis of market value between
the operations of the manufacturing department
and the sales department as there is in this case.
We perceive no reason why under the facts in
this case, the profits derived from the sales operation should not be ascertained so far as plaintiff is concerned as they would be if the sales operations were conducted by a separate corporate
entity. In either case the profits are earned at
the same time and place."
Piedmont and Northern Railway Co. v. Query, 56 F .
2d 172 (1932), held that the South Carolina Tax Commission could not employ the statutory formula on a mileage basis in computing the railroad company's income
taxes with respect to two disconnected lines of railroads,
one located entirely in South Carolina and the other
entirely in North Carolina.
I t appeared that the railway company, a South Carolina corporation, owned one line of railroad entirely in
South Carolina, extending from Spartenburg to Greenwood, a distance of 101 miles. The other line located entirely in North Carolina extended from Charlotte to
Gastonia, a distance of 26 miles. The two lines of railDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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road were 56 miles apart at the nearest point and were
separately operated except as to certain expenses for
general management. The railway company had paid
taxes to South Carolina on the entire net income of the
railroad in South Carolina including its earnings from interstate as well as intrastate commerce. It paid no tax on
the income of the railroad in North Carolina. The Tax
Commission contended that the railway company should
be taxed on the net income of the intrastate traffic of
the South Carolina road plus a mileage proportion under
the statute of the combined net income of interstate commerce of the two roads and imposed additional income
taxes on this basis. The Court in an opinion by Judge
Parker rejected the contention of the Tax Commission
and stated at page 175:
"The mileage proportion basis as applied to
the interstate income of a railroad or a railroad
system partly within the state ordinarily measures
with reasonable accuracy the value of the property
or the income earned within the state . . . It will
not be sustained, however, where the circumstances are such that its application results in taxing the railroad on property beyond the jurisdiction of the taxing power . . . "
The foregoing cases, involving as they do judicial
insistence on the use of separate accounting methods
in lieu of the statutory formula in determining net income
attributable to business within the taxing state, have
a clear and obvious applicability to the facts of the case
at bar. The cases hold that where a product is manuDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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factured in one state and transferred by the corporation to its "sales department" in another state at a fair
and reasonable price, the state where the selling activity
takes place is required to compute its tax, not on the basis
of the statutory formula, but on the basis of the difference between the prices so charged or billed and the
proceeds of sale within the state taking into account its
other expenses within the state and a fair share of the
corporation's out-of-state general overhead or administrative expenses. In the case at bar, the Utah Division's
molybdenite, copper and other product is not charged to
plaintiff's "sales department" but is transferred and
charged to the sales subsidiary and A. S. & B.? separate
and distinct companies, at fair and reasonable prices.
Such prices are market prices less fair and reasonable
deductions therefrom. Both the sales subsidiary and
A. S. & E. earn, receive and are allowed to retain a fair
profit for performing the selling activity outside Utah.
A pair of cases both decided by the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin on April 15, 1941 are squarely on the point
involved in the present appeal. The first case is Burroughs Adding Machine Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Commission, 237 Wis. 423, 297 N.W. 574. In this case it appeared
that the appellant was a Missouri corporation duly qualified to transact business in Wisconsin. Appellant, a
wholly owned subsidiary of Burroughs Adding Machine
Co., a Michigan corporation, was engaged in selling
throughout the United States, Alaska and Hawaii various
adding, calculating and bookkeeping machines manufactured by the parent company. The parent company
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transacted no business and owned no property in Wisconsin. In addition to the stock of appellant, the parent
corporation owned the stock of 25 other subsidiaries engaged in selling and servicing machines produced by the
parent. The officers of appellant and the parent company
were the same and there were several directors common
to both companies.
In 1921 appellant and the parent entered into a contract under which appellant agreed to purchase from the
parent all of the products manufactured by it. For these
products appellant agreed to pay to the parent all sums
received by it except such sums as would permit appellant to earn annually 24% of the par value of appellant's
capital stock. The corporations operated under this contract until 1934, appellant receiving annually a net income of 24% of $150,000.00 or $36,000 per year. In 1926
the Tax Commission demanded a consolidated statement
from appellant and the parent company. This was refused and a doomage assessment was proposed and sustained upon hearing. Injunction proceedings instituted
in the Federal Court were denied. In 1930 the Commission again demanded consolidated statements but permitted appellant, pending audit, to file returns stating the
income as actually received and accounted for on its
books with certain adjustments. Such returns were made
for 1929 to 1933 inclusive.
On January 1, 1934, a new contract was entered into
under which sales were made by the parent to appellant
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at a 50% discount from list prices and with the allocation
to appellant of 90% of sales and advertising expenses
u
as well as a proportion of general expenses" (principally
incurred for jointly used offices). This contract established on a contractual basis the same discount, costs and
expenses appellant used in computing its income for the
years 1929 to 1933 inclusive, except that the apportionment of general expenses under the new arrangement was
somewhat more favorable to appellant and to that extent
increased the latter's income. The Tax Commission refused to accept the returns on the basis of the separate
accounting of appellant and approved additional assessments of tax on the basis of consolidating the income of
appellant with that of its parent and applying to such
consolidated income the statutory Wisconsin formula
made up of the average of the three factors of property,
sales and manufacturing costs. The parent and subsidiary were treated by the Commission as a unit and a ratio
between appellant's property, sales and costs in Wisconsin to those of the parent and all of its subsidiaries everywhere was established. The opinion by Justice Wickhem
states at page 575:
"The question here is whether there is any
authority in the Tax Commission under the provisions of Section 71.25, stats., to require a consolidated return of the income of the parent and
all subsidiaries and then to compute the tax apportionable to Wisconsin in accordance with the
factors set up in section 71.02 3d."
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On the other hand, appellant asserted that the statute
furnished no authority for disregarding the corporate
entity and apportioning the tax on the basis of the statute
which in terms applied only to single taxpayers doing
business within and without the state.
The position of the Tax Commission was thus identical with the position of plaintiff in the case at bar, that
is to say, it was argued that the manufacturing operations of the parent company should be consolidated with
those of the sales subsidiary and the statutory threefactor formula applied to such consolidated income.
After indicating that the duty of the Tax Commission
is to determine the income which the taxpayer would have
had had it not been for this income diverting contract,
the Court continued, page 576:
"The question, therefore, is whether a percentage of total consolidated income arrived at by
taking an arithmetical average of the ratios of
appellant's tangible property, sales and manufacturing costs in Wisconsin to total consolidated
property, sales and manufacturing costs everywhere, establishes what appellant would have
earned in Wisconsin had it not been for the contract of 1921. It is our conclusion that it does not
do so. The fallacy in the method is that it attributes to appellant that portion of the parent's income which constitutes the latter's profit from the
activities of appellant in Wisconsin."
As is stated by Judge Cardozo in the
case, supra (244 N.Y. 114,155 N.E. 70):

Studebaker
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"The tax has been laid upon the theory that
the profit to the agent, in order to be fair and
reasonable, must absorb the entire profit to the
principal from the business of the agency . . . The
privilege for which the appellant has been taxed
is the privilege of selling in New York the products of its principal. The business transacted
by the principal included the process of manufacture carried on in Michigan and Indiana, a process
which was anterior of necessity to any service by
the agent. We find no basis for a holding that a
fair agreement between the parent which manufactured and the subsidiary which sold would
have given the whole profit to the subsidiary and
nothing to the parent."
"Judge Cardozo concedes, as did this court
in the Curtis case, that if the selling agency is a
mere bookkeeping device of the parent, there is
power in the taxing state to assess the parent corporation upon its activities there and to use a consolidated return to apportion the proper amount
of this tax to the taxing state. But where a statute,
as does Section 71.25, requires that the subsidiary
be treated as an entity and its income established,
the commission must comply and it may not do
this by assigning to the subsidiary profits of the
parent corporation from dealings with the subsidiary. The use of the ratio is based upon the
theory that a single taxpayer is involved and that
the application to this taxpayer's total income of
a percentage which is the average of the ratios
gives a fair approximation of the entire income
of this taxpayer in this state. Upon this theory,
the use of ratios has been sustained. Hans Kees'
Sons v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 . . . This is
what the application of the ratios in this case
actually accomplished, and it matters little
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whether appellant be considered an entity and
hence taxed upon the income of another or
whether the effect is to levy a tax indirectly upon
the parent corporation. In neither case does the
method answer the calls of section 71.25 . . .
"As Judge Cardozo points out, there should
be little difficulty in addressing the inquiry to
the question how much would have been made had
contracts not artificially controlled the income.
A consideration of the usual or customary commissions and the normal and usual expenses of
selling and servicing, the profit or loss on tradeins and other such matters, would bear directly
upon the issue prescribed by section 71.25, and
lead to an answer to the statutory question. This
we hold to be the proper method of approach."
The other Wisconsin case is that of Northern States
Power Co. v. Tax Commission, 237 Wis. 433, 297 N.W.
578. This case involved an appeal by Northern States
Power Company and four affiliated companies against
additional assessments of income taxes made by the Tax
Commission. A chart on page 579 (N.W.) shows the
common stock ownership of the principal affiliated companies in the Northern States Power group. The chart
shows Northern States Power Company (Delaware) owning directly or indirectly the stock of fourteen corporations, including Northern States Power Company (Wisconsin), and Northern States Power Company (Minnesota). All of the companies were in practical effect managed by the same persons as officers and directors. The
intercompany business relations and contracts are shown
in detail on page 580. Under these intercompany arDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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rangements, gas and electric energy would be sold from
one company or division of a company to one of the other
affiliated companies. For example, it is stated "Interstate Light and Power Company (Wis.) (Apple Eiver
Div.) hydro-electric energy was disposed of by Northern
States Power Company (Minn.)." The various subsidiaries were financed directly or indirectly by Northern
States Power Co. (Del.) by loans upon which 6% interest
compounded monthly was exacted.
Each of the eight Wisconsin subsidiaries of the
Delaware corporation reported their income to Wisconsin for the year involved "upon a separate accounting
basis." The Tax Commission concluded that the separate accounting method used by the companies did not
reflect their true income derived from business transacted
in Wisconsin and made separate additional assessments
against each of the Wisconsin subsidiary companies for
the year 1930 to 1933, inclusive.
In making its assessments the Tax Commission consolidated the total net income of the Delaware company
and all of its subsidiaries, direct and indirect, including
appellant. Against this total net income so determined,
the Tax Commission applied the statutory three-factor
formula and of the total net income so apportioned to
Wisconsin attributed a portion thereof to each of the
appellant taxpayers.
The case involved particularly the production of
power by the Wisconsin subsidiaries and the transfer and
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sale of such power to the Minnesota subsidiaries for resale to Minnesota customers. In applying the statutory
three-factor formula, consisting of property, sales and
manufacturing factors, the taxpayers apparently made no
objection to use of the property and sales factors, but did
object to use of a factor of units manufactured in lieu of
the costs of manufacturing. The Tax Commission had
decided that cost of manufacturing, if used instead of
units manufactured, would have given an inequitable
ratio "inasmuch as Wisconsin is predominantly hydro
and Minnesota is predominantly steam." Thus the higher
cost of production in Minnesota would have the effect
of allocating income to that state disproportionate in
amount.
In its findings the Commission, among other things,
held that it was not bound by the terms of the intercompany arrangement between the companies, that it could
consolidate and apportion the income of the companies
as a group, that the intercorporate arrangements were
not fair and reasonable, that the intercorporate arrangements established an unfair price for the power produced
by the Wisconsin affiliates and that the arrangements
had the purpose and effect of evasion of the income tax
law. It was also concluded that the use of common officers and directors "in effect made of the Wisconsin subsidiaries mere branches of the parent corporation."
On the appeal the taxpayers contended that each
appellant should be treated as a single taxable entity,
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that the commission had no power to consolidate the net
incomes of the companies and apportion the same by
formula, and that if the sales between the affiliated companies were at an unfair price, the commission should
ascertain the facts and fix a fair price and adjust the
corporations' income accordingly.
The Tax Commission, on the other hand, contended
that where the separate accounting basis understated
true Wisconsin income it was entitled under the statute
to consolidate and apportion the income of the affiliated
companies.
The Court speaking through Chief Justice Kosenberry stated at page 584:
"Without statutory authority the commission
proceeds in this case to consolidate the incomes of
the parent and affiliated companies and then to
apply the formulas applicable to income taxes
within and without the state. It not only does
that but having found by formulas the income of
all the Wisconsin affiliates, it proceeds to apportion it among the affiliates by formulas. It in
effect treats the whole matter as if there was but
one taxpayer and that the parent corporation, its
Wisconsin income being apportioned among the
Wisconsin affiliates. We find no authority in
the statute for such procedure."
Again, at page 585, it is stated:
"As was stated in the Burroughs case, we find
no insuperable difficulties in finding, if such be
the fact, that a company is selling its products at
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

144
less than a fair price, or in finding that it is purchasing products in a manner so as to create a loss
or improper income, and after those facts have
been determined, it should not be impossible to determine what the reasonable profits would have
been but for such arrangement, having due regard to reasonable profit. Certainly the difficulty
of solving such a problem falls far short of equalling the difficulty of ascertaining a just and fair
rate in a rate case. The result of the application
of formulas in these cases, is as in the Burroughs
Adding Machine Co. case, to allocate earnings
to Wisconsin, which are made outside of the state
by subsidiary corporations who have purchased
products from Wisconsin corporations. What is
to be taxed in Wisconsin under the income tax
act is Wisconsin income. If a Wisconsin company
manufactures a product which it sells outside of
the state and the buyer thereafter resells it at a
profit, Wisconsin can have no claim upon that
profit. If the price paid for energy generated in
Wisconsin is a fair price, the fact that a subsidiary makes a profit upon a resale in Minnesota
gives Wisconsin no right to tax the profit in Minnesota"
In the case at bar neither plaintiff nor defendant
has a right to ignore the intercompany arrangements
with and the separate corporate entities of the sales
subsidiary and A. S. & E, The price collected by plaintiff from the sales subsidiary and A. S. & E. with respect
to the Utah Division product being a fair price, the profit
realized by the sales subsidiary and A. S. & E. on the resale in New York or elsewhere outside Utah gives Utah
no right whatsoever to tax such sales profit as allocated
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by the parties in such contracts. The profit is earned
by the sales subsidiary and A. S. & E. outside Utah. At
the same time, however, Utah is entitled to a tax on the
full profit earned by the Utah Division from its production within Utah as arrived at on the basis of the intercompany contracts and reflected on the separate accounts
of the Utah Division's operation.
We refer at this point to several leading and important cases which hold that the taxing officials are not
bound by the intercompany prices agreed upon between
affiliated companies where such contract prices are not
fair or reasonable or arms-length prices but in effect
constitute a fraud on the tax laws of the taxing state and
represent devices to syphon out of the taxing state income
earned from business done within the state. In this connection reference is made to section 80-13-18, U.C.A.
1943, which gives defendant specific statutory authority
to distribute, apportion or allocate the gross income or
deductions between or among corporations controlled
by the same interests in order to prevent evasion of taxes
or clearly to reflect the income of any of such corporations. Even in the absence of such specific statutory authority, it is generally held by the Courts that taxing
>Js may ignore sham transactions whose only pur>ffect is to evade the tax laws of the state.
°mical v. Wisconsin Tax Commission, 214
X Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld
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tax on the basis of the value of the charcoal, crude alcohol
and acetate of lime produced by the corporation but distributed at cost to its two stockholders, Cleveland Cliffs
Iron Company and Goodman Lumber Co. The Court
stated at page 449 :
"The value of the goods was readily ascertained by the tax commission and the income of appellant was thereby fixed with certainty. The
appellant claims that the income found by the
tax commission is a theoretical income and not an
actual income. In law that is certain which can
be made certain. The income of the appellant was
made certain by the application of correct principles of accounting and the tax thus ascertained/'
To the same effect is In re Morton Salt Company, 95
P . 2d 335 (1939), in which the Supreme Court of Kansas
permitted the tax commission to treat a parent corporation and its foreign subsidiaries as a unitary business,
where it appeared that the parent company made no
profit on its manufactured product but sold such product
to its sales subsidiaries at cost. The Court, after discussing certain Wisconsin and Massachusetts cases, stated at page 339 :
"In the Wisconsin and Massachusetts ca^~*
the business transactions between the paren+
poration and its subsidiary were condu^'
basis which made a separate fair pre
Because of this the Court held und^
lar statute applicable that for tb^
puting income tax the corp r
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situation here. Appellant makes no profit from
the manufactured product sold to its subsidiaries;
it sells to them at cost. The result is that it syphons out of this state its own profits for its
manufacturing business in this state into its foreign state subsidiaries and collects that profit
through the dividends declared to it by such subsidiary. The two opinions in the Palmolive Co.
case disclosed the formation of numerous corporate entities designed for the purpose of enabling
the original corporation to evade income taxes in
Wisconsin. So far as these corporations had anything to do with the manufacture, distribution and
sale of products, the court treated all of them as
a unitary business, disregarding corporate forms.
Even agreements between the manufacturing company and the selling companies on the cost of
manufacture, plus 3% profit for certain years and
plus a 6% profit for certain other years, was disregarded as inadequate. Among the many corporations formed was one that dealt solely with advertising, and because of the nature of its business it was not included within the group of corporations treated as a unitary business."
The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in Palmolive Co. v. Conway, is reported
in 56 F. 2d 83 (1932). The decision of District Judge
Lindley is reported in 43 F. 2d 226 (1930). In this case
it appeared that the Palmolive Co. of Wisconsin which
had manufactured and sold Palmolive soap in Milwaukee
since 1894 was reorganized in 1923. As a result of the
reorganization the parent company became the owner of
all the property of the Wisconsin company outside Wisconsin and became the owner of all the capital stock of
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plaintiff. Plaintiff on the other hand became the owner
of the Milwaukee plant and equipment and all of the
stock of the Wisconsin Company. The Wisconsin company remained the owner of the Milwaukee inventory
and accounts receivable relating to Wisconsin business.
The three corporations were governed by officers and
directors substantially identical. The parent company
established its chief office in Chicago where it occupied
seven floors. Plaintiff had no separate offices and no
full time employees. Its transactions were few and its
books of records were kept by the office force of the parent company.
The parent company contracted with the Wisconsin
company to buy the latter's entire output of Palmolive
soap, except that sold in Wisconsin, for the year 1924
at factory cost plus 3 % . F o r 1925 and 1926 the agreed
purchase price was fixed at factory cost plus 6%.
District Judge Lindley, after reviewing the operations and profits realized before and after the reorganization and other pertinent facts, stated at page 229:
"These and many other facts of like import
and significance lead the Court to conclude that
under the undisputed circumstances shown, and
the intercorporate relations shown, the contract
of factory cost plus percentage manufacture and
sale to the parent company constituted a fraud
upon the income tax laws of Wisconsin."
He concluded that the reorganization of the old Wisconsin company and the new intercompany arrangements
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were designed solely to evade the Wisconsin tax and for
the purpose of giving the appearance of removing from
the state all income of the Wisconsin company over 6%
plus factory cost, whereas in fact there was left within
the state the same activities of production which existed
prior to the new arrangement. Notwithstanding that the
cost of production continued to be much the same after
the reorganization as before, its previous average gross
profit of 50% was cut down so that 90% of such gross
profit was diverted from a Wisconsin source to a new
apparent source in Chicago. Although the intercompany
sales agreement was set aside the Court refused to set
aside the arrangements with the affiliated advertising
corporation known as the "Buckingham Agency." In this
connection the Court at page 232 stated:
"What has been said has been said with reference to the income of the Wisconsin company
and plaintiff company earned in the State of
Wisconsin. In the opinion of the court, the situation with regard to the income of the Buckingham
Agency is different, and no part of such income
should be allocated or charged to the plaintiff or,
Wisconsin companies. That corporation was organized subsequent to the reorganization hereinbefore discussed. I t had only one activity, the
placing of advertising. Its activities were all outside of the state; they had no connection with the
manufacture, but consisted of placing advertising
of the parent company with advertising
houses
and collecting commissions thereon. No p a r t of
its income was directly or indirectly earned in
the state of Wisconsin; no p a r t of it is taxable
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within the state; and, to the extent of the allocation thereof by the tax commission to Wisconsin
there should be an injunction as prayed."
In affirming the decree of the District Court, the
Circuit Court speaking through Judge Alschuler stated
at page 85:
"But, apart from the foregoing, we will give
some consideration to the Wisconsin company's
profits as undertaken to be fixed by its contract
with the parent company. While intercorporate
contracts fixing the income or profits of a subsidiary are not per se fraudulent or void as
against state taxation of the subsidiary is income,
concededly they will not stand in the way of ascribing to the subsidiary a reasonable income from
the operation which it carries on within the income
taxing state. A stipulated percentage of profit
upon manufacturing cost might in many cases be
fair enough if all cost factors were included; but
with substantial cost items omitted the agreed
percentage might prove only a delusion."
The Court also stated page 87 :
"Having in mind the magnitude of the business here involved, we believe the commission
reached a conclusion which sufficiently approximates justice between this taxpayer and the state
as to require approval of the result."
A somewhat similar situation was presented in Bukk
Motor Company v. City of Milwaukee,

Wisconsin, 48 F .

2d 801 (1931) (CCA 7). The decision of District Judge
Geiger in this case is reported in 43 F . 2d 385 (1930).
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The case involved the validity of a reassessment of state
income taxes by the Wisconsin Tax Commission for the
years 1917 to 1924 of Buick Motor Company, a Michigan
corporation, licensed to do business in Wisconsin. The
company with a capital stock of $10,000.00 was a wholly
owned subsidiary of General Motors Company, a Delaware corporation. Under contract dated January 2? 1917,
General Motors Company, termed the "seller," contracted
with Buick Motor Company, termed the "buyer," to sell
to the buyer the entire output of automobiles produced
at the seller's Buick factory at Flint, Michigan, upon a
basis which would result in an annual net profit of
$2500.00 to the buyer on said business. The contract
had unlimited duration.
During the years involved appellant's annual sales
of cars and parts ranged from a minimum of $89,000,000
to a maximum of $231,000,000, the annual sales of the
Wisconsin branch ranging from $2,454,000 to $6,800,000.
The cars and parts sold by the Wisconsin branch were
billed to the branch by appellant at about the same price
as to independent distributors and were shipped from
General Motors factory at Flint, Michigan and remittances were made by customers to the Wisconsin branch
which, having no bank account of its own, sent the remittances as received to General Motors. For the year 1917
ppellant returned as income to Wisconsin the sum of
,018.42, later contending that its income was only $2,% which was the amount of income annually returned
A
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sion added as further income the sum of $80,051.00 representing in the main Wisconsin's portion of a total amount
held by appellant as reserves for dealer's rebate. In
1920 the commission signified its dissatisfaction with appellant's general plan of return of income. Correspondence and discussions ensued, and resulted in 1921 in the
innauguration of the general practice of treating appellant's Wisconsin branch as though the branch were an
independent jobber or distributor of the Buick products.
Amended returns were accordingly filed for 1919 and
1920 but none for prior years under which a portion of
the income tax paid for 1919 was refunded to appellant.
F o r subsequent years returns were filed on this basis.
However, in 1926 the commission caused an audit to be
made of appellants' accounts as well as those of General
Motors. The commission concluded from the audit that
the returns did not truly reflect the income from Wisconsin business and accordingly made a reassessment
of tax. The Court in an opinion by Judge Alschuler
stated at page 803:
"But it is insisted that the intercorporate contract relation should be given effect, and that the
stipulated $2500.00 of net profit to appellant
should be held to be the maximum of appellant's
actual taxable income for each of the years in
question. Whether the contract, as between the
contracting parties, is upon its face fraudulent,
does not concern the state in the matter of it
taxes upon income derived from business tran
acted within its limits. Whatever other purpr
such a contract might have, the conclusion
quite irresistable that one of its objec+
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transfer the income arising from the business of
such states as then had, or might thereafter enact,
an income tax law, so that the income would not be
taxable in the state where earned. This motive
might not alone warrant the state in ignoring
the contract, but if appellant, notwithstanding
the contract, continued to earn the income upon
business transacted within the state, the contract
would not serve to defeat the right of the state
to tax the income so earned."
Again
"'While appellant carried on this vast business under an arrangement with General Motors
wjiereby the profits realized at once passed to
General Motors, the profits constituted taxable
income in Wisconsin where they passed to the
single beneficial owner of the capital stock. Distribution of corporate profits to or among stockholders, by whatever form, does not relieve the
corporation from income tax on what is earned
and distributed."
The Court cited the Cliffs Chemical and Shaffer v. Carter cases, hertofore mentioned.
In the case at bar, running like a thread through
plaintiff's argument, is the suggestion that because plaintiff is qualified to do business in New York where the
sales subsidiary transacts the business of selling plaintiff's Utah molybdenite and copper product, the opera*s of the two companies should be scrambled together
1 unit. Of some interest on this point is the state-f the Court at page 804:
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" I t is maintained for appellant that General
Motors was also licensed to do business in Wisconsin, and that if this income from the selling
of Buick products were taxable in Wisconsin, it
should be assessable to General Motors as its income. But appellant is a distinct corporation,
which had contracted with General Motors to buy
and sell Buick automobiles and parts, and it was
this separate entity which transacted this business
in Wisconsin, and to this entity the state had a
right to look for its tax upon the profit arising in
Wisconsin on the transaction of this business
there. Judge Geiger's opinion has, in our judgment, well demonstrated that the intercorporate
contract does not limit the state to a tax upon the
income which the contract assumes to prescribe."
Also running like a thread throughout plaintiff's
argument is the suggestion that the sales subsidiary in
selling the Utah product is acting for plaintiff representatively and not individually in the course of its
own business. This matter will be discussed hereafter
in more detail under Point 3 of this brief. We take the
liberty, however, of referring to Judge Geiger's statement and analysis of this point at page 390:
u

This particular contract provides for a 25%
profit on a capital of $10,000.00. If it must be
respected, then a contract eliminating all profit
retainable by the plaintiff ought to be just as
valid. Certainly, on its face, it negatives the purpose of creating an ordinary agency, and the voir
ume of business transacted by the plaintiff dnot indicate a good-faith purpose to allow f
per year as reasonable compensation for the
of a distinct and separate entity which assur
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sponsibility, as such, for the enormous business
transacted. In my judgment, it cannot be true,
as plaintiff asserts, 'were the contract involved
made with General Motors by an individual instead of plaintiff, we may assume that it would
pass everywhere unchallenged as determinative
of that individual's income.' The assumptions that
the contract made by an individual would be analogous and of unquestioned validity when tested
out under a tax law would, so it is believed, depend upon the identical consideration urged
against the plaintiff, viz. whether the individual
professed or insisted that the business transacted
was his individually or whether it was his representatively; what, if any, purpose could be discerned in his willingness to transact a countrywide volume for little or no consideration in
either capacity; and what, above all, is to account
for the rather anamolous and practically indeterminate manner of fixing a purchase consideration."
Again, it is stated:
"And the record for the Tax Commission,
in this case, is not only consistent with, but largely
predicated upon, the idea that the income arising
on the business transacted came to the motor
company, not on business which it transacted in
the state, but solely upon devolution by the plaintiff to the motors company under or by virtue of
the c o n t r a c t . . .
" I t is my judgment that when the business
transacted is found to be plaintiffs, conceding the
'subsidiary' relation to General Motors, the tax
authorities of the state were not obliged to respect the contract as an instrumentality relieving
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plaintiff, in whole or in part, from the effectiveness of the tax law against the income arising in
or on such business."
The Buick case is clear authority for the proposition
that where by intercompany contract the wholly owned
subsidiary undertakes to sell the product produced by its
parent the business of selling is the separate and distinct
business of the subsidiary and this notwithstanding that
the producing parent may be qualified to do business in
the state where the sales subsidiary in conducting the selling business. If the intercompany contract does not give
the sales subsidiary a fair and reasonable profit for conducting the selling business, the taxing authorities may
adjust the terms of the contract and determine the profit
which would have been earned if the contract had been
negotiated on a fair, reasonable and arms-length basis.
In the case at bar, it is the specific fact that the intercompany contracts between plaintiff and its sales subsidiary and A. S. & E. transfer the Utah product to the
selling companies at a fair, reasonable and arms-length
consideration. In such circumstances, neither defendant
nor plaintiff are entitled to have this contract set aside.
The contract is binding on both the taxpayer and the tax
authorities.
The doctrine of the foregoing cases is again illustrated by the decision of this Court in Columbia Iron Mining
Co. v. Iron County, 230 P. 2d 324 (1951). In this case
the court held that defendant was not bound to accept the
price for iron ore contained in the intercompany contract
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between Columbia Iron Mining Co. and Geneva Steel Co.,
both wholly owned subsidiaries of United States Steel
Corporation, where it appeared that such prices were
below fair market value and thereby avoided the payment
of the fair amount of taxes on iron ore. The Court speaking through Mr. Justice McDonough stated at page 327:
"As between subsidiaries, the ore selling subsidiary and the ore buying subsidiary, the operations are controlled by the parent corporation,
and the United States Steel Corporation as such
parent corporation is the ultimate owner. It was
not the intent of the legislature to permit a corporation which operates in this state through
wholly owned subsidiaries, to allow one subsidiary
to sell to another subsidiary at a price which is below fair market value, and thereby avoid payment
of the fair amount of taxes. In such cases, the
ultimate owner is the parent corporation, and the
state tax commission is not required to adopt the
intercompany sales as the basis for the assessment."
It may be of interest to note that this decision, which
was rendered a few months following the denial of plaintiff's petition for rehearing in Case No. 7298, required
administrative implementation. In lieu of contract values
of approximately $1.55 per ton of iron ore, a new fair
market value of the iron ore had to be ascertained by defendant. The values finally arrived at and determined
were the values used by the state of Minnesota taxing
authorities in determining the value of iron ore at the
mouth of the iron mines in Minnesota. Such values in
Minnesota are determined annually by working back from
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the published prices of iron ore at the Lower Lake Ports.
From such published prices are subtracted the transportation and other expenses incurred in getting the ore
from the mouth of the mine to the Lower Lake Ports.
Such values when transplanted to Utah have resulted in
tax values of iron ore in the neighborhood of $4.50 to
$6.50 per ton depending upon the grade, character and
composition of the ore. Such values are now used by
defendant for net proceeds, occupation tax and franchise
tax purposes and have not been appealed for judicial
reviews
We turn now to a pair of decisions of the Supreme
Court of Kansas covering, not the reasonableness of intercompany sales prices, but the reasonableness of an
intercompany contract between parent and subsidiary
company covering management and administrative services rendered by the parent to and for the subsidiary
company. These cases are pertinent to the case at bar
when it is recalled that for the period 1931 to 1936 the
Utah Division w^as not a division of plaintiff but an affiliated company, Utah Copper Company. The record
shows that both from an accounting and operating standpoint, the Utah Division is a separate unit of plaintiff,
separable from plaintiff's other divisions and subsidiaries. I n other words, the mandate of this court in No.
7298 requiring defendant to compute the tax on the basis
of the separate accounts of the Utah Division is in certain respects equivalent to requiring the Utah Division
to be treated as a separate and distinct entity or unit
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from plaintiff's other operating divisions or subsidiaries.
The question, heretofore mentioned, arises as to the
extent to which the New York management and administrative expenses should be allowed as a deduction on the
separate books and tax returns of the Utah Division. In
computing the net income of the Utah Division arising
from business done in Utah, the Utah Division's fair and
proportionate share of the New York administrative
expenses as reflected on its books has been allowed as a
deduction by defendant on the Utah tax returns. It will
be remembered that the Cottonwood Coal Co. case, heretofore cited, holds specifically that the maintenance of an
out-of-state administrative office by a mining company
conducting mining operations within the taxing state does
not require an apportionment of income outside the state
in which the mining operations are conducted.
Nutrena Mills Inc. v. Kansas State Tax Commission,
91 P. 2d 15 (1939), involved a corporation organized under the laws of Missouri engaged principally in the business of manufacturing and selling feed for livestock and
having its principal manufacturing plant in Kansas where
it was duly authorized to do business. All of its stock
•wned by Miller Management Corporation, a Miscation, not qualified to do business in Kansas
on states that "the evidence is that it perils services for Nutrena Mills, Inc., in the
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On June 23, 1934, the subsidiary entered into a written contract with its parent under which the parent
agreed to furnish to the subsidiary "complete managerial superintendence and executive control for the proper,
efficient and economical operation of the business and
affairs" of the subsidiary. For such services the subsidiary agreed to pay $4.50 to the parent for each ton of
feed manufactured by the subsidiary. For the year 1935
this amount was reduced to $3.25 per ton. In filing its
tax returns for the years 1934 and 1935 in Kansas the
subsidiary deducted $47,308.85 for 1934 and $129,001.67
for 1935 because of the management and financial
charges. The Tax Commission readjusted these amounts,
allowing $7,000 for 1934 and $33,580 for 1935, these being
the sums actually paid by the parent for salaries of the
officers of the subsidiary. The balance was treated as
dividends from the subsidiary to the parent and accordingly taxable to the subsidiary. The Kansas law and
regulations permitted the deduction of all 'ordinary and
necessary' expenses paid in carrying on a business and
permitted the deduction of a reasonable allowance for
salaries or other compensation paid for personal services
actually rendered.
The subsidiary taxpayer argued that tb r
per ton agreed upon were fair and reasonal
It appeared, however, that the subsidiary'*
commission for 1933 showed that its net r
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to have been 46c plus for 1933, to have been $1.85 for 1934
(up to June 1) and had never approached anything like
$4.50 per ton. The Court stated page 18:
"Hence, the agreement is open to the interpretation that the price per ton which by its contract
of June 1934, the Nutrena Mills, Inc., agreed to
pay the Miller Management Corporation for its
management and financial services was fixed so
high that it would take all of the profits of the
Nutrena Mills, Inc., even though they might be
greatly in excess of the previous profit of the
company."
Again,
"The Nutrena Mills, Inc., had its manufacturing plant in Kansas and transacted its business in
this state and is liable for income taxes here. If,
as argued by appellee, it was to syphon out of this
state and into another state the profits made by
Nutrena Mills, Inc., in Kansas by a contract to
pay the out-of-state corporation a sum grossly
in excess of the reasonable value of its services
to Nutrena Mills, Inc., that fact should not defeat
the collection of the income tax from the Nutrena
Mills, Inc., by this state."
The other Kansas case is Wyandotte

County

Company v. State Commission of Revenue and

Gas

Taxation,

127 P. 2d 481 (1941). In this case it appeared that the appellant Wyandotte County Gas Company was the operating gas company of the Cities Service organization in the
Kansas City area, In filing its Kansas income tax return
for 1937 the company claimed a deduction of $30,120.20
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from gross income which amount represented a management fee paid to its parent, Cities Service Company. Such
fee had been computed under an intercompany contract
dated September 1,1929 on the basis of 1 % % of its gross
revenue.
The commission disallowed the deduction in its entirety finding as follows:
"The commission further finds that the New
York management fees paid to the Cities Service
Company were based upon a percentage of gross
income and were computed without regard to actual services rendered. Such fees, therefore, do
not constitute an ordinary and necessary business e x p e n s e . . . "
No attempt was made before the commission or in the
District Court to show the value of any services rendered
the taxpayer by the Cities Service Co. or in fact that
any services had been rendered. The Court cited the
Nutrena Mills, Inc. case and sustained the commission.
Under these cases and the separate accounting cases
cited heretofore, the most that plaintiff should be entitled/'
to charge and deduct against the net income from its
Utah operations is a fair distributive share of the New
York administrative expenses to the extent that such
expenses are reasonable in amount and cover services
actually rendered by the New York administrative personnel to the activities of the Utah operation. There is
not the slightest showing or contention in the present proceeding that the amount of New York administrative
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expenses allowed by defendant is unfair, unreasonable
or in an amount less than the fair value which such services contributed to the net income earned by the Utah
Division. In fact Mr. Henry B. Fernald testified as follows (See F . page 157):
"Q.

And the general and administrative overhead
of the New York Office has been properly allocated in p a r t to the Utah Division ?

A.

I think I can say it has been properly allocated, but understanding that there are some
of the general expenses of the corporation
on which there has been no attempt to distribute, division by division; but they are left as
general expenses of the corporation, which
in the aggregate are quite minor in total
amount."

The Cottonwood Coal Company case, the Standard
Oil Company cases, and the other cases heretofore referred to show clearly and conclusively that the Utah tax
may and should be assessed on the basis of the net income
of the Utah Division separately computed on plaintiff's
books of account where the segregation of income on
such books of account is based upon market values which
on a fair basis allocate some of the profits to the state
of production and some of the profits to the state where
the selling business is transacted, providing that a fair
share of out-of-state administrative overhead is charged
back against the operation in the state of production.
Such segregation of income on a separate accounting
basis Is required in such circumstances even though
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the taxpayer corporation itself in its own name and in the
regular course of its own business conducts both the
manufacturing and selling operations. The selling activities of Standard Oil in North Dakota, for example,
were not conducted by a separate subsidiary of the taxpayer corporation, but were conducted by its own "selling department."
In the case at bar, the selling activity has been
separately incorporated and all sales are handled by and
in the name of the separate and distinct subsidiary corporation. Computation of the tax on the company engaging in the production operations must be computed
on the segregated books of account if such accounts reflect fair and reasonable intercompany arrangements
between the affiliated companies. The net income which
plaintiff derives in New York from the selling operations
separately conducted by its wholly owned sales subsidiary is derived from the dividends which plaintiff receives annually from such subsidiary. During the period
here involved, plaintiff received dividends from the sales
subsidiary aggregating $1,240,000. Such dividends together with all of plaintiff's other investment income has
been allocated to New York and excluded from the Utah
tax base. All of the net income from the molybdenite
and blister copper produced by the Utah Division in Utah
is attributable to Utah and is earned from Utah business solely and exclusively. All of the Utah products
being transferred to the sales subsidiary and A. S. & R.
at fair prices for resale, plaintiff on a separate accountDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ing basis is entitled to no apportionment of income within and without the state of Utah merely by virtue of the
maintenance of an out-of-state administrative office.
Where allocation to the taxing state is made by
separate accounting methods the only thing required with
respect to the out-of-state administrative office is that
a fair share of such general out-of-state overhead be
charged against the separable local operation.Were this
not so, there would be no such thing as allocation by
direct separate accounting methods. The statutory formula would be applicable to all cases, the only difference
being the question whether such statutory formula should
be applied to the total net income of the corporation from
all sources or whether it should as a matter of right entitle the taxpayer to apply it against the separate net
income shown and calculated on his separate set of books
as attributable to the operations conducted within the
producing state. The mere existence of an out-of-state
administrative office would thus require the state of production to allocate income within and without the state
by formula in every and all cases. This is clearly not
the law as the foregoing cases cited under this point show.
A different case would be presented, of course, where
the taxpayer corporation comes forth and shows that the
existence of the out-of-state administrative office has
subjected him to an income or franchise tax in the state
in which the administrative office is located. In such a
case a question of double taxation of the same net income
might be involved.
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In the case at bar, plaintiff has not shown nor does it
now claim that any question of double taxation is involved. It makes no claim that any portion of the net
income of the Utah Division is taxable or has been subjected to tax by the New York taxing authorities. This
feature of the case is particularly important because a
computation of tax under Subdivision 8 of the Utah
Statute under the mandate of this Court in Case No.
7298 requires defendant in computing the tax to take into
account whether or not the assessment will result in
double taxation. This failure of plaintiff to make any
claim of double taxation is particularly significant also
when we look at plaintiff's Utah operations from the
standpoint of New York's similar franchise tax law.
New York's claim for tax against net income arising from
plaintiff's Utah Division is negligible, if any. In the first
place, New York sees a corporation which by separate
accounts has attributed all of the net income of the Utah
operations to the Utah separate division of the company.
If New York accepts and recognizes such separate and
segregated accounting methods it sees on such books no
net income of the Utah Division allocated or apportioned
to New York. In the second place, if New York sought
to apply its statutory formula based upon property, payroll and gross receipts against plaintiff, it is faced with
the fact that all of the property of the Utah Division is
located outside New York, all of the payroll of the division is located outside New York and all gross receipts
from sales of the Utah product are negotiated and effected by a separate and distinct corporate entity, to wit,
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the sales subsidiary or A. S. & R. as the case may be.
In these circumstances and on the present record it may,
therefore, be fairly concluded that not $1.00 of net income
which plaintiff in the case at bar is seeking to exclude
from the Utah tax base has been taxed or is legally subject to tax by any jurisdiction as arising from or attributable to the doing of business outside the state of Utah.
Plaintiff's net income from the Utah molybdenite and
blister copper product is in its full 100% amount net income earned from its land and mines and other operations in Utah. The market values determined under the
intercompany contracts between plaintiff and its sales
subsidiary and A. S. & E. constitute the separate gross
proceeds or their equivalent for the purpose of net proceeds, occupation tax and corporation franchise tax of
plaintiff's Utah Division. Deduction of the out-of-state
administrative, selling, refining, transportation and
marketing expenses from gross proceeds actually realized
represents Utah gross income which arises from the privilege of engaging in a local business which has been
granted to plaintiff by the State of Utah. No other state
or foreign country has or in the nature of the case could
have any claim for tax against this income or the privilege for which it is exacted. As a further illustration of
principle, see State v. Harnpel, 178 N.W. 244 (1920),
held that income from out-of-state land and mines
*r> Michigan was not taxable in Wisconsin when
'^tees resident in Wisconsin and distriDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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buted to Wisconsin beneficiaries, such beneficiaries being
stockholders of the corporation previously owning such
land and mines.
To summarize, defendant urges here under point 2
that the full 100% net income of the Utah Division constitutes plaintiff's Utah corporation franchise tax base.
This follows for the reason that plaintiff by fair and reasonable intercompany contracts with the sales subsidiary
and A. S. & E. has allocated by corporate contract the
profits attributable to Utah business and earned from
the Utah molybdenite and blister copper product. Defendant also urges that the profit on the sale of the products is earned by the sales subsidiary and A. S. & E. outside Utah, that such selling profit based on intercompany
contract is fair and reasonable, that in the absence of
fraud or an intent to evade the Utah tax neither plaintiff
nor defendant in this proceeding may set aside the intercompany contracts with or the separate corporate entities
of the sales subsidiary and A. S. & E,, that the out-ofstate expense incurred by plaintiff with respect to the
Utah product does not constitute out-of-state business
by plaintiff or its Utah Division, that a tax required to be
computed on the basis of a direct allocation by separate
accounting methods must be based on such separate accounts and not on the basis of the statutory formula an
plied to such separate accounts, and that the fair vr
of the Utah molybdenite and blister copper product
on the intercompany contracts with the sales
and A. S. & E. less the out-of-state e x ^
/ Clark Law School, BYU.
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statutory allowances have already been judicially determined to constitute the proper tax base with respect to
plaintiff's Utah operations for net proceeds and occupation tax purposes.
It would appear that plaintiff's case on this appeal
will turn mainly on the question whether the separate
corporate entity of the sales subsidiary may be set aside
and ignored. Both before the defendant below and here
on appeal, plaintiff seeks to ignore the separate corporate entity of the sales subsidiary either on the ground of
"agency" or on the ground that being a wholly owned and
dominated subsidiary of plaintiff, defendant and this
court should look through the corporate form and treat
the sales subsidiary as a mere department or adjunct
of plaintiff in carrying on and conducting plaintiff's
business. In other words, plaintiff is arguing that the
sales subsidiary is the alter ego of plaintiff because dominated by its sole stockholder. On the other hand, if regarded as a separate entity, it is urged that it is acting
"representatively" and not "individually," conducting
plaintiff's business but not its own business.
The cases and authorities to be discussed under
Point 3, together with the authorities discussed here
under this Point 2, all show clearly and conclusively that
in the absence of fraud or evasion the separate corporate entity must be recognized and accepted for tax purposes. By definition the word "taxpayer" means one
corporation, not two or more corporations, except where
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in pursuance of the law in such cases provided, affiliated
companies are permitted to file a consolidated tax return covering the operations of the companies as if they
were a single entity. Unless affiliated companies join in
a consolidated tax return the tax liability of each company must be separately computed providing the intercompany contracts and arrangements are fair and reasonable and have been negotiated upon an arms-length basis.
It should be recalled at this point that plaintiff's
sales subsidiary, a New York corporation, has never
qualified to transact nor has it in fact transacted business within the state of Utah. The consolidated return
provisions of the Utah franchise tax lawT and defendant's
regulations issued thereunder manifest a clear intent that
only affiliated companies subject to taxation in Utah
may file a consolidated tax return. Where such consolidated returns are filed, intercompany transactions are
ignored and one tax computed with respect to the entire
group of affiliated companies as if they were one legal
taxable entity. The action of plaintiff in filing its Utah
tax returns of adding back into the Utah Division's net
income the full commissions paid to its sales subsidiary
and deducting in lieu of such commissions an estimated
amount representing the actual expenses incurred by the
selling subsidiary with respect to the sale of the Utah
copper and molybdenite appears to be clearly in erroi.
Such action appears directly contrary to the regular
and systematic treatment of such commissions on the
books of account of the Utah Division. I t seems to fly
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directly in the teeth of the fair and reasonable intercompany arrangements between plaintiff and its sales subsidiary. Furthermore, it appears to do violence to the
provisions of the Utah statute relating to the filing of
consolidated returns.
As stated by this Court in First Security Corporation of Ogden v. State Tax Commission, 91 Ut. 101 (1936)
at page 113:
"The statute requires only Utah corporations
or corporations qualified to do business in Utah
to make returns. The state of Utah has no power
nor authority to require a Wyoming corporation
which has not accepted the constitutional provisions of Utah nor qualified to do business in the
state, to make returns under the income tax law."
In A. C. Lawrence Leather Co. v. Commonwealth,
151 N.E. 851 (1926) the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated the same principle as follows at page
852:
"The clear meaning of the paragraph in its
entirety is that taxation upon combined net income of foreign corporations can be levied only
when such corporations doing business in this
commonwealth constitute the entire group filing
a consolidated return of income to the federal government, and that such corporations which have
joined with one or more corporations 'not subject
to this section/ in filing a consolidated return to
the federal government must each file with the
commissioner a statement of its net income as
there described."
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Again the same court in J. G. McCrory Co. v. Commissioner

of Corporations,

182 N.E. 481 (1932) at page

484 stated:
"The taxpayer was a domestic corporation.
Neither its parent corporation nor any one of the
other subsidiaries of that parent corporation carried on a business in this Commonwealth. The taxpayer conducted a local retail business in two
cities within the Commonwealth. It was not engaged in business elsewhere. There is no warrant
in Gr. L. c. 63 for basing the excise tax on the domestic corporation upon the capital or income
of foreign corporations carrying on no business
within the Commonwealth. I t is elementary that
no tax can be valid unless authorized by statute
and assessed in conformance to its terms . . .
There is nothing in this record to show that the
relation between the taxpayer and its parent corporation was fictitious or a mere cloak for something not appearing on the face of the transaction.
The method followed by the commissioner upon
the facts disclosed was in conflict with the principle stated in Hoeper v. Tax Commission, 284 U.S.
206, at page 215, . . . in these words: '. . . because
of the fundamental conceptions which underlie
our system, any attempt by a state to measure the
tax on one person's property or income by reference to the property or income of another is contrary to due process of law as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.' While the tax in thf
case at bar is an excise and not a property tax,
this principle is equally applicable when the excise
is measured by property or income not belonging
to the corporation sought to be taxed."
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The Supreme Court of Minnesota in State v. Oliver
Iron Mining Co. 292, N.W. 407 (1939) in discussing the
mandatory consolidation provisions of the Minnesota
statute, stated at page 411:
"Nor does it offend our tax law or any provision of c, 405 that the affiliated or related corporations which have no tax status in this state
are not joined in the consolidated returns. As
we regard it, if all of the affiliated corporations
which are taxable in this state join in the consolidated return it is a sufficient compliance with our
law although there may be other affiliated corporations having no tax status here."
See also Annotation contained in 117 A.L.E. 508 entitled
"Franchise tax of corporation as affected by creation
of affiliated corporation."
Under the foregoing authorities it is quite clear that
plaintiff's returns in consolidating the operations of
the Utah Division with the operations of the sales
subsidiary, which latter corporation is not subject to
taxation in Utah, is wholly unwarranted and in conflict
with the clear wording of our Utah statute. Furthermore, it should be remembered at this point that even if
the separate corporate entity of the sales subsidiary is
completely disregarded, plaintiff makes no claim in this
proceeding that the separate corporate entity of the
fabricating subsidiaries, Chase Brass and Copper Co.
and Kennecott Wire and Cable Co., should be disregarded. The transfer of 25% of the total production of copper
of the Utah Division to these fabricating subsidiaries in
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any event would have to be attributed to Utah business
for the reason that such intercompany sales are on fair
and reasonable terms and thus covered by the separate
accounting cases heretofore mentioned. The statutory
formula could in no event be applicable to such transfers
of the Utah copper product to the affiliated fabricating
subsidiaries. Furthermore, it should be pointed out
that A. S. & E. which disposes of the gold, silver, platinum and paladiuin product of the Utah Division cannot
under any circumstances consolidate for tax purposes
its operations with those of plaintiff for the reason that
plaintiff and A. S. & R. are not affiliated companies.
With respect to defendant's position under this
point that the Utah tax must be computed upon the full
100% net income show and reflected on the separate accounts of plaintiff's Utah Division, which position assumes that the separate corporate entity of the sales
subsidiary must be recognized and respected both by defendant and plaintiff, we invite the court's particular attention to the case of Curtis Companies, Inc. v. Wisconsin
Tax Commission, 251 N.W. 497 (1933), which case is also
reported in 92 A.L.R. 1065.
Bearing in mind plaintiff's basic position in this proceeding that plaintiff's producing operations in Utah
must be combined with the selling operations in New York
of its sales subsidiary and tax computed on the basis of
the statutory formula as appplied to such combined opDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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erations, w7e quote from the summary of appellant's
argument appearing at page 1067 of the A.L.E. Report:
"Plaintiffs and affiliated corporations cannot
on the record here be treated as a single corporation doing business both within and without the
state, in order to justify an apportionment of income as the income of Curtis Companies, Inc."
In the case at bar plaintiff seeks to combine the operations of its sales subsidiary with the Utah Division
in its attempt by use of the statutory formula to exclude
% of the net income of the Utah Division as attributable
to the selling activities conducted in New York. In the
Curtis Companies case, it was the tax commission which
attempted to combine the operations of the affiliated corporations and compute the tax as if such combined operations were being conducted by a single corporation. We
quote first from the headnote contained in the A.L.E,
Report.
"Authority to require a consolidated state income tax return from a manufacturing corporation and the company of which it is a subsidiary,
and to treat such return as the return of a single
corporation in ascertaining, according to the
method prescribed by the income tax statute, the
portion properly subject to state income tax, on
the ground that the allocation of corporate income
of the manufacturing corporation to the state as
arrived at by the separate accounting method is
controlled by arbitrary factors, to-wit, the margin
allowed to the manufacturing corporation on sales,
at a price not claimed to be unfair, to the distributing subsidiaries of the parent company the
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distribution of advertising charges, the distribution of general administrative charges, and the
factory rental charge made by the parent company
to the manufacturing company,—is not conferred
by a statutory provision relating to cases where a
corporation so conducts its business as directly or
indirectly to benefit the members or stockholders
by selling its products at less than a fair price,
and to cases where a corporation a substantial
portion of whose capital stock is owned either directly or indirectly by another corporation acquires and disposes of the products of the parent
company in such a manner as to create a loss or
improper net income."
Again on page 1066 (ALE) the headnote states:
"So long as the corporate form or intercorporate agreements between a manufacturing subsidiary and the company by whom all the stock of such
subsidiary is owned do not constitute devices
having the purpose or effect of covering up income actually received by the corporation whose
affairs are under examination, the State Tax
Commission is without power, in assessing the
subsidiary for state income tax, to disregard corporate agreements as to price, expenses, and other
factors essential to the establishment of a net
income, and to proceed to determine the income
upon the basis of its judgment as to providence
or business wisdom of such arrangement."
The headnote continues:
"Power to disregard the corporate entity,
or intercorporate contracts, in assessing the state
income tax of a manufacturing corporation, stock
in which is owned by a parent company but which
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has its own officers who actually transact its affairs and which sells its products at a fair price to
the distributing subsidiaries of the parent company, by which charges are made for rental, advertising and general administrative charges, is
not conferred upon the state tax commission by a
statute empowering it to require, in the case of
affiliated corporations, 'such consolidated statements as in its opinion are necessary in order to
determine the taxable income received by anyone
of the affiliated or related corporations.' "
The opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court by
Justice Wickhem gives the specific facts involved in the
case as follows :
The Curtis Companies, Inc. was a holding company
owning all the capital stock except director's qualifying
shares of the Curtis & Yale Company and of several companies engaged in a similar business. The Curtis & Yale
Company was a producing company manufacturing and
jobbing sash, doors and miscellaneous mill work. Its
plant was located at Wausau, was owned by Curtis Companies, Inc. and was leased by that corporation to the
Curtis & Yale Company. Both the Curtis & Yale Company and Curtis Brothers & Company, another subsidiary with a plant at Clinton, Iowa, did extensive manufacturing and sold their products to outside dealers as
well as to the distributing subsidiaries of Curtis Companies, Inc.
It appeared that since 1920 Curtis Companies, Inc.
and Curtis & Yale Company had filed returns of income
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with Wisconsin reporting Wisconsin income upon a
separate accounting basis. In 1929 a field audit of both
companies for the years 1925 to 1928 inclusive was made.
On the basis of this audit it was determined that Curtis
& Yale Company owed additional income taxes of $6,319.90 and that Curtis Companies, Inc. was entitled to
a refund of $491.55. In making these assessments the
separate accounting method of reporting Wisconsin's
income was not changed. Due notice of the additional
assessment was given and on objection by the taxpayers,
a hearing was held before the commission. On the hearing it was conceded that Curtis Companies, Inc. was
entitled to a greater refund, that is, in the amount of
$547.58. Curtis & Yale Company conceded liability for an
additional tax of $2,611.72, but objected to the balance.
Objection of Curtis & Yale Company to the assessment centered principally about the disallowance of a
total of $66,640.47 for advertising expenses in the returns
of the company for 1925 to 1928 inclusive. These sums
represented charges made to Curtis & Yale Company
by Curtis Companies, Inc. as its proper share of national
advertising authorized by it.
As a result of the hearing the commission concluded
that the separate accounting method did not reasonably
reflect Wisconsin income and that the "proper basis for
reporting in this case is, therefore, a consolidation of
the incomes of the inter-related corporations and an
apportionment thereof in the manner described by the
statute."
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The assessment ultimately made was entered against
Curtis Companies, Inc., the parent company. The plaintiffs contended that the action of the commission in consolidating the income of the affiliated companies and
assessing a tax on the combined income to the parent
company by application of the Wisconsin statutory formula was improper and invalid.
The Court refused to permit the statutory apportionment of the combined income of the affiliated companies and ruled that the tax should be computed on
the basis of the separate accounts regularly maintained
by each company.
The opinion states at page 1070 (A.L.E.) :
"Having determined that the allocation of
corporate income to Wisconsin, as arrived at by
the separate accounting method, is controlled by
four arbitrary factors, to-wit: (1) The 1 1 % %
margin allowed to the factories on sales to the
distributing subsidiaries; (2) The distribution of
advertising charges; (3) The distribution of general administrative charges; and (4) The rental
charged Curtis & Yale Company for the Wausau
factory, it is first contended that the commission
had a right to require consolidated returns under
the authority given by section 71.25(2). I t is
further contended that the domination of the
Curtis and Yale Company by Curtis Companies,
Inc. combined with the arbitrary character of the
items which determine the Curtis & Yale income,
justify the commission in disregarding the separate identity of the corporations and imposing a
tax in accordance with the consolidated return.
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I t is conceded that this tax probably should have
been entered against the Curtis & Yale Company,
but it is contended that this is an error that can
be readily corrected. I t will be noticed that the„
commission does not conclude that the intercorporate transactions under examination here
were unfair during the years under audit, nor is
it contended that either the form of corporate
organization adopted or the contracts between
the parent and subsidiary had for their purpose
the evasion of the income tax law by diverting a
portion of the Curtis & Yale Co. income properly
attributable to its Wisconsin activities through
subsidiaries doing business in the state not having
an income tax law.
"At the outset it seems clear that section
71.02(3) (d) relates to the situation presented by
a single taxpayer who does business within and
without the state. He is permitted separately to
account when that method reasonably reflects the
income properly attributable to activities in this
state, and, if it does not, the statute contains a
precise and detailed description of the manner
in which the Wisconsin income is to be determined.
This method involves the application to the total
income of such a taxpayer, of the average of certain ratios described in the section, Assuming
that Curtis and Yale Company was a wholly independent corporation and not a subsidiary, it is
clear that this section sets forth in detail the
method of ascertaining its Wisconsin income. I t
is claimed, however, that the commission, for any
purposes of the income tax law, may require a
consolidated return in cases of affiliated corporations, and that having exacted this return, the
corporations may be treated as a single corporation in applying the ratios described in section
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71.02(3) (d). Certainly section 71.25 gives no such
authority to the tax commission. This section is
entitled 'Corporate Tax Evasion Prevented.' Its
first subdivision deals with two situations: 1st,
a corporation which so conducts its business as
to directly or indirectly benefit the members or
stockholders by selling its products at less than a
fair price; 2nd, where a corporation, a substantial
portion of whose capital stock is owned either
directly or indirectly by another corporation, acquires and disposes of the products of the parent
company in such a manner as to create a loss or
improper net income. I t is not seriously contended that Curtis & Yale Company sold its products at less than a fair price, nor was this fact
found by the commission. The second provision
of the section obviously has no application to the
Curtis & Yale Company since it was the producing
company and had no contract whatever to dispose
of the products of Curtis Companies, Inc. In the
two situations above described, neither one of
which, as it seems to us, applies to this case, the
commission may determine the income of the corporations found to engaged in an effort to evade
taxes by disregarding these arrangements and
estimating the reasonable profits which might
have been made but for their existence."
The Court further stated :
"If it once be admitted that the intercorporate
contract or arrangement does not establish an
unfair price for the goods, and in addition that
it is not a device adopted for the purpose of avoiding the provisions of the income tax law, section
71.25 has no application, and, if the position of
the commission is sound it must be because the
commission, from some source or by some process,
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

182
porate contracts for income tax purposes whenever it appears that the taxpayer corporation, the
income of which is under investigation, is wholly
owned by another corporation. This question we
shall consider hereafter. It is, of course, clear
enough that except for this question, presently
reserved, the commission has no visitorial or
supervisory control over the affairs of a corporation; that it cannot question the wisdom of its
contracts or practices, being limited to a decision
as to whether or not the contracts or business
practices are colorable devices adopted to conceal
income and avoid the tax."
With respect to whether the commission may combine the operations and income of parent and wholly
owned subsidiary merely because "a wholly owned subsidiary is involved" the Court stated:
u

We find no authority in the statutes to sustain the conclusion that the commission has such
powers. The only basis for a claim to such powers
rests in the undoubted right of the commission
to exact reports that accurately reflect income,
and to tax upon the basis of the true income. So
long as the corporate form or the intercorporate
agreement do not constitute devices having the
purpose or effect of covering up income actually
received the corporation whose affairs are under
examination, they do reflect the true income of
the corporation. The corporation reports, for
example, in this case the aggregate income actually received from sale of products. It reports
its actual expenditures for advertising and for
rent. Its gross income, minus legitimate deductions, constitutes its net income upon which a tax
may be levied. The situation is quite different
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from that in the Palmolive, Buick, and Cliffs
Chemical Company cases, where profits actually
earned by the subsidiary were routed to the
parent corporation by special contract designed
to prevent a showing of profit by the subsidiary."
The judgment of the court below was reversed, the
assessment set aside and the cause remanded to the tax
commission with direction to reassess the tax as indicated in the opinion based upon the separate accounts
of parent and subsidiary and not on the basis of an
apportionment of income under the statutory formula
based upon the combined net income of parent and
subsidiary.
The Curtis Companies case is again clear authority
that the action of plaintiff in the case at bar in combining the net income and operations of plaintiff's Utah
Division and its sales subsidiary and apportioning the
net income of both parent and subsidiary under the Utah
statutory formula was improper and erroneous. Particularly is this so where the subsidiary was not even qualified to do or doing business in Utah and consequently
not subject to taxation upon its- selling profit in Utah.
The testimony, evidence and findings of defendant show
that the intercompany arrangement between plaintiff
and sales subsidiary covering the sale of the Utah product is a fair, reasonable and arms-length arrangement.
The transfers by plaintiff of a portion of the Utah
product to A. S. & E. under fair, reasonable and armslength intercompany arrangements must likewise be
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recognized and accepted by both plaintiff and defendant
in this case. The Curtis Companies case is likewise of
interest in that it shows once again that where the tax
is to be computed on the basis of separate accounting
methods only a fair and reasonable proportion of general administrative charges need be charged against the
local operation. Not an apportionment of income within
and without the state is required or permissible, merely
a fair distribution of the general overhead or administrative expense.
The foregoing authorities under this Point 2 clearly
establishing that the Utah corporation franchise tax
should be based upon the full 100 per cent net income of
the Utah Division of plaintiff, as separately kept and
maintained, we turn next to the question whether this
court has jurisdiction to increase by a modification of
defendant's decision or a remand of the case, the deficiencies in tax as determined by defendant.
The jurisdiction of defendant to increase the amount
of deficiencies over the amount of deficiences shown in
the initial notice by letter to the taxpayer, required under
the provisions of Section 80-13-36, U.C.A. 1943, appears
not to have been judicially considered in this state.
Furthermore, the question seems not to have been considered of the extent to which this court has jurisdiction
in modifying a decision of defendant or in remanding a
case to defendant for rehearing, to make a determination
or to direct a determination by defendant which will
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result in deficiencies in tax greater than the amounts
previously asserted against the taxpayer by defendant.
The general procedure contained in the statute with
respect to the determination and assessment of tax deficiencies by defendant with respect to corporation franchise taxes is as follows.
Under Section 80-13-36, U.C.A. 1943, after determining that there is a deficiency in tax, defendant mails
notice of such deficiency to the taxpayer which notice
contains the details of the deficiency and the manner of
computing the tax. Within sixty days after the mailing
of such notice, the taxpayer may file a petition with
defendant for a re-determination of the deficiency.
Except with the taxpayer's consent, the deficiency cannot be assessed or collection proceedings instituted until
a mailing of such notice and the expiration of sixty days
thereafter, or if a petition has been filed with the defendant until defendant's decision has become final. The
statutory provisions suspend the running of the statutes
of limitations on the making of assessments and the
institution of collection proceedings until the expiration
of 30 days after notice to the taxpayer of defendant's
decision. Such decision, however, does not become final
upon the expiration of such thirty day period if proceedings for review of the decision are taken to this
Court. In the event of appeal, Section 80-13-46 provides
that the decision "shall become final, (1) when affirmed
or modified by the judgment of the Supreme Court; (2)
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if the Supreme Court remands the case to the tax commission for rehearing, when it is thereafter determined
as hereinabove provided with respect to the initial proceedings."
Upon the filing of the taxpayer's petition for a
redetermination of a deficiency, notice of which has been
mailed to the taxpayer, the statute requires defendant to
give the taxpayer notice and an opportunity to be heard.
It is also provided that after hearing a decision shall be
made as quickly as practicable. Of particular importance
to the question here presented is Section 80-13-39 entitled
"Jurisdiction to Redetermine Deficiency." This section
reads as follows:
66

The Tax Commission shall have jurisdiction
to redetermine the correct amount of the deficiency even if the amount so redetermined
is
greater than the amount of the deficiency, notice
of which has been mailed to the taxpayer, and to
determine whether any penalty, additional amount
or addition to the tax should be assessed; provided, that at the hearing or prior thereto claim
therefor is asserted."
In addition to the power of this Court under Section
80-13-46, referred to above, of affirming or modifying
defendant's decision or remanding the case to defendant
for rehearing, Section 80-13-47, entitled "Review by
Supreme Court," provides for application to this Court
for a writ of certiorari or review for the purpose of having "the lawfulness of such decision inquired into and
determined." This latter section also provides "upon the
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hearing no new or additional evidence may be introduced,
but the cause shall be heard on the record before the Tax
Commission as certified to by it. The decision of the
tax commission may be reviewed both upon the law and
the facts, and the provisions of the code of civil procedure relating to proceedings in the supreme court shall,
so far as is applicable and not in conflict with this chapter, apply to the proceedings in the supreme court under
the provisions of this section." Of interest also is Section
80-13-48 entitled "Exclusive Jurisdiction of Supreme
Court." This section provides "no court of this state,
except the supreme court, shall have jurisdiction to review, reverse or annul any decision of the tax commission, or to suspend or delay the operation or execution
thereof." Although Section 80-13-47 permits "any party
affected thereby" to apply for a writ to review a decision
of defendant this apparently means and has been construed to mean a party other than the Tax Commission
itself. The requirement of the deposit or bond covering
the taxes, interest and other charges in Section 80-13-49
would indicate that defendant, unlike the Federal government, has no right to appeal on behalf of the State a
decision not appealed by the taxpayer. In the Federal
law, the Commissioner of Internal Eevenue is specifically
given the right of appeal from decisions of the Tax Court.
I t appears that the problem of the validity of an
increase in the deficiency beyond that set forth in the
initial deficiency letter to the taxpayer may arise either
before defendant or before this Court on appeal. Let us
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assume the mailing by defendant of a notice of deficiency
and the filing by the taxpayer of a petition for redetermination of the taxes set forth in such deficiency letter.
At any time before the hearing is actually held or at any
time during the hearing, defendant has the statutory
right to assert its claim to the increase. At the same time,
if no such claim were asserted, Section 80-13-39 would
prevent defendant by its decision from redetermining
the deficiency in an amount greater than the amount contained in the original deficiency letter. Again, if the
decision were appealed to this Court, the Court has jurisdiction under the statute to "affirm," "modify" or "remand" the decision to defendant for "rehearing." If the
Court, after a review of the matter, decides that the tax
deficiency appealed by the taxpayer is too small, may
the Court "modify" the decision to increase the deficiency
where claim therefor has been asserted at the hearing
below by defendant, and, further, where a case on appeal
has been remanded by this Court to defendant for rehearing, may defendant at the "rehearing" assert a claim
for an increased deficiency as a result of the decision and
opinion of this Court. These two questions, involving
the occupational hazards of tax litigation, are presented
here.
The authorities hereafter discussed show that the
same rule applicable to the initial hearing is applicable to
the "rehearing" following a remand of the case by this
Court. The reason for this is the provision in Section
80-13-46 that upon remand of a case to the Tax CommisDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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sion for rehearing, the same statutory rules with respect
to a decision by defendant are applicable on the rehearing
as are applicable with respect to initial proceedings
except that defendant's decision on rehearing cannot be
inconsistent with this Court's decision and opinion. The
discussion here with respect to the year 1942 and the
effect of the court's mandate and remittitur in Case No.
7298 on defendant's authority to increase the deficiencies
on the rehearing over and above the def iciences originally
asserted and appealed to this court is tied directly into
plaintiff's argument that under the mandate of this court
in Case No. 7298 the allocation factor of 66.926% is
res judicata and binding on defendant. This point is
hereafter discussed under defendant's Point 5 with respect to whether defendant's decision is inconsistent with
the Court's mandate in No. 7298 but discussed here with
respect to whether defendant may assert a claim for an
increase on the "rehearing" under the statute assuming
such claim to be entirely consistent with the Court's
mandate.
In view of the fact that the questions here being considered are novel ones so far as this Court is concerned,
we must turn primarily to the applicable Federal authorities for assistance on the problem.
I t will be remembered that the Utah corporation
franchise tax law in its general framework is largely
based upon the Federal 1928 income tax law. Section
272 (e) of the Internal Eevenue Code provides as follows :
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"Increase of deficiency after notice mailed.—
The tax court shall have jurisdiction to redetermine the correct amount of the deficiency even
if the amount so redetermined is greater than the
amount of the deficiency, notice of which has been
mailed to the taxpayer, and to determine whether
any penalty, additional amount or addition to the
tax should be assessed—if claim therefore is
asserted by the commissioner at or before the
hearing or a rehearing."
The above provision has been in the federal tax law since
the 1926 act.
For a general discussion of the problem see PrenticeHall 1954 Federal Tax Service, Volume 3, Para. 21,504—
9, and 1954 CCH Fed. Tax Reporter, Vol. 4, para. 1354.10.155.
The Utah statute, unlike the Federal law, confers no
authority on defendant to grant a rehearing. Thus, following a hearing, when defendant's decision is rendered
and mailed to the taxpayer, its jurisdiction in the matter
is then completely exhausted and terminated. The only
authority for a rehearing in the Utah statute is one
directed by this Court upon a remand of the case. In
other words, the authority of defendant is the same as
that of the State Tax Commission of Arizona considered
in Magma Copper Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission,
191 P. 2d 169 (1948). In this case it appeared that the
taxpayer following a hearing before the commission and
an adverse decision by the commission, instead of appealing to the court filed a petition for rehearing with the
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commission which was granted. A further hearing was
held and the commission's original assessment was confirmed. The taxpayer within the statutory period measured from the second decision appealed to the court.
On behalf of the state it was argued that the commission
had exhausted its jurisdiction when it entered its first
decision and that all action taken thereafter was null and
void, and that the court therefore was without jurisdiction in the matter. The Supreme Court of Arizona stated
at page 175:
"Nowhere in the income tax law is there any
authority for a rehearing by the commission upon
rendering its decision after the hearing provided
for in Sec. 73-1539, supra. The only remedy provided for is by appeal to the Superior Court. No
appeal was taken from the order of the commission of December 29, 1942. Instead the appellant,
for some reason, moved for a rehearing. The commission was wholly without authority to grant a
rehearing or to take further action of any kind
in the matter. All actions thereafter taken by it,
including its order of October 11, 1945 were null
and void."
When we turn to the provisions of the Federal law
pertaining to the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit
Courts of Appeals to review decisions of the Tax Court
of the United States (formerly Board of Tax Appeals)
we see a substantial similiarity of these provisions with
the Utah statutory provisions governing the jurisdiction
of this Court over decisions of defendant.
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Section 1141 of the Federal Internal Eevenue Code
provides
"(a) Jurisdiction.—The Courts of Appeal
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review the
decisions of the tax court, . . . in the same manner
and to the same extent as decisions of the district
courts in civil actions tried without a jury; and
the judgment of any such court shall be final,
except that it shall be subject to review by the
Supreme Court of the United States upon certiorari in the manner provided in Section 1254 of
Title 28 of the United States Code."
This section also provides
"(c) Powers.—(1) To affirm, modify or reverse.—Upon such review, such courts shall have
power to affirm or, if the decision of the board
is not in accordance with law, to modify or to
reverse the decision of the board, with or without
remanding the case for a rehearing, as justice
may require."
The provisions of Section 80-13-39 U.C.A. 1943 and
Section 272 (e) of the Internal Eevenue Code, with respect to increases of deficiencies, appear to be almost
identical with the exception that under Federal practice
the Commissioner of Internal Eevenue may assert the
claim not only "at or before the hearing" but also at "a
rehearing." The phrase "or a rehearing" is omitted in
the Utah law. This rehearing provision in the Federal
law appears to be applicable to both rehearings granted
by the Tax Court itself and those directed by the Federal
Courts of Appeal. In other words, the Commissioner
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may assert his claim for increase before the hearing, at
the hearing or at any rehearing before the Tax Court.
In the case at bar the question of the validity of a
claim asserted by defendant at a rehearing granted by
itself is not involved. With respect to the year 1942,
there is involved the validity of defendant's claim asserted at a rehearing directed by this Court by the mandate and remittitur in No. 7298. With respect to the
years subsequent to 1942, that is, 1943 to 1950 inclusive,
there is involved the validity of defendant's claim
asserted at the initial hearing, which hearing had been
consolidated with the rehearing relating to 1942.
In Cement Gim Co. v. Commissioner, 36 F. 2d 107
(1929) (CCA DC), the Court after referring to the pertinent provisions of the Federal revenue code, stated at
page 108:
"The Commissioner, in his amended answer
to the Board, set forth the error in his determination of the deficiency for the year 1920, and requested that the deficiencies be increased by the
amount of the partial allowance he had made for
that year. This correction was made by the Board.
The Board in its redetermination of the deficiency
was acting clearly within its jurisdiction and
authority."
Again in Davison v. Commissioner, 60 F. 2d 50
(1932) (CCA 2), the Court stated, page 51:
"The petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of
the Board to assess a deficiency greater than the
deficiency set out in the 1925 notice because he
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asserts that the statute of limitations had run
before the commissioner's amended answer was
filed. This contention is without merit. Section
274(e) of the Kevenue Act of 1926 . . . , permits
the Board to redetermine the correct amount of
the deficiency, even if it be greater than the deficiency stated in the commissioner's notice to the
taxpayer, 'if claim therefor is asserted by the
commissioner at or before the hearing or a rehearing.' . . . The provisions of section 277 (b),
. . ., and Section 274 (a) of the act . . . cause the
running of the statute of limitations to be suspended while proceedings are pending before the
Board."
However, in the same case covering the year 1926,
the Court refused to permit an increase of deficiency
where no claim therefore had been asserted at the hearing, the Court stating, page 52 :
"The 1926 deficiency was also increased by
the Board, although the commissioner had failed
to assert any claim for an additional deficiency
as required by Section 274 (e) of the Revenue Act
of 1926. This was clearly an error, and cannot be
justified under Rule 50 of the Board's Rules of
Practice. Rule 50 requires the computation of
deficiency to be in accordance with the decision
on the issues presented at the hearing of the
proceeding on the merits. New issues, other than
those relating to computation, cannot be raised
upon computation of the tax under Rule 50."
Again in Weiller v. Commissioner, 64 F. 2d 480
(1933) (CCA 2), the Court stated the general rules to be
as above, citing the Davison and Cement Gun cases. It
then stated, page 482:
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"The only difference between the two decisions last mentioned and the case at bar is that
here new property upon which an additional deficiency has been found was first introduced in
the answer of the commissioner before the Board
of Tax Appeals and had never been considered
by the commissioner or included in his deficiency
notice. The taxpayer's theory seems to be that a
deficiency can only be increased by the Board
when it concludes that the commissioner adopted
a wrong rule of law in dealing with the facts
shown by the return, or where the particular
credits or debits upon which the commissioner had
based his determination of the deficiency were
valued improperly. But we see no reason for supposing that Section 308(a) is so limited and we
hold that it enables the Board of Tax Appeals to
make a full audit and do complete justice between
the parties whenever the taxpayer seeks to review
the assessment and the commissioner asserts a
claim that an additional amount should be
assessed. It seems clear from the foregoing that
the Board proceeded properly and rightly determined an additional deficiency. It can make no
difference that in arriving at this determination
it dealt with matters extraneous to the original
assessment,"
In Helvering v. Edison Securities Corp., 78 F. 2d
85 (1935) (CCA4), the Court stated at page 90:
"The Board refused to entertain the claim
for increased deficiency seemingly on the ground
that the power given it by Section 274 (e) is to be
exercised only if the claim is asserted by the commissioner at or before the hearing or a rehearing
of the case, and because in the opinion of the
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Board this stage had been passed when the commissioner set up the claim in this case. We think
that the power still persisted, for there seems to
be no reason why the word 'hearing' should not
be given a significance broad enough to include
the whole proceeding down to the final decision.
Ordinarily a hearing in equity embraces the decision also. (Citing Cases) But here the purpose is
manifest to give the taxpayer an opportunity to
answer and resist the claim before it is made
effective by the action of the Board. If this is
done, a claim of increase may be made and considered with propriety, whether it is presented
during the taking of the evidence or in the period
allowed for oral arguments, or written briefs, or
even subsequently during the hearing under Rule
50; in short, at any time before or after the filing
of the board's findings of fact until the decision
and judgment of the board has been entered; or
even later in the event of a re-hearing.
"This statement, however, must be taken with
the qualification that the power to receive the
claim should not be exercised unless a reasonable
opportunity to oppose it is given to the taxpayer,
and unless it is presented in accordance with
reasonable rules laid down by the Board. If the
question involved in the increase has been actually
raised during the trial and the taxpayer has presented his evidence and his views on the point or
has been given a chance to do so, the claim may
be received at any time before the decision and
allowed therein if found to be correct; but the taxpayer ought not to be taken by surprise."
Again the Court stated
"Even after a full trial below, an appellate
court has the power to remand a case for further
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proceedings if it has been tried on a wrong theory,
Underwood v. Commissioner CCA (56) (F2d) 67,
73; and it cannot be doubted, in view of the purpose for which the Board was established and of
the statute governing its procedure, that it has
equal power to do full justice to the parties while
they are still before it
"
A footnote on page 91 discussing this problem and
the jurisdiction of the Board under the 1926 act goes on
to state
"And from an adverse decision by the Board,
either party was given a right to appeal to the
Circuit Courts of Appeals, and these Courts were
given power to modify or reverse a decision of the
Board if not in accordance with the law, with or
without remanding the case for a rehearing, as
justice may require."
With respect to the situation where a remand of the
case from the Appellate Court was involved we invite the
Court's attention first to the case of Underwood v. Commissioner, 56 F. 2d 67 (1932) (CCA 4), in which the
Court stated at page 73:
"The Board had ample power under the
statute to require the production of additional
evidence when it became clear that it could not do
justice to the taxpayer by reason of the deficiencies in the record before it. It was unquestionably
encumbant upon the taxpayer to offer the testimony in the first instance, and cases arise where
the moving party must suffer the consequences of
his own neglect. Here, however, the Board's own
opinion showed that the commissioner's action
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was wrong in a material respect. The information
to correct the mistake was readily obtainable from
the same source as that from which the gross
receipts of the taxpayer were ascertained. Under
these circumstances, the Board should have deferred its decision until testimony showing the
amount of the deductions to which the taxpayer
was entitled was introduced, and then have redetermined the deficiency. The decision of the
Board will therefore be reversed and the case
remanded in order that the course indicated may
be followed. This action, we think, is authorized
by the powers vested in this court by the Eevenue
Act of 1926, . . . where it is provided that the
Circuit Court of Appeals shall have power to
modify or reverse a decision of the Board, if not
in accordance with the law, with or without remanding the case for a rehearing, as justice may
require. In a number of instances, Circuit Courts
of Appeal have remanded cases for rehearing
when it seemed necessary in order to do justice
to the parties. It does not appear in these cases
that new evidence was available; but in the instant
case the evidence is known to exist and it would
be an abuse of discretion to decline to receive it.
. . . In addition, there is the well established rule
that an appellate court has the power, without
determining and disposing of the case, to remand
it to the lower court for further proceedings if
the case has been tried on a wrong theory, or the
record is not in condition for the appellate court
to decide the question presented with justice to
all parties concerned...."
A case of particular pertinence to the case at bar is
Hall v. Helvering, 68 F. 2d 399 (1933) (CCA DC). This
case involved two appeals to the Circuit Court in the
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same controversy. The taxpayer had assigned to his
second wife certain life insurance commissions to which
he was entitled from Lincoln National Life Insurance
Company. The question arose whether the assignment
constituted a transfer of future income on which the
husband should be taxed or whether it was an assignment
of property the income from which would be taxable to
the wife.
In the first proceeding before the Board of Tax
Appeals, the Board decided that the assignment was
merely an assignment of future income. The taxpayer
appealed to the Circuit Court which reversed the Board's
decision and held that the assignment was an assignment
of property. The case was remanded to the Board for
further proceedings.
In the further proceedings before the board, following the remand, the Commissioner contended that even if
the amounts paid by the life insurance company to the
wife did not constitute income taxable to the husband,
nevertheless the amount that the wife had paid out of
such sums to discharge debts of the husband was taxable
to the husband. The Board sustained the Commissioner's
contention and the taxpayer again appealed to the Circuit Court. The Circuit Court affirmed the decision of
the Board and stated at page 400:
"When the question arose as to whether there
was a deficiency in petitioner's taxes, he appealed
to the Board, and thereby stopped the running of
the statute of limitations until final determination
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of that question, but when the case was here before, this court did not decide, nor was it asked
to decide, whether there was a deficiency in petitioner's income tax.
"We decided only that what passed from the
husband to the wife under their contract was
property, not income; and remanded the case for
further proceedings.
"Such further proceedings could only mean
to fix the taxpayer's liability, if any, on that basis;
which in turn could only mean that the consideration for the assignment should be taken into account; and the laws determining what is gain or
loss from the sale of property should be applied to
arrive at the tax due."
Judge Groner dissented from the opinion not on the
ground that the Commissioner lacked the authority to
raise the issue on the remand, but on the ground that the
Board on the remand had reached its decision without
giving the parties an opportunity of introducing additional evidence on the new issue. Judge Groner's dissenting opinion states:
"When our mandate went down, the commissioner revived an alternative claim which he had
originally urged on the Board but had elected to
abandon, or at least not to urge, on the first
petition for review. On this formerly unconsidered issue, the Board, without any new evidence, entered its order of redetermination, under
which petitioner was required to pay, not only
the full amount of the tax originally demanded
by the commissioner, but some $4,000 or $5,000
more. Assuming as I do, that it was permissible
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for the commissioner to revive the issue unpassed
on by the Board at the first hearing, I think the
decision should nevertheless and for another reason be reversed....
"The case on this new and previously unconsidered issue was, I think, decided by the Board
prematurely and without affording either of the
parties opportunity to introduce evidence."
Another case of a special significance to the case at
bar is that of Swenson v. Commissioner, 69 F. 2d 280
(1934) (CCA 5). In this case the court stated at page
281:
"An effect of the remandment of the cause to
the Board of Tax Appeals 'for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion' was to
enable that Board to act on the petition for redetermination which by the remandment again
was submitted to it, and to direct it in doing so
to avoid the errors which had vitiated its former
decision. The ruling of this court plainly contemplated a resubmission of the case to the Board
of Tax Appeals and a reconsideration by that
tribunal of evidence before it. Nothing contained
in the opinion or the mandate indicated that the
Board of Tax Appeals was to refrain from passing on the evidence submitted to it, or was bound
by the finding of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue on the subject of the fair market value
of the corporate stock mentioned at the time it
was received for the oil and gas lease. This court
did not direct the Board of Tax Appeals to adopt
or accept a computation based on findings made
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and
did not intimate that that Board was at liberty
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to refrain from considering evidence submitted
to it and reaching its own conclusion therefrom.
After the reversal of the decision of the Board of
Tax Appeals which formerly was reviewed by
this Court and the remandment of the cause for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this
Court's opinion, the duty of the Board to act on
the petition for redetermination was not different
from what it was before the former erroneous
decision was rendered; the mandate of this court
having the effect of restoring to that board the
power it had when the case was first before it,
except that its further proceedings were forbidden
to be inconsistent with this Court's op'miow"
A case in line with the above authorities and
squarely in point with the case at bar is that of William
E. Boeing v. Commissioner, 47 BTA 5 (1942). The,
decision is also reported in CCH Board of Tax Appeals
Dec. 12,543.
In this case it appeared that the taxpayer filed gift
tax returns for the years 1936 and 1937 claiming thereon
two $5,000 exclusions on the ground that although the
gifts were to a trust there were two beneficiaries of the
trust and he was entitled to one $5,000 exclusion for each
beneficiary. The Commissioner mailed the taxpayer
notices of deficiencies in the amount of $1,312.51 for
1936 and $1,312.50 for 1937, on the ground stated in the
deficiency notice that the taxpayer was entitled to only
one exclusion in view of certain court holdings to the
effect that a trust represents one beneficiary. The taxpayer filed a petition for redetermination of the defiDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

203
ciency with the Board. Following a hearing on the merits
the Board decided in petitioner's favor and held that
there was no deficiency. The Board's decision was placed
on the ground that the two beneficiaries of the trust were
the donees of the gift and not the trust itself, as the
Commissioner had determined. The Commissioner appealed the Board's decision to the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The decision of the Circuit Court is reported in Commissioner v. Boeing, 123
F. 2d 86 (1941).
When the case was heard first before the Board, the
only issue presented or considered by the Board was the
question whether the trust or the beneficiaries constituted
the "donee", that is, whether the taxpayer was entitled
one or two exclusions. On appeal the Commissioner
raised before the Circuit Court for the first time the
question whether the taxpayer was entitled to any exclusion by reason of the fact that the gifts were gifts of a
future interest in which case under the statute the $5,000
exclusion would not be applicable.
The Circuit Court in its opinion reversed the decision
of the Board, holding that the gifts were of future interests and in its opinion indicated that the Board was
right in rejecting the proposition of law advanced by the
petitioner that the trust was the donee "person" but
further held that "on the basis of the record before it, it
was wrong in holding that there were no deficiencies in
taxes for the two years." The Court stated:
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"Accordingly, the decision must be reversed
and the cause remanded to redetermine or compute the deficiency. Since the applicability of the
future interests provision of the statute was not
considered and no issue was made in respect of
it, opportunity should be given the taxpayer to
present evidence on the issue if he so desires.
"As the matter stands the Commissioner has
assessed deficiencies based on an exclusion of
$5,000 for each of the two years, although the
taxpayer appears to be entitled to none. The
Board of Tax Appeals is a body authorized by
statute to operate under rules of its own adoption. Whether, in the light of its rules and of Sec.
272(e), (f) of the 1932 A c t . . ., the Board may or
should redetermine a greater deficiency than the
amount of which notice has been given the taxpayer is a question which we have not considered
and do not undertake now to decide. The question
is not before us since no assertion of an additional
deficiency has yet been made by the Commissioner
in conformity with the statute."
Following its opinion the Circuit Court issued the
following mandate:
"On Consideration Whereof, it is now here
ordered and adjudged by this Court, that the
decision of the said Board of Tax Appeals in this
cause be, and hereby is reversed, and that this
cause be, and hereby is remanded to the said
Board of Tax Appeals for further proceedings
in harmony with the opinion of this Court.
"You, Therefore, Are Hereby Commanded
that such further proceedings be had in the said
cause in accordance with the opinion and judgment
of this court
"
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Following the filing of the above mandate, the Commissioner filed a motion with the Board to permit the
Commissioner to file a claim for increases in the deficiencies as proposed in the original deficiency notices and
to permit the petitioner to introduce evidence on the question of future interests if he so desired.
The taxpayer on the other hand filed a motion
stating that he had no desire to present additional evidence on the future interest issue and opposed the Commissioner's motion to file a claim for the increased
deficiencies.
Member Sternhagen first ruled on March 9, 1942
that the Commissioner's assertion of the claim for additional deficiencies was not timely in that the claim had
not been originally asserted at or before the original
hearing or a rehearing thereof stating as follows: "No
claim was asserted by the respondent at or before the
hearing. No motion was made for a rehearing and therefore no rehearing was had, so no claim was asserted at
or before a rehearing. By rule 19 a motion for rehearing
must, except by special leave, be filed within thirty days,
so the time for such a motion has expired. If the present
motion of respondent be considered as a motion for rehearing, although it is not couched in those terms, it is
plainly not a timely motion." This ruling reported in
46 BTA and in CCH Dec. 12,460, was pursuant to order
of March 27, 1942, ordered to be reviewed by the full
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Board of Tax Appeals. Upon review^, member Sternhagen's ruling wras reversed by the Board. After a careful analysis and consideration of the problem, the Board's
opinion states:
"As we have already stated, it seems plain
to us that the Court, in reversing and remanding
these proceedings, has directed a rehearing at
which the issue of 'future interests' is to receive
consideration. That is the very occasion and
purpose of the reversal and remand of the Board's
prior decision.
" I t is of course perfectly true that the Commissioner will get no increase in the deficiencies
which he has already determined unless he asserts
them in a proper pleading 'at or before the rehearing.' Moise vs. Burnet, 52 F . 2d 1071. . .
The Moise decision clearly prohibits an increase
in the deficiency under the pleadings now on
file....
"The Commissioner, however, by motion duly
filed, seeks to file an amended answer in which
by affirmative allegations he raises the issue of
'future interests' and in which he clearly and
succinctly sets forth his grounds for an increased
deficiency and, after setting forth the grounds,
concludes as follows:
"Wherefore, respondent respectfully prays
that the deficiency claimed in his notice of deficiency be increased in accordance with the foregoing computation and now asserts a claim for
such increase of deficiency as the statute in such
a case provides.
"We think respondent's motion to file his
amended answer raising the new issue of 'future
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interest' and asking for an increased deficiency
is, under the circumstances existing in these proceedings, a timely motion."
The opinion also states
"The present opinion replaces and supersedes
the opinion herein entered March 9, 1942, . . .,
which was, by order of the Chairman dated March
27,1942 referred to the Board for review."
The Moise Case referred to in the Board's opinion
had held that the claim for an increased deficiency should
be actually and definitely made and not left to conjecture, inference or interpretation. The opinion of the
Court in the Moise Case stated at page 1073:
"No words of claim, request, or demand were
used by the Commissioner. He must be bound by
his pleadings and cannot be assumed to have
intended to present a claim that he did not
actually assert."
Copy of this Court's remittitur issued January 12,
1951 in case No. 7298 covering the year 1942 is in evidence as Tax Commission Exhibit P P (2). The Court's
mandate reads:
"This cause having been heretofore argued
and submitted on the return made to the Writ of
Review heretofore issued herein, and the court
being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is
now ordered, adjudged and decreed that the
order of the State Tax Commission be and the
same is affirmed and the cause remanded with
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instructions to determine and enter a deficiency
judgment in accordance with the views expressed
in the opinion filed herein."
The case thus came back to defendant by remand
under the authority conferred upon this Court by Section
80-13-46, U.C.A. 1943, which provides that a decision of
the Tax Commission shall become final "if the Supreme
Court remands the case to the Tax Commission for rehearing, when it is thereafter determined as hereinabove
provided with respect to the initial proceedings." Upon
resumption of its jurisdiction over the case following
the remand, defendant's authority and jurisdiction was
the same as it had been before on the initial proceedings
or hearing, the only qualification being that it could take
no further action or make any redetermination or assert
any claim for increased deficiencies at the rehearing
which would be in conflict or in any way inconsistent w^ith
the decision and opinion of this Court.
The first hearing followed the remand in No. 7298
which hearing covered not only the year 1942 but the
subsequent years to and including 1950, was held on
December 4, 1951. At this hearing (Tr. 3) it was stated:
"The purpose of the hearing is to finally
determine the corporation franchise tax deficiency
of Kennecott for 1942 and the years subsequent
thereto, under and in accordance with the decision
and mandate of the Supreme Court of the State
of Utah in the case of Kennecott Copper Corporation and Bingham and Garfield Eailway Company, Plaintiff, v. State Tax Commission, Defendant, Case No. 7298."
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It was also stated (Tr. 5) :
". . . The serious question has arisen whether
the method adopted by the commission has gone
as far as the Supreme Court's decision requires.
In other words, the present deficiencies in tax,
excluding interest totalling $2,712,915.47, may be
too low. We are thus placed in the dilemma of
having Kennecott here contesting proposed deficiencies which instead of being too high, may
legally be too low.
"Under the Supreme Court's mandate we are
required to compute Kennecott's tax liability on
the basis of the separate accounts of receipts and
expenses which the company maintains for its
Utah Division. This is clearly a sensible and
proper basis because it relates Kennecott's tax
liability to the net income it derives from each
pound of copper, each pound of molybdenite concentrate, each ounce of gold, and each ounce of
silver extracted from the ore actually mined from
the Bingham pit in Utah."
Defendant's claim at the hearing for an increase of
deficiencies based upon the full 100% net income shown
and reflected on the separate accounts of defendant's
Utah Division was as follows (Tr. 8):
". . . I must, as counsel and as a matter of
precaution, to protect the interest of the State,
here and at this time reserve the right to this
Commission and to the Supreme Court if this case
again reaches the Supreme Court, to amend the
deficiencies by asserting tax based on 100% of
the Utah Division's net income. Accordingly,
under and pursuant to the provisions of Sec.
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tion of the Tax Commission is hereby reserved
to assert, and claim therefor is hereby in fact
asserted at this hearing to redetermine the present
deficiencies in an amount or amounts greater than
the amount or amounts, notice of which has previously been mailed to the taxpayer, by computing such deficiencies on the entire net income of
the Utah Division and not on some lesser proportion or fraction thereof."
Defendant's assertion of claim to compute plaintiff's
Utah corporation franchise tax based upon the full 100%
net income of the Utah Division has thus been clearly
and specifically made at the rehearing on 1942 and at
the hearing on the subsequent years. The claim has in
no way been left to conjecture, inference or interpretation. It should also be pointed out and perhaps emphasized that the reserved right to increase the deficiencies
is not related to a different "issue" from that previously
considered by the Court in No. 7298. I t is thus unlike the
Boeing case where the increase of deficiencies was due to
a separate and distinct issue of "future interests" which
had not been raised in the Board below. In the case at
bar the issue is "allocation." That was the issue before
defendant originally in the case covering the year 1942.
I t was the issue before this Court in No. 7298. It was
the issue before defendant on the hearing covering the year 1942 and subsequent years. It is the issue
here on appeal again. Defendant has reserved its jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the Court to allocate 100%
of the Utah Division's net income to Utah if the facts and
authorities so require and notwithstanding that by its
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decision here on appeal the actual amount allocated to
Utah is about 93%. Plaintiff's contention for 1942 is
that the correct figure is 66.926%, which figure has been
used by defendant in the original notice of deficiency.
For the subsequent years plaintiff contends that the allocation to Utah should average about 64%.
Under the circumstances here presented and the
pertinent authorities heretofore cited, it appears to be
quite clear that this court has jurisdiction to modify
defendant's decision here on appeal or to remand the
case to defendant for further proceedings to permit the
computation of tax based upon the full 100% net income
of plaintiff's Utah Division. The basic reason for the
Federal and Utah statutory provisions relating to claims
for increased deficiencies over and beyond those contained in the original deficiency notices, rests essentially
on a conception of fairness to the taxpayer in giving him
adequate notice of the nature of the claim and an opportunity to present evidence thereon and to have such evidence considered before any redetermination is made.
In the case at bar plaintiff cannot claim that it was surprised or prevented in any respect from giving evidence
on the issue of the extent to which the net income of its
Utah Division should be allocated to Utah. It was properly apprised of defendant's claim for a full 100% allocation on the first day of the hearing and the record is
voluminous with plaintiff's testimony showing that the
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amount of the Utah Division's net income to be allocated
to Utah should be not 100% nor 93% nor 80%, but a
percent which will average about 64% for all of the years
involved.
With respect to the proposition that this Court has
full and complete jurisdiction under the circumstances
here existing to modify the decision of defendant or to
remand the proceedings with directions to redetermine
the deficiencies in tax either by way of a decrease or by
way of an increase in such deficiencies we refer the Court
to the following cases.
In Olds and Whipple v. Umted States, 22 F. Sup.
809 (1938) (Court of Claims), the court stated at page
818:
"A third reason for denying this contention
is that when a case decided by the Board is appealed to and reversed by the Circuit Court of
Appeals such court is not limited by the provisions of Sec, 274 (e) and 272 (e) of the Eevenue
Acts of 1926 and 1928 in the decision of the issues
raised on appeal by the taxpayer. Section 1003
(b), 26 USCA Sec. 641 (c) (1), provides that upon
such review, such courts shall have power to affirm or, if the decision of the Board is not in
accordance with law, to modify or to reverse the
decision of the Board, with or without remanding
the case for a rehearing, as justice may require.
If justice requires that issues raised by the taxpayer on appeal be decided and if such a decision
results, as it did in this case, in deficiencies in
excess of those determined by the Board, the taxDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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payer is in no position to complain. The provisions of the statute with reference to the determination of increased deficiencies were obviously
intended to protect the taxpayer against the
assertion of the increased deficiencies by the commissioner in excess of those determined by him
in the statutory deficiency notice and against a
determination by the Board of increased deficiencies by reason of a decision on matters of which
the taxpayer has not been advised and not raised
by either party before the Board. It would be a
strained construction of the section to hold that
it was intended to protect the taxpayer against
his own deliberate acts or the natural and necessary consequences of a correct decision of the
issues raised by him.
"The fourth and final reason which requires
a decision against plaintiff on its contention made
in support of the third alleged cause of action is
that if it be assumed that the Board upon the
opinion and mandate of the Circuit Court of Appeals did not have authority or jurisdiction to
enter the decision of Nov. 20, 1935, or the increased deficiencies for 1927 and 1929, unless
claim therefor was made by the commissioner at
or before the final hearing, a proper claim by
the commissioner for the increased deficiencies
of $15,234.67 for 1927 and $330.01 for 1929 was
made by the commissioner in sufficient compliance
with the provisions of Sections 274(e) and 272(e)
of the Eevenue Acts of 1926 and 1928, respectively. . . . The filing of the recomputation pursuant to the order of the Board of Feb. 27, 1935,
and the submission of the cases thereon to the
Board for final decision was a rehearing within
the meaning of Sections 274(e) and 272(e) of the
Eevenue Acts of 1926 and 1928. The commissioner
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was therefore enabled at such time to make claim
for the first time for increased deficiencies, and
if his recomputation carried out the opinion and
mandate of the Circuit Court of Appeals, which
we assume it did and which is not denied by the
petition in this case, he made a valid and legal
claim for the increased deficiencies within the
meaning of the sections in question."
Again in Insular Sugar Refining

I
j

Corp. v. Commis-

sioner, 157 F . 2d 673, (1946) (CCA 2), the Court stated
at page 673:
"When this case was before us last year . . ,
a majority of the court held that the Tax Court
had been right except that it had mistakenly reversed the assessments, levying the deficiency
properly assessable for the year 1935 in the year
1936; and vice versa. Since the deficiencies were
not the same, this required a refund of part of
the deficiency paid for the year 1935 and an increased deficiency for 1936. The taxpayer had
sought to amend its petition before the Tax Court
to conform to the facts; but apparently that court
became confused and denied the application. In
any case we held that its refusal was 'an abuse
of discretion' and concluded our opinion as follows: 'the cause is remanded to the Tax Court
with direction to amend its order to conform
to the ruling here made.' Our mandate affirmed
the order below; but remanded the cause to the
Tax Court 'with direction to amend its order to
conform to the ruling made in the opinion of this
court.' This the Tax Court did by an order awarding a refund for 1935, and increasing the deficiency of 1936. The taxpayer has appealed upon
the ground that Section 272 (e) of the Internal
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Revenue Code, . . ., gives jurisdiction to the Tax
Court to increase a deficiency only in case 'claim
therefor is asserted by the commissioner at or
before the hearing or a rehearing'; and, although
the commissioner did assert a 'claim' by amending
Ms answer to increase the deficiency for 1936,
at the hearing held upon remittitur of our mandates, that was not a 'rehearing,' so that the court
had no jurisdiction to execute our mandate.
"We cannot now see why we found it necessary to remand the case at all; Section 1141 (c)
(1) of the Internal Eevenue Code . . . , gives us
power to 'modify . . . the decision of the tax court,
with or without remanding the case for a rehearing, as justice may require.' I t is true that the
error was not of the kind which appeared upon
the face of the record, and which may be corrected
at the time; but plainly the section does not limit
our powers to correcting such errors without a
rehearing. However, whether we had the power
to correct this error without remand, we did remand it, and section 1141 (c) (1) certainly gave us
power to remand the case for a 'rehearing' and
perhaps only for a 'rehearing'. By what legerdemain the Tax Court became incapable of obeying our mandate "to amend its order to conform
to the ruling made' escapes us. The theory appears to be that the merits have somehow become
so enmeshed in a web of verbiage, that the taxpayer is to be relieved of paying what he con<cedly owes!'
The Court's attention is likewise invited to the
provisions of Section 80-13-47, U.C.A. 1943, which indicates that a decision of defendant may be reviewed by
this Court both upon the law and the facts and that the
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provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to
proceedings in the Supreme Court shall so far as applicable and not in conflict with the tax law be applicable
to proceedings before this Court.
Eule 72(a) providing for appeals to be taken to
this Court from all final judgments states:
"In equity cases the appeal may be on questions of both law and fact. In cases at law^ the
appeal shall be on questions of law only."
Eule 76(a) provides as follows:
"The Supreme Court may reverse, affirm or
modify any order of judgment appealed from, and
may, in case the findings in any case are incomplete in any respect, order the court from which
the appeal was taken to add to, modify or complete the findings so as to make the same conform
to the issues presented and the facts as the same
may be found to be by the trial court from the
evidence, and may direct the trial court to enter
judgment in accordance with the findings when
corrected as aforesaid, or may direct a new trial
in any case, or further proceedings to be had. If
a new trial is granted, the court shall pass upon
and determine all questions of law involved in the
case presented upon the appeal and necessary to
the final determination of the case."
It would thus appear that the jurisdiction of this
Court is fully as great and in fact substantially the same
as that of a Federal Circuit Court of Appeal and the
Supreme Court of the United States over decisions of the
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Tax Court of the United States. It might even be urged,
although the point is not here material, that the jurisdiction of this Court over defendant is somewhat broader
than the jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Appeal over
the Tax Court for the reason that our statute makes it
quite clear that a decision of defendant may be reviewed
both upon the "law and the facts." By the Dobson decision, 320 U. S. 489, the Supreme Court of the United
States severely restricted the jurisdiction of the Circuit
Courts of Appeal over the Tax Court with respect to
both law questions and questions of fact. Congress repealed this decision by legislation effective Sept. 1, 1948,
and the Federal statute referred to above now provides
that the United States Courts of Appeals are authorized
to review decisions of the Tax Court "in the same manner
and to the same extent as decisions of the district courts
in civil actions without a jury." This language might
perhaps be construed as being a little narrower than the
language of the Utah provision which states that the
"decision of the Tax Commission may be reviewed both
upon the law and the facts . . . "
Under this Point 2 we undertook initially to showand have shown that the Utah franchise tax must under
the mandate of this court in No. 7298 and the pertinent
statutes and authorities be based on the full net income
shown and reflected on the separate books of account of
plaintiff's Utah Division, that use of the method of direct
allocation by separate accounting methods precludes and
prevents application and use of the three-factor statutory
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formula, that the out-of-state administrative, refining,
transportation and marketing expenses should be and
have been deducted and charged against the operations
in Utah, that the intercompany arrangements between
plaintiff and the sales subsidiary and A. S. & E. being
fair, reasonable and arms-length must be recognized and
respected by both plaintiff and defendant in this proceeding, that the separate corporate entity of the sales
subsidiary cannot be set aside and ignored, that the
operations of plaintiff's Utah Division and the operation
of the sales subsidiary and A. S. & E. cannot be combined
and consolidated under the consolidated return provisions
of the Utah statute, that within the issue of "allocation"
defendant has properly and in accordance with the
statute and the mandate of this court in No. 7298 reserved the jurisdiction of defendant and this Court to
compute the tax on the full 100% net income of the Utah
Division of plaintiff and that on this appeal this Court
should modify defendant's decision or alternatively remand the case to defendant with directions that none
of the net income of plaintiff's Utah Division as shown
and reflected on its separate books of account be apportioned outside the State of Utah. The tax based upon the
lawT and the facts should be in an amount equal to 3 %
of the adjusted total net income for the years here involved shown on line 1 of tax computation schedule, page
193 of defendant's decision here on appeal.
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P O I N T NO. I I I .
I F PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO APPORTION SOME
OF THE NET INCOME OF ITS UTAH DIVISION OUTSIDE
UTAH, THE DECISION OF DEFENDANT IS MORE THAN
FAIR AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.

Under this branch of the case we will undertake to
show that if plaintiff is entitled to apportion some of the
net income of the Utah Division outside Utah by virtue
of the existence of an administrative office outside Utah,
defendant's decision being fair and reasonable and not
arbitrary should be affirmed. Plaintiff's argument under
its Point 1 is an excellent presentation of its position in
the matter. In assessing the validity and the soundness
of this argument, however, some preliminary remarks
appear desirable.
I t will be remembered that plaintiff's argument is
addressed to a construction of the Utah statute which will
result in the apportionment outside Utah of 36% of the
net income of the Utah Division to its New York administrative office, notwithstanding it is not shown or even
claimed that any portion of this income has been taxed
or is taxable in New York and notwithstanding that the
selling business was conducted by separate companies.
In its decision defendant as a discretionary matter applied the statutory formula to the separate accounts of
plaintiff's Utah Division in computing the tax. The decision allocates about 6% of the property of the Utah Division outside Utah, 3 % of the payroll of the Utah Division outside Utah, and 13% of the gross receipts
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of the Utah Division outside Utah. The average of the
3 fractions thus allocates outside Utah about 7% of the
net income of the Utah Division, 93% being allocated to
Utah business. Plaintiff on this appeal raises no objection to the apportionment of 6% of the property, 3% of
the payroll and 13% of the gross receipts of the Utah
Division outside Utah. The contention is that in addition
to the apportionment of the gold and silver receipts outside Utah, constituting 13% of total receipts, all receipts
from copper, molybdenite, platinum and palladium as well
should be apportioned outside Utah.
It is argued that the gross receipts from all sales
must be allocated outside Utah and thus excluded from
the gross receipts numerator because generally speaking
(see page 29 of brief) none of the sales were negotiated
or made within Utah, none of the persons concerned with
sales worked out of offices in Utah, none of the products
were delivered to customers within Utah, no sales activities of any character wrere carried on within Utah, and
that to apportion any gross receipts from sales to Utah
patently violates the intent of the apportionment statute
when viewed in relation to the very substantial activities
occurring outside of Utah in connecting with the production of net income from the Utah Division. Notwithstanding that the fair and proportionate share of the New
York administrative expense has been deducted and
charged against the Utah operation, and notwithstanding
that the Utah molybdenite and commingled blister copper products are transferred at fair value to and for
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resale by the sales subsidiary and A. S. & E., it is said
that the Utah statute requires the sales business conducted and carried on by the sales subsidiary and A. S.
& E. to be assimilated with and attributed to plaintiff's
outside administrative office. Furthermore, even though
the sales subsidiary and A. S. & E. by intercompany contract have been allocated and given a fair profit for conducting the selling business, it is felt that the Utah
statute decrees that 36% of the net income of the Utah
Division be attributed to the administrative work performed outside Utah by plaintiff's New York office.
The mandate of this court in No. 7298, requiring a
computation of tax on the basis of the separate accounts
of plaintiff's Utah Division under the provisions of subdivision 8 of the Utah statute, and the applicable authorities heretofore considered under defendant's Point 2
have shown that the tax properly should be computed
on the basis of the full 100% net income of the Utah
Division. An apportionment of 93% of net income to
Utah is not arbitrary or error where the authorities and
statutory provisions show that the proper apportionment
should have been 100%. Without in any way conceding
or admitting that the apportionment should be in any
amount less than 100%, we take up the argument here
to show that even if plaintiff is entitled to application
of the statutory formula to its Utah Division's separate
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

222
accounts, defendant's decision is proper and in every
respect fully complies with the statutory formula provisions of the Utah statute.
I t might be helpful to the Court in the ascertainment
of the meaning and intent of the Utah apportionment
formula to consider for a moment the underlying theory
of apportionment formulas generally. On page 32 of its
brief plaintiff cites Altaian and Keesling, Allocation of
Income in State Taxation (2d Ed. 1950) for the proposition that the sales factor serves the purpose of balancing
the property and payroll factor by giving weight to the
elements which are not reflected by the property and
payroll factors. We further invite the Court's attention
to Chapter VI of the above cited treatise which is entitled
"Theory of the Apportionment Formula." This chapter,
page 107, first states:
"As discussed in the preceding chapter, even
though a taxpayer may be doing business in two
or more states, where the business in any state
is separate and distinct from the business in the
other state, the income attributable to such state
may properly be determined by the so-called separate accounting method."
Thereafter follows a general discussion of the appropriate use on the other hand of the statutory formula
where the business within the taxing state is integrated
with the taxpayer's business in other states to such an
extent that the net income from operations within the
taxing state cannot by separate accounting methods be
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

223
properly segregated from outside operations. In such
a case net income arising from operations in the several
states may be apportioned to the taxing state by formula.
At page 110 the property factor is discussed and it
is pointed out that under our business system capital is
generally considered an income producing factor which
to the extent at least of the taxpayer's actual capital
investment should be taken into consideration in an
apportionment formula. A discussion of the payroll factor commences at page 122, where it is stated that the
use of the payroll factor is the easiest of all factors to
justify on theoretical as well as practical grounds. It is
stated: "There can be little question that without the
services of human beings it would be utterly impossible
to conduct business or to earn income." A discussion of
the sales factor commences at page 124, where it is
stated:
u

In direct contrast with the payroll factor the
use of the sales factor is one of the most difficult
of all to sustain. The principal objection to the
use of the sales factor is the difficulty of determining howr sales should be allocated. There are
any number of possibilities of which the following
are a few: The place where title passes; the place
where the products sold are manufactured or produced; the place where orders are solicited; the
place from which the goods are shipped; the place
where orders are received; the place where orders
are approved; the place from which the order is
sent; and the place to which the goods are shipped.
There are still other possibilities. Thus, in the
case of companies engaged in the transportation
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of passengers or freight, it is common to apportion
receipts on a mileage basis. A similar rule is
often followed in the case of companies engaged
in the operation of telephone and telegraph lines.
Still another possibility is to apportion sales to
the office where the transaction is "principally"
consummated. Another possibility would be to
divide certain classes of sales and apportion them
in part to one state and in part to another. In
any given case, which of these or other methods
should be used?
"As will be seen later, there is a wide discrepancy between the practices of the different
states using the sales factor in the apportionment
formula."
After discussing the various conflicting considerations and the difficulties involved in the application of
a sales factor, the authors state: "In view of the foregoing difficulties, it may well be asked, why use the sales
factor?" It is then suggested that its use, as indicated
by plaintiff, is justified to serve as a balance of the property and payroll factors.
Chapter VII is entitled "Allocation Formulae in
Practice" and shows the wide variation among the various states in their statutory provisions and practices
with respect to allocation formulas. Also set forth are
brief summaries of the apportionment formulas used by
each of the several states.
The attention of the Court is likewise directed to
annotation entitled "What constitutes business, business
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done, or the like, outside the state for purposes of allocation of income under tax laws, 167 A L E 943. This
article discusses the matter of sales outside the state or
to out-of-state buyers and shows again the wide variation
of practice among the states, particularly with respect
to the sales factor under statutory formulas of apportionment. A study of the formulas used by the various
states would reveal quite clearly, it is suggested, that
the apportionment formula adopted by any particular
state seems to have been adopted by reference to the
specific economic situation of that state. This is particularly true with respect to the sales factor. A consuming
state has a tendency to adopt a sales factor which would
allocate the sale to the point of delivery or consumption.
A producing state would have a tendency to allocate the
sale to the point of shipment or manufacture. A mercantile state would have a tendency to allocate the sales
to the place where the orders are accepted or where other
work connected with the sale is done. The result of the
various conflicting formulae and the variation of practice
among the states is that sales may be allocated to more
than one state. This raises, however, no constitutional
objection providing the state has a formula of apportionment in the statute, "crude approximation" being sufficient. The evil consequences of overlapping statutory
formulas are to a considerable extent in most of the
states alleviated by provisions similar to subdivision 8
of the Utah statute, which permit a modification of the
statutory formula where the taxpayer is able to show
that application of the formula results in double taxation
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or does not properly reflect net income from business
done within the state. Use of the method of direct allocation by separate accounting is likewise designed to
avoid problems of double taxation and the taxation of
business attributable to activities outside the taxing state.
Of the various types of sales factors which it might
have chosen, Utah saw fit to select the same sales factor
which is used by the states of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, as is well known,
economically are primarily states of production and
manufacture. The goods produced within those states
are marketed throughout the entire country and elsewhere. Both states as a matter of revenue protection to
themselves adopted a rather strict but fair sales factor.
All receipts of a taxpayer from sales are allocated to the
state unless the taxpayer showTs not only that he is
"doing business" outside the state but also that the sales
business is being conducted outside the state in an office
of the taxpayer actually maintained outside the state and
from which office the sales are negotiated and effected
in behalf of the taxpayer. It is not enough as it is in
several states, that the sales are negotiated and effected
outside the state by a roaming sales force of the taxpayer. It is also a statutory prerequisite that this sales
force be negotiating and effecting the sales in behalf of
the taxpayer from an out-of-state office maintained by
the taxpayer with which the force is connected, situated
or dispatched.
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Is the position of plaintiff on this appeal that the
phrase "in behalf of the corporation" should not be construed as requiring the sales to be negotiated and effected
by an agent in the name of his principal, the taxpayer,
and in the regular course of the taxpayer's business. I t
is deemed to be a sufficient compliance with the law that
the agent although an independent broker, factor, commission merchant or distributor is selling and marketing
the goods out-of-state. Defendant, on the other hand,
construes the phrase "negotiated or effected in behalf of
the corporation by agents" as clearly meaning that the
agent must be acting and operating representatively and
in the name and behalf of the taxpayer corporation. I t is
defendant's position that if the agent as broker, factor or
commission merchant sells in his own name and behalf
and in the regular course of his own business and calling,
the statute does not permit the exclusion of such sales
from the gross receipts numerator. We will undertake
hereafter to answer the specific objections of plaintiff
to defendant's construction of this statute. We emphasize at this time, however, that defendant's construction
rests upon the very basic common-sense business conception that sales business outside the state under the statute
means sales business conducted by the taxpayer corporation outside the state. The whole idea of the Utah
statute is to tax net income attributable to business done
within the state. If the selling business outside the state
is conducted by another corporation, the selling activity
outside Utah is not business done by the taxpayer outside
Utah.
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Plaintiff seeks to distinguish the large group of
cases holding that a corporation producing goods within
the taxing state is not entitled to an apportionment of
income within and without the state where the goods are
marketed outside the state through independent brokers,
factors or commission merchants. Such cases hold
specifically and uniformly that the marketing of goods
through independent brokers, factors or commission
merchants does not constitute the doing of business outside the producing state. The attempt to distinguish
these cases is based on the fact that plaintiff happens to
maintain an administrative office in the state in which
the selling business is transacted and conducted by other
companies. The business of the selling companies thus
becomes, it is felt, combined, assimilated and consolidated with the business activities of the administrative
office. On this theory the sales business thus becomes
conducted and transacted by the administrative office
outside Utah with the same force and effect as if the
broker, factor or commission merchant did not exist.
Any disinterested look at the tax computation (F.
page 193) of defendant here appealed from shows on its
face a clear and obvious liberality to plaintiff. No question has been raised as to the specific assignment to Utah
of the loss of $950,877.67 before arriving at the net income subject to apportionment, nor to the assignment
of 6 per cent of the property outside consisting primarily
of inventory in transit to market, nor to assignment of
3 per cent of the payroll outside consisting of New York
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administrative expense and the further allowance of such
expenses as a deduction, nor to the assignment outside
of 13 per cent of gross receipts from sales of gold and
silver, nor to the allowance in full as a deduction of all
payments to A. S. & R. as expense. In allocating 7 per
cent of the net income of plaintiff's Utah Division to the
New York administrative office, as applied to about
$230,000,000 of total net income, defendant has thus allocated to the New York office and treated as non-taxable
in Utah over $16,000,000 of net income.
Plaintiff feels, however, that the existence of the
administrative office in the same state as that in which
the selling companies sell the Utah Division product
requires the exclusion from Utah of 36% or over $82,000,000 of the net income of the Utah Division. 36% of
the Utah Division's net income on plaintiff's theory is
supposed to have been earned by the relatively small
administrative staff located in plaintiff's New York
office. Under the pertinent authorities, such a result
appears to constitute a gross if not incredible distortion
of the Utah statute. From a practical business standpoint, it is difficult to see how to the administrative payroll of 3% in New York is possibly attributable 36% of
the profit of the marketable molybdenite and blister copper product of the Utah Division which moves out of
Utah each day for sale by other companies. If plaintiff
itself conducted the selling business in New York in its
own name and from its own premises by means of a sales
department within its own organization, negotiating and
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executing the contracts of sale of copper and molybdenite
in its own name, dealing with the customers and collecting receipts from sales in its own name and in the regular course of its own business, a different question would
obviously be here presented. The administrative office
of plaintiff in New York, however, has not and never
has negotiated or effected the sale of a single pound of
copper or molybdenite in behalf of the plaintiff corporation. The selling business conducted by separate and
distinct corporations cannot be attributed to the administrative work conducted by plaintiff in its New York
administrative office. I t is here in Utah that plaintiff
has its large capital investment, where the mine is located,
where the activities of 5,000 employees convert a raw
crude ore into marketable molybdenite and blister copper.
The income is earned from the industrial operation
of producing metal, not from New York administrative
services.
The statutory test for the assignment of payroll
within and without the state is essentially the same as
the statutory test for the assignment of gross receipts
from sales within and without the state. The statute
says that there shall be assigned to the state wages,
salaries, commissions or other compensation to its "employees" as represents the compensation of employees
not chiefly situated at, connected with, or sent out from,
premises for the transaction of business owned or rented
by the corporation outside the state. Plaintiff makes no
claim or suggestion here that the "commissions" to the
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sales subsidiary constitute a part of out-of-state payroll.
In fact, it will be recalled, for tax purposes plaintiff
added such commissions back into income deducting estimated expenses of the subsidiary instead.
The statute under the gross receipts fraction assigns
to Utah the amount of the corporation's gross receipts
from sales "except those negotiated or effected in
behalf of the corporation by agents or agencies chiefly
situated at, connected with or sent out from premises for
the transaction of business owned or rented by the corporation outside this state, and sales otherwise determined
by the tax commission to be attributable to the business
conducted on such premises." Thus, under the payroll
fraction, the statute speaks of "commissions" to "employees." Under the gross receipts fraction the statute speaks
of sales "negotiated or effected in behalf of the corporation by agents." Although the word "employees" is not
used in the gross receipts fraction, it is suggested that
"agents" although a broader term for some purposes
is here used in much the same context and with the same
meaning as "employees" under the payroll fraction to the
extent that the agents as described must be acting "in
behalf of the corporation." The phrase "in behalf of"
means, as we shall hereafter see, "in the name of" and
covers the situation where the agent is acting not individually in the regular course of his own business, but
representatively on behalf of the corporation. The disDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tinction in the statute is thus essentially dependent upon
whether the "agent" is conducting his own business individually or conducting the taxpayer's business representatively.
In other words, the question under the statute is
essentially this—whose business is it? I s it the taxpayer
corporation's business or is it the separate business of
the agent? Pertinent judicial decisions in construing the
statute plainly hold that sales of a corporation outside the
state of production by independent brokers, factors or
commission merchants is not business done by the corporation outside the state so as to require an apportionment
of income within and without the state. This construction, illustrated in the decisions, rests on the obvious
practical view that a corporation is only entitled to allocate a p a r t of its net income to its sale activities outside
the state if, but only if, the selling activities outside the
state are performed by the corporation itself.
Although wTe will hereafter take up plaintiff's argument point by point in detail with respect to the gross
receipts factor, it is apparent that the basic framework
of plaintiff's case rests upon the argument (page 35 of
brief) that the sales of the Utah product are made entirely outside Utah, to buyers located outside Utah, through
persons operating at or from offices permanently located
outside Utah, and that no selling activities of 'any
character took place in Utah or were carried on by persons within or operating from or under the supervision
or direction of plaintiff's offices within Utah.
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The short answer, of course, to this argument is
contained in the numerous constitutional cases cited
under defendant's Point 1. These cases made it abundantly clear that the state of production or manufacture
has a very special and unique claim for a tax laid on the
privilege of conducting a local manufacturing or production business, even though a tax on such privilege be
measured by the gross receipts from out-of-state sales.
Moreover, our statute is perfectly plain in its intent to
apportion gross receipts from sales outside Utah only
where the taxpayer engages itself in a selling business
outside the state from which such gross receipts are held
by the statute to be in part earned and realized. The
statute only permits % of the net income by the gross
receipts factor to be allocated outside the state where the
taxpayer engages in the business of selling outside the
state from premises maintained outside the state.
It is, therefore, not enough under our statute for
plaintiff to show that the sales of the Utah product are
made outside the state. The goods originate in Utah,
commence their interstate journey in Utah and the selling
activity is conducted and transacted by a separate and
distinct corporation, the sales subsidiary. The statute
does not permit defendant to assign sales receipts to
Utah only where it establishes that the taxpayer is conducting the sales activities in Utah. The statute says
that the sales receipts are assignable to Utah unless the
taxpayer establishes that the sales are negotiated and
effected in its behalf from its out-of-state premises, i.e.,
that it is doing a sales business outside the state.
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We turn now to the consideration, here very important, of the legal and tax status of independent brokers,
factors and commission merchants. Are they, under the
authorities and within the meaning of our statute, carrying on their own business or are they carrying on as
plaintiff contends the business of their principal!

I

I
]
i

As a preliminary matter, we again invite the Court's
attention to the standard form of contract covering all

J

sales of copper by the sales subsidiary (F. page 71) which
reads: "Kennecott Sales Corporation, hereby agrees to

1

sell and deliver and Triangle Conduit and Cable Company, Inc., New Brunswick, N. J. agrees to purchase and

\
j

receive the products on terms and subject to conditions
specified below."
We also refer to defendant's findings with respect

j

to the status, function and activity of Kennecott Sales
Corporation. (Page 140 of Findings, et seq.)

Among

these findings, at page 147, is the following:
"g. The Sales Corporation was employed by
Kennecott as a commercial agent and vested and
entrusted under appropriate instructions and arrangements with the right of possession, disposal
and control of all copper and molybdenite produced by Kennecott for the purpose of selling
such property, at an agreed commission or compensation, in the name and pursuant to and in
the usual course of trade or business of the Sales
Corporation and authorized to receive payment for
such sales from the purchaser thereof. We hold
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and find that the Sales Corporation was in fact
and functioned as a factor or commission merchant with respect to all sales of copper and
molybdenite during the period here involved."
Prentice-Hall, State and Local Tax Service, Vol. 1,
All States Unit, Para. 7500, states:
"Another methed is to consign goods to a factor in the state whose business is to sell the goods
to his customer and account to his principal according to the terms of his contract . . ."
Paragraph 7501 reads as follows:
"Consigning goods to a factor in another state
is interstate commerce. — A contract of factorage
is one whereunder one party, called the consignor,
places in the hands of the other party, the consignee or factor, goods which, while they are still
in the latter's hand, remain the property of the
consignor. The factor is to sell such goods to his
customer in the state, paying to the consignor for
the goods so sold a price fixed by the contract and
retaining for himself the amount by which the
price his customer pays him exceeds that which
he is required to pay to the consignor. The business done in the state is entirely that of the factor.
When he makes a sale of the consignor's goods in
the state, what really takes place is this: The
factor purchases the goods from the consignor
and resells them to his customers. In Mitchell
Wagon Co. v. Poole, the court said: 'The contract
here provided for the bankrupt becoming purchaser in several contingencies. One, was when
lie sold the wagons. This follows from the fact
that he had a right to sell on such terms as to price
and time of payment as he liked, but was bound,
if he sold, to pay appellant for them at a fixed
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price at a fixed time, and the proceeds of the sale
were to be his. A sale by him ivas, in effect, a
purchase and a resale.' . . . In Cooper Kubber Co.
v. Johnson the Court said: 'The terms "factor"
and "commission merchant" are said to be nearly
or quite synonymous; the former expression beingmore common in the language of the law, and
the latter in the language of commerce. A "factor"
is one whose business is to receive and sell goods
for a commission, being entrusted with the possession of the goods to be sold, and usually selling
in his own name. 1 Mecham on Agency, Sees. 74,
2497, et seq. While in one sense a factor or commission merchant is the agent of the consigning
dealer or manufacturer, he does not conduct an
agency for business for the latter at the place of
business of the former, where the sales of the consigned merchandise are made to customers chosen
by the local dealer, at his own risk, and the proceeds of the sale do not become the exclusive property of the consigning company. And business so
conducted is truly said to be that of the factor or
commission merchant.' Where the consignor is a
foreign corporation sending goods on consignment to the factor from without the state, such
corporation is engaged in interstate commerce."
Although the sales subsidiary is here not a "del
credere" factor in that it did not guarantee accounts for
collection, it was in every respect under and by virtue of
its contractural arrangements with plaintiff a usual and
normal type of commission merchant, as the findings of
defendant at page 60 et seq. clearly show.
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We quote the findings, page 64:
"p. The American Smelting and Refining
Company or anyone holding any copper of Kennecott for delivery is authorized, upon demand
made by the Sales Corporation to make deliveries
to the Sales Corporation or its order of such
copper."
Again at page 33 is the following:
"By arrangements entered into between Kennecott and the Sales Corporation which have been
accepted, recognized and followed by A. S. & R.,
Kennecott has entrusted the Sales Corporation
with authority to sell all of the refined copper
produced at the Baltimore refinery of A. S. & R.
or other refinery, and with the right to possess
and control such copper for the purpose of sale
and to issue instructions to A. S. & R. or others
pertaining to the casting, storage, handling and
shipment, sale or other disposition of such copper
and with the right to receive payment from the
customer of the purchase price thereof."
The status of brokers, factors and commission merchants is well recognized both in the law, in business and
in the administration of state tax laws. Much of the agricultural and livestock production in Utah is marketed
outside the state through this medium. F o r example,
cattle, sheep, wool and fruit are to a large extent so
marketed. Conversely, many of the products consumed
in Utah and produced in other states are marketed here
in Utah by means of brokers, produce merchants, factors
and commission merchants. Although selling the goods
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of their principal, the business done is not the business
of the principal, but their own business. They are the
ones who sell to the customer in the market. F o r example,
Eeg. 45 under the Sales Tax Law provides:
"Every auctioneer, consignee, bailee, factor,
etc., entrusted with possession of any bill-of-lading, customhouse permit, warehouseman's receipt,
or other document of title for delivery of any tangible personal property, or entrusted with possession of any such personal property for the purpose
of sale, is deemed to be the retailer thereof, and
upon the sale of such property is required to file a
return on the selling price and pay a tax thereon. . . ."
Again Regulation No. 6 under the Corporation Franchise Tax Law provides in part as follows :
"Application of corporation franchise tax act
to foreign corporations selling merchandise to customers in Utah.
"In general, foreign corporations which have
neither agents nor stocks of goods in Utah, and
which engage in no other activities here, are not
doing business in this state and are, accordingly,
not taxable under the Corporation Franchise Tax
Act, even though goods are shipped to customers
in this state pursuant to order received by mail,
telephone or telegraph. Such corporations are
likewise not subject to the tax, even though sales
are made to customers in this state pursuant to
orders taken by independent dealers (factors) or
by brokers, if such corporations engage in no other
activities which amount to doing business in this
state through the medium of an agent of the corporation.
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"(a) Whether or not orders taken for
sales are made by an agent, or by an independent
dealer, or by a broker must depend upon the facts
of each particular case. In general, if a person
acts only for one company and takes orders and
makes sales in the name of that company or
otherwise purports to represent that company,
he is acting as an agent and his acts are the acts
of the company. Conversely, if a person purports
to be doing business on his own account and not as
a representative of some other party, the person
is generally acting as an independent
dealer.
Finally, if a person is acting as a representative
and not in his own behalf but purports to be representing several other parties, his activities are
generally those of a b r o k e r . . . .
"(d) Foreign corporations do not become
subject to the tax imposed by the corporation
Franchise Tax Act, because they send goods to
independent dealers or brokers on consignment,
or because they maintain stocks of goods here
from which deliveries are made pursuant to orders
taken by independent dealers or brokers."
Thus the sales subsidiary in selling the Utah product
of plaintiff is conducting its own business and not that
of plaintiff even though in a sense every broker, factor
or commission merchant is an "agent." The point here,
however, is that the factor is not an agent acting in his
principal's behalf and in the name of his principal — he
is acting in his own name and behalf and in the regular
course of his own business. See: Gwin, White & Prince v.
Eenneford, 305 U.S. 434. The activities of the sales subsidiary either in New York or in any other state in which
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it might qualify to do business would not constitute the
conduct by plaintiff in such states of a selling business.
The selling business would be attributable solely and exclusively to the activities of the sales subsidiary. The
selling business would in no wise be attributable to plaintiff. Plaintiff as a result of the sales subsidiary's activities in either New York or elsewhere runs no risk of
having the sales subsidiary's activities imputed to it for
tax or other purposes.
We refer the Court to the discussion under the heading "Sales to Broker or Factor" contained at page 956 of
annotation in 167 A.L.R. 943. It is there stated:
"A taxpayer cannot be deemed to be doing
business outside the state so as to require an allocation of income where it merely sells its product
outside the state through cooperative marketing
associations and independent produce brokers or
factors, even assuming that the association or
brokers are agents of the taxpayer."
The California case of Irvine Company v. McColgan,
167 ALE 934, 157 P. 2d 847 (1945), is referred to.
The above annotation refers to the decisions of this
Court with respect to the question whether out-of-state
broker sales constitute out-of-state business and states
the ruling of the Supreme Court of Utah to be that such
sales do not constitute out-of-state business for franchise tax purposes. The annotation reads, page 957:
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"The decision in American Invest. Corp. v
State Tax Commission (1941) 101 Utah 189, 120
P. 2d 331, that a sale, by a foreign investment
corporation doing business within the state, of
shares of stock in two other foreign corporations
through an out of state broker was out-of-state
business was over-ruled in a case involving ordinary income of an investment company in J. M.
and M. S. Browning Co. v. State Tax Commission
(1945) 107 Utah 457, 154 P. 2d 993 . . . wherein it
is also said that buying and selling stocks and
bonds does not constitute doing business."
Of significance here is the following statement at
page 954 of the above annotation:
"In the absence of a statute allocating to outof-state business sales negotiated or effected
through a sales office maintained out of the state,
there is little logical basis for making a differentiation based solely on whether the taxpayer
maintains a sales office out of the state or merely
sends a salesman out of the state to do the same
work that might be done through a branch sales

office"
The above quotation it will be noted interprets the
Utah type of statute as requiring the maintenance of a
"sales office" outside the state from which the out-of-state
sales are negotiated or effected by the corporation's salesmen. This is precisely defendant's point here, namely,
that plaintiff although maintaining administrative offices, does not maintain in New York a sales office.
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In the following discussion we ask the Court to assume, contrary to the Cottonwood Coal Co. Case and the
numerous cases cited under defendant's Point 2 with reference to direct allocation by separate accounting
methods, that plaintiff by virtue of its New York administrative office is thereby doing business in New York so
as to require an apportionment of net income outside
Utah. This was the assumption made in defendant's decision by its computations of the payroll, property and
gross receipts fractions. With respect to the sales factor
we refer the Court to the discussion in the A.L.K. Annotation, 167 at page 958 under the sub-heading "Express
Statutory Provisions as to Sales." The statutory provisions as to sales allocation are substantially the same in
the states of Utah, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. Although the problem of the sales factor was before this
Court in the case of California Packing Corporation v.
Commission, 97 Utah 367 (1939), the matter has been
considered more frequently by the appellate courts of
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts.
We quote from the above annotation at page 960:
"Where an out-of-state sales office made sales
within the state which were filled from a branch
within the state, and the state appellate tax board
found as a fact that such sales constituted sales
negotiated through the out-of-state office so as
to be excluded from taxation under such a statute,
the decision was affirmed in Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation v. Ford Motor Company
(1941) 308 Mass. 558, 33 NE 2d 318, in view of
another statute making the board's findings of
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fact final. Conversely, where orders negotiated
by the local branch of the corporation with local
buyers were filled by an out-of-state branch, it was
held that the sales were properly classified as
sales made within the state.
"And it was held under such a statute, in Com.
v. Electric Storage Battery Co. (1941) 51 Dauph
Co. Eep. (PA) 90, that a sale is to be assigned to
the out-of-state office which negotiated and concluded it, even though the goods were manufactured within the state and orders therefor were
filled from several warehouses within and without
the state.
"But in California Packing Corp. v. State
Tax Commission (1939) 97 Utah 367, 93 P . 2d 463,
a three to two decision, the majority of the court
practically rewrote the portion of the statute
quoted, supra this sub-division, saying that it
should read: 'Negotiated or effected in behalf of
the corporation by agents or agencies chiefly situated at, connected with or sent out from premises
owned or rented by the corporation, for the transaction of business outside of this state.' And the
majority construed the statute, as thus rewritten,
saying: 'It excepts from sales the income of which
is used in computing the tax those which may be
handled from offices or premises within the state
to a purchaser without the state for shipment out
of the state, if made by an agent of the company
chiefly engaged in out-of-state sales and business.
Sales otherwise made of goods within the state
for shipment out of the state are deemed to be
sales made and business done within the state,
and enter into the income from which the tax is
computed. This construction makes the question
of the exception of proceeds of a sale of goods
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within the state depend upon where the sale is
made rather than upon the home office of salesman. This more directly covers business done
within the state.' But the minority thought that
the legislature had clearly indicated its intention
to make the locus of the sale depend upon the location of the office out of which the salesmen
work, and pointed out that ordinarily such a
formula did rough justice. It might be added that
the construction adopted by the minority has the
virtue of being practical from an administrative
point of view, for the state has only to add up
total sales of the local office and that is the end
of it; but under the view of the majority the state
must first determine whether each salesman is engaged chiefly in work within or without the state
and, if most of his work is without the state,
whether each sale was made within or without the
state, and the cost of such an administrative investigation may often exceed the tax to be collected. The Pennsylvania Tax Court disapproves
the majority opinion in this case in Com. v. Bayuk
Cigars (1941) 50 Dauph Co. Rep. (Pa.) 243 (Rehearing denied (1941) 51 Dauph Co. Rep. 140,
affirmed in (1942) 345 Pa. 348 28 A. 2d 134, affirmed in (1943) 318 U S 746, . . .; and in Com.
v. Charles S. Walton & Co. (1942) 53 Dauph Co.
Rep. (Pa.) 279."
A brief discussion of the California Packing Corp.
Case appears unavoidable. It is cited by this Court in
its opinion in No. 7298, and by plaintiff in its brief (pages
26-27, 36 and 53) generally for the proposition that the
Utah law seeks to avoid double taxation and to levy a tax
with respect to business done only within the state, and
that under neither the majority or minority opinions
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should any sales be assigned to Utah which are not negotiated by personnel operating from offices in Utah.
We feel it necessary to point out that plaintiff relied
primarily upon the California Packing Corporation case
before this Court in No. 7298 in support of its claim to a
calculation of tax on the basis of the statutory formula
as applied to its total operations. This Court held, however, that this plaintiff's tax should be computed not on
the basis of the statutory formula but on the basis of the
separate accounts of plaintiff's Utah Division. This
Court in its opinion in No. 7298 cited both the majority
and minority opinions in the California Packing case as
establishing the right of defendant to depart from the
statutory formula and assess the tax under subdivision 8
of the Utah statute on the separate business done by
plaintiff's Utah Division.
To see what, if any, relevance the California Packing
case has to the allocation problem in the case at bar, it
is necessary to turn to the facts of the case. It appeared
that the Packing Company in filing its franchise tax returns used the three factor formula in the statute and
allocated to Utah some property and some payroll. In the
sales fraction, however, it showed $55,511,789.30 of total
sales none of which were assigned to Utah. The sales
fraction was thus zero as plaintiff contends it should be
here in the case at bar. The Packing Company allocated
no sales to Utah "since none of the goods were sold by
salesmen or agents sent out from premises within the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

246
state of Utah." In auditing the return the Tax Commission allocated to Utah sales in the amount of $2,122,110.26 *
which represented "the sales of goods which were stored
in Utah at the time of sale although such sales were made
by agents sent out from the California offices of the
company." The Tax Commission, before the Court,
sought to justify this adjustment of the gross receipts
fraction under subdivision 8 of the statute. The majority
opinion states at page 372:
"The amount shown as No. 3, total gross receipts in Utah, includes sales of goods which were
stored in Utah at the time of sale regardless of
whether the sales were made to Utah concerns or
to concerns in other states.
"Should the income from sales of produce
manufactured or stored within this state be allocated to income attributable to business carried
on within this state when such sales are made for
the company by an agent sent out from the California office?"
After construing the statute as indicated above in the
A.L.K. annotation, the Court went on to state at page 374
as follows:
"This construction also puts into the income
of business done within the state the proceeds
of sales of goods manufactured or stored within
the state but sold for shipment out of the state,
where the sale is made through a broker or jobber
within the state rather than through an out-ofstate agent or employee of the company. We repeat, the exception goes only to sales to an out-ofstate party when the agent of the company making
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the sale is chiefly connected with out-of-state business and such others made from premises maintained for out-of-state business as the Tax Commission may determine to be attributable to business done out of the state."
Again at page 375, with the exception of an order by
a St, George merchant on a Salt Lake warehouse filled
by a delivery from a Las Vegas, Nevada, warehouse, the
Court states:
"The section thus provides that the receipts
from business assignable to the state shall be determined from three factors: (a) Sales of goods
manufactured or stored within the state, less the
exception noted above . . ."
The result of the majority opinion was to yield "in
the main results closely akin to those which the commission sought to accomplish by departing from the statutory formula." (page 379)
The dissent in the minority opinion was placed on the
ground that the statute "means just what it says" (page
390), and the Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania and
Massachusetts have followed the construction of the
statute as set forth in the dissenting opinion.
In a strict sense the California Packing Corporation
case is completely distinguishable from and has no application to the case at bar whatsoever for the reason
that the sales employees operating out of the California
"offices of the company" were selling the goods manuDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

248
factured or stored in Utah "to Utah concerns or to concerns in other states" in the name and in behalf of the
company itself. In other words, the goods were not being
sold by an affiliated sales subsidiary or by A. S. & B. or
by some other separate and distinct company or by independent brokers, factors or commission merchants. The
Packing Company was thus manufacturing and selling its
own goods in the regular course of its own business.
Although the majority opinion seemed to indicate
that the test under the statute should be, not the home
office of the salesman, but whether the agent was "chiefly
engaged in out-of-state sales and business," the opinion
goes on to state that "this construction makes the question
of the exception of proceeds of a sale of goods within the
state depend upon where the sale is made rather than
upon the home office of the salesman.7'
Furthermore, the dissenting opinion in discussing
this "drastic" revision of the statute, stated at page 386:
"Before transposition the test of accepted
sales was whether they could be credited to
agencies outside of Utah, i.e., agencies or agents
accredited to premises outside of Utah. After the
transposition the test is whether the sales which
are accepted were made out of the state."
Although the minority raises certain constitutional
doubts about certain possible applications of the gross
receipts factor as contained in the law, the cases cited
heretofore under defendant's Point 1 and the several
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decisions in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania and particularly the Bayuk Cigars case which was affirmed by
the Supreme Court of the United States clearly and definitely sustain the constitutionality of the Utah statute
both as it stands in the books and as applied here to
plaintiff.
If we assume that the California Packing Corporation case is still law in this state, under neither the majority nor the minority opinion would selling activities
outside the state by independent brokers, factors or commission merchants appear to require an apportionment
of income outside Utah. However, to the extent that the
California Packing case is interpreted as discarding the
statutory test in the law and adopting in lieu thereof the
sole test of whether the sale was made outside Utah,
the decision has subsequently been clearly if not expressly
over-ruled by this court in the J. M. and M. S. Browning
Co. case.
The opinion in American
v. State Tax Commission,

Investment

Corporation

101 Ut. 189 (1941) points up

clearly the conflict of view on this question within the
Court. The majority opinion, page 201, states:
"'Do the proceeds from the sale of the oil
stocks represent receipts from business done in
Utah? I t does not appear that anything with respect to the sale of this stock was done in Utah.
These stocks were sold on the New York stock
exchange by a member of that exchange in New
York. They were not sold in Utah nor under any
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right of the plaintiff to do business in Utah. A
sale made within the state is business done within
the state. A sale is made without the state to another person without the state and by an agent
chiefly engaged in out-of-state business is not business done within the state/'
The opinion relies upon the California Packing case for
the above and then continues:
"The legislature adopted a method of taxation
which meant to reach only the profits earned within this state. The general criteria for determining
the place of sale in cases of executed contracts of
sale is the place where the title to the property
passes to the buyer as between himself and the
seller."
The dissenting opinion at page 207 with respect to the
point here involved states:
"Further, by the prevailing opinion, if a local
broker with New York connections sells stock for
plaintiff, in N. Y., the income is not taxable, but
if such broker consummated the deal in Utah,
the income would be taxable. I t is clear that the
opinion fails to understand that the business of
the Idaho corporation or the oil companies in
earning a surplus and declaring dividends is an
entirely different business from plaintiff's business of owning stock and receiving dividends, and
that in this case the franchise covers the latter
type of business. Equally clear is it that the
opinion fails to distinguish the business done by
the broker in New York and that done by plaintiff here in placing the stock with the broker for
sale, and receiving the returns therefrom."
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Except for its well substantiated position under
Point 2 requiring the franchise tax to be based upon the
income shown by a direct allocation of separate accounting which position is in accord with the mandate of this
Court in No. 7298, defendant would here be having obvious difficulties if the majority decision in the American
Investment Corp. case in its interpretation of the California Packing case and the statute were still law. If
stock sent from Utah to a New York broker for sale by,
the broker in New York is not business done within Utah
solely because "title to the property passes to the buyer"
in New York, plaintiff's argument here that sending its
copper and molybdenite to New York for sale in New
York by the sales subsidiary is not business done within
Utah would have considerable merit.
However, in J. M. & M. S. Browning
Commission,

v. State

Tax

107 U. 457 (1945), the previous minority

view became the law and insofar as defendant's position
here or generally in administering the statute is concerned, the statute "means what it says." On page 466 of
the opinion it is stated :
"The only thing that can be noted as having
been done in another state is the holding of rental
properties and possibly the buying and selling
in other states of stocks and bonds."
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Again,
"It follows that all of the income from conducting its investment business was derived from
business done in Utah. The holding of the Tax
Commission in this regard must be affirmed. Insofar as the American Investment Co. v. Tax
Comm. case, supra, is to the contrary, it is hereby
expressly over-ruled."
Also of significance here is the statement of the
court at page 463:
"If in making the allocation of net income of
the taxpayer to Utah, the tax commission is required to look, not at the business done by the
taxpayer, but at the business done by some third
corporation, this reasonable basis is almost totally
destroyed."
Again at page 465:
"The test as to whether a corporation is doing
business in states other than Utah under particular fact situations would therefore be: Would
such conduct if carried on in Utah be held to constitute doing business so as to subject the corporation to the Utah corporate franchise tax."
Just as the Court in the Browning case felt the question to be whether the plaintiff there was conducting an
"investment" business in a state other than Utah, so here
in the case at bar is the question whether plaintiff is
conducting a "sales" business in a state other than Utah.
We emphasize particularly the fact that some of the consolidated companies in the Browning case "did business in
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Utah and Missouri, and had employees chiefly situated
at, and carried on business from premises which were
rented outside the state of Utah." Such business done
outside Utah from premises outside Utah did not, however, require the apportionment outside Utah of any of
the income from the investment business. The investment
business was all done in Utah and all of the investment
income thus became apportionable to Utah. The office
outside Utah did not engage in any investment business.
In the case at bar the office of plaintiff outside Utah is
an administrative office and does not engage in any sales
business whatsoever. That business is conducted in New
York by separate and distinct companies.
We invite the Court's attention to the following quotations from the annotation in 167 A.L.R. and cases cited
therein:
"The fact that the purchaser is located outside
the state does not require that the income from a
sale to him be allocated to business done outside
the state." (947)
" 'Doing business' cannot be so identified with
'receipt of income' that the business of the taxpayer in making sales must be deemed to have
been done at the place where the purchase price
was received." (947)
"It has been held that the fact that title to
goods passes outside the state does not necessarily
establish that the income from a sale of such goods
arises from business done outside the state." (948)
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The Court's particular attention is likewise invited
to the case of Maxwell v. Kent-Coffey

Mfg. Co., 204 NC

365, 168 SE 397; affirmed 291 U.S. 642 (1934). In this
case it appeared that the taxpayer was a Delaware Corporation carrying on a manufacturing business in North
Carolina.

99.8% of the goods manufactured

within

North Carolina were sold outside the state, in the amount
of $1,545,485.95. Sales within the state were $3,021.13 or
00.2% of the total sales. In filing its tax return the taxpayer allocated 58.538% of its net income to North Carolina. The Commissioner of Revenue, however, allocated
99.2% of the taxpayer's net income to North Carolina
and assessed an additional tax on this basis. The Supreme Court of North Carolina sustained the assessment
and stated:
"The bare fact of sale produces no income.
I t is merely the act by which the income is captured; the capital, the organization, or efforts
which produce the sale, are the things to be considered in ascertaining the amount of income to be
credited to the sale. Again 'no effort was made
in the evidence to break up the business of appellee into the separate or component elements of
buying, manufacturing and selling, as was done
in the Hans Rees' Sons Case . . . "
We come now to a specific analysis and answer of
plaintiff's argument as set forth in its brief that receipts
from sales of products produced by the Utah Division
were not gross receipts from business done in Utah and
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cannot be attributed to business carried on within Utah.
The discussion assumes, without conceding, that plaintiff
is entitled to apply the statutory formula against its
Utah Division's separate books of account.
Plaintiff's main point that sales of the Utah products
do not constitute gross receipts from business done in
Utah appears at page 19 of its brief. The discussion
from pages 19 to 23 is general and reference is made to
the provisions of the Utah statute relating to the statutory formula basis of allocation. At page 21 it is pointed
out that the gross receipts from all sales of copper,
molybdenite, platinum and palladium of the Utah Division have been attributed to Utah business "although all
of such sales wrere made outside of Utah to buyers located
outside of this state by agents operating from offices outside of this state." Plaintiff's contention is stated on
page 22 to be that "such gross receipts are the result of
business carried on in a state other than Utah." It is
stated that the gross receipts factor "should be substantially zero and that the net income to be allocated to
Utah should range from 63 to 65%." Plaintiff indicates
its agreement with defendant's decision to the extent
that the decision allocated the gross receipts from gold
and silver outside Utah. The sales of platinum and palladium are indicated to be "but an infinitesimal p a r t " of
the total and therefore the subsequent argument is addressed primarily to the sales of copper and molybdenite.
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I t is urged that the subsequent argument demonstrates
the error in defendant's application of the statute and if
so applied the resulting tax is unconstitutional.
The only point necessary to discuss here is the reference to the sales of platinum and palladium. True it is
that these receipts may be infinitesimal when considering a total adjusted net income, before apportionment,
of the Utah Division in the amount of $232,570,086.66.
Such receipts are nevertheless in a substantial amount.
Plaintiff has raised the propriety of assigning such
receipts to Utah business and we suggest that such receipts should not be assigned outside the state merely
because such receipts constitute a small proportion of
total receipts. This is not a very good reason. The evidence clearly shows and establishes that the sales of
platinum and palladium were negotiated and effected by
and in the name of A. S. & K. from A. S. & R.'s own separate premises and in the regular course of its own business. Plaintiff has established no basis whatsoever for
the assignment of such receipts to business done by
plaintiff outside Utah.
Plaintiff urges on page 23 that the Utah tax statute
is designed to tax net income attributable to Utah business and that the decision of defendant it at variance with
this purpose.
Plaintiff's discussion from pages 23 to 29 is again
general and to the effect that the so-called Massachusetts formula is only designed to impose a tax on the
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corporation's net income fairly and reasonably attributable to business done within the taxing state. It is
pointed out that Massachusetts in adopting its threefactor formula of property, payroll and gross receipts
from sales first recognized that no single factor could
be generally applied to give a fair allocation of income
within and without the state. It is pointed out that the
Massachusetts formula has been adopted by several
states "with some differences in its specifications in one
state or another." It is urged that the statute, its legislative history and the opinions of this Court show that
the statute only taxes such income as is reasonably
attributable to business done in Utah. It is suggested
that defendant has by a tortured construction of the
statute violated its fundamental purpose and has manifested no concern as to whether the result reached was
fair or not. It is further suggested that the three factors
must be applied "since each factor operates as a check
and balance to the others" and that application of the
formula is necessary in the case of a "single or unitary
business conducted across state lines." At page 29, plaintiff indicates its acquiescence in the assignment of 6%
of the property outside Utah, 3% of the payroll outside
Utah, but objects that the assignment to Utah of receipts
of sales of products, other than gold and silver, constitutes a patent violation of the statute because none of
the sales were negotiated in Utah, none of the persons
concerned with sales worked out of offices in Utah, none
of the products were delivered to customers in Utah
and no sales activities occurred within Utah.
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As heretofore indicated, the several states in adopting the Massachusetts formula have modified the statutory test on the sales factor. The Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Utah laws do not however, arbitrarily
allocate sales receipts to the state of production or manufacture or to a state in which the corporation is otherwise
doing business if it appears that the sales are negotiated
by the company in out-of-state premises. The statute
pertaining to the sales factor simply assigns gross
receipts to the state from sales unless the taxpayer corporation itself conducts outside the state the selling
business and activity from the corporation's own premises. The statute neither requires nor permits the apportionment of net income to business conducted or the
corporate franchise exercised outside the state by some
other company. Furthermore, even on plaintiff's theory
of the case, the formula is clearly and definitely inapplicable to the intercompany transfers of 25% of the copper
produced by the Utah Division to the fabricating subsidiaries, Chase Brass and Copper Co. and Kennecott
Wire & Cable Co., separately accounted for.
After pointing out on page 29 that no sales activities
are conducted in Utah, plaintiff begins to move toward
the heart of the problem on page 30 by referring to
various administrative duties performed in the New
York office as "evidence" of out-of-Utah activity and
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then concludes on page 31 that the administrative activities of plaintiff in New York were so "necessary and
substantial" that but for them "the operation of the
Utah Copper Division would not have been carried on
successfully over the years involved." It is further concluded that the error of defendant lies in the fact that
it has "inequitably attributed to Utah sales in no way
related thereto." The answer of course to this contention is that defendant has not attributed to Utah sales
in no way related to Utah. The only gross receipts from
sales assigned to Utah are sales of the Utah molybdenite
and blister copper products. These products are related
to Utah because they were produced in Utah. These
products were loaded on cars in Utah for shipment outside Utah in interstate commerce. The Utah Division
started the product on its way for out-of-state sale by
the sales subsidiary. This subsidiary did the selling, not
plaintiff's New York administrative office. Administrative liason with or even some supervision over the independent sales subsidiary's activities does not make the
business of the subsidiary business done by the New
York administrative office any more than supervision
over Utah production constitute production of molybdenite and copper in the New York administrative office. The discussion on pages 32 to 35 relates generally
to the propriety of the statutory formula to a company
which manufactures in one state and sells in another,
but overlooks the fact that in plaintiff's case plaintiff
conducts outside Utah no selling business.
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On page 35 the point is made that defendant erred
by assigning to Utah business carried on its entirety in
other states. Pages 35 to 38 again emphasize that no
selling activities are supposed to have occurred in Utah
and that because the sales were out-of-state sales the
defendant has violated the statute and the construction
of the statute by this Court in the California Packing
Case. I t is urged that the "except" clause in the Utah
statute has been erroneously and too narrowly construed and further that such construction disregards
the clause in the statute which also excepts from assignment to Utah "sales otherwise determined by the tax
commission to be attributable to the business conducted
on such premises." I t is urged that however technical
the interpretation of the initial language of the "except"
clause, the aforesaid concluding language clearly assigns
outside Utah that business which is not fairly attributable to Utah. Plaintiff concludes at 38:
"It thus becomes apparent that the real and
substantive question under the statute is, in each
case, whether the sales in question resulted from
sales activity within or otherwise related to Utah
or whether, on the contrary, they are in fact attributable to sales activity permanently carried
on outside of this state. I t is entirely inconsistent
with the purpose of the statute to attribute to
Utah gross receipts from sales which had no relation to any sales activity conducted in that state."
Here seemingly is the outright contention that permanent sales activity outside Utah automatically excludes
sales receipts from Utah business, irrespective of
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whether the sales activity outside the state is conducted
by the taxpayer or some independent marketing instrumentality. This construction is clearly incorrect and
does violence to the statute. Most certainly, to begin
with, the business of producing and manufacturing molybdenite and blister copper in Utah is business assignable to Utah. The statute then by clear command assigns the receipts from its business to Utah unless
and until the taxpayer can demonstrate that the sales
fall within the "except" clause. This "except" clause
under any reasonable construction only excepts those
sales negotiated "in behalf of the corporation" by agents
in out-of-state premises owned or rented "by the corporation." The sales are not those of some other corporation but "of the corporation." The corporation
concerned is the taxpayer. Furthermore, plaintiff can
place no reliance on the concluding portion of the language under consideration for the reason that defendant in its decision did not otherwise determine that
the sales herein involved were attributable to the
business of plaintiff conducted at plaintiff's administrative office in New York. In fact, the evidence
showed and defendant specifically found that the selling business of the sales subsidiary was the separate
business of the subsidiary conducted on and attributable to the subsidiary's premises.
Plaintiff carries the main burden of its argument
from pages 39 to 59 of the brief. By the point on
page 39 it first undertakes to show that the sales by
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the sales subsidiary in New York were sales "in behalf
of the corporation by agents." It then undertakes by
the point on page 54 to show that the sales subsidiary
as agent was "chiefly situated at, connected with, or
sent out from premises" of plaintiff outside Utah.
There is thus presented the basic position of plaintiff that the sales were negotiated by an agent in behalf of plaintiff from plaintiff's premises as contrasted
with defendant's position that the sales were negotiated
by the sales subsidiary in its own behalf and from its
own premises. The two points, namely, first, whether
the sales were negotiated in behalf of the corporation
and, second, from the corporation's out-of-state premises, although to some extent intermingled, are separate and distinct points and to justify exclusion of
sales receipts from Utah under the Utah statute it is
necessary for the taxpayer corporation to establish both
points.
We turn first to the question whether the sales
of copper and molybdenite negotiated and effected by
the sales subsidiary were sales made by an agent "in
behalf of" plaintiff. Pages 39 to 46 of plaintiff's brief
are devoted, first, to showing that the sales subsidiary
was an "agent" even though it be a factor or commission merchant; second, that plaintiff's control over its
wholly owned sales subsidiary precludes a finding that
the sales subsidiary was a factor or commission merchant; third, that the separate corporate entity of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

263
sales subsidiary should be ignored and "rather its activities as they affect the Utah Copper Division should
be taken into account to the same extent as though it
were simply a division of Kennecott"; fourth, plaintiff's production activities and the sales subsidiary's
sales activities "constitute a single unitary enterprise"
and a separation of the two activities would "disregard the essential economic facts of the case." The
pages following from 46 to 54 are then devoted to the
attempt to distinguish the Buyuk Cigars and Minds
Coal Mining cases which involved the similar Pennsylvania statute.
True it is to begin with that a broker, factor or
commission merchant is an "agent" but also equally
true, as plaintiff's quotation from the Eestatement of
the Law on page 42 shows, the "attorney at law, the
broker, the factor, the auctioneer," are "independent
contractors." When the broker, the factor, the commission merchant functions, he functions not representatively but individually in his own name and behalf and in the regular course of his own business. As
hitherto pointed out in the quotation from paragraph
7501 Prentice-Hall All States Unit, while in one sense
a factor or commission merchant is the "agent" of the
consigning dealer or manufacturer, he nevertheless conducts his own separate business of selling the goods
to which he has been entrusted with the power of sale.
The factor sells the goods to his own customers. He
pays to the consignor a price fixed by the contract and
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retains for himself the amount by which the price his
customer pays him exceeds that which he is required
to pay to the consignor. As the Prentice-Hall quotation
points out "the business done in the state is entirely
that of the factor. When he makes a sale of the consignor's goods in the state, what really takes place is
this: The factor purchases the goods from the consignor and resells them to his customer." F o r sales
tax purposes the factor is in the business of reselling
the goods of the consignor. Doing business in Utah
through a factor, broker or commission merchant is
not doing business in the state. The business done
here is that of the broker, factor, or commission merchant. The sales negotiated and effected by a factor
or commission merchant are not sales made "in behalf
of" his consignor principal. The sales are negotiated
and effected "in his own behalf." This phrase "in
behalf of" in the Utah statute means and can only
mean in whose name and pursuant to whose business
are the sales made. To use the language of the Buich
case, supra, the factor acts "individually" and not "representatively". The business of selling being thus
the separate business of the factor or commission merchant, it would, where the question is whose business is it, make no difference whether the manufacturer and the factor were doing business in the same
state. Business conducted by one person is not business conducted by another person, unless it is done
representatively.
An overwhelming line of cases has
established the rule contained in the Utah Regulations
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heretofore quoted, that where the manufacturer is in
one state but sells his product outside the state through
a factor or commission merchant, he is not doing a
sales business outside the state of production.
Taxwise no net income is assignable outside to the
state in which the sales business is conducted independently by a factor or commission merchant. Administrative
control or supervision may be exercised by the consigning principal over his out-of-state broker, factor
or commission merchant. The Utah sheep ranch with
respect its Boston wool broker, the Utah cattle ranch
with respect to its Denver or Omaha livestock agent,
the Utah investment company with respect to its New
York broker, the Utah fruit grower with respect to
its Chicago produce broker may exercise an administrative supervision over sales in the sense of outlining
the basis and terms within which the agent may
sell but the Utah product is sold out-of-state by these
independent agents in their own name and in the regular course of their own business. Moving an administrative office outside Utah, the state of production,
to another state or even to the state in which the broker,
factor or commission merchant is selling the goods
can make no difference to the fundamental question
raised by the Utah statute as to whether the sales business conducted outside the state is business conducted
by the corporation outside the state. To apportion
sales receipts outside the state the statute requires a
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ing and negotiating and effecting contracts of sale
outside the state. Although the legal authorities pertinent to the questions are considered here, the question
whether a sale is negotiated "in behalf of the corporation" is largely a question of fact. Let us turn then
to the record and to defendants findings of fact.
Defendant has specifically found as a fact in this
proceeding that the sales negotiated by the sales subsidiary covering the Utah product were not sales negotiated on behalf of plaintiff, but in the subsidiary's
own behalf. For example, the standard form of contract of sale ( F p. 71) shows that all contracts were
negotiated and executed by and in the name of the
sales subsidiary as seller. Nowhere in this standard
contract is plaintiff's name even mentioned. All casting, shipping and delivery instructions to A. S. &
E. were given by and in the name of the sales subsidiary. The sales subsidiary dealt exclusively with the
customers. The cash proceeds from sales were collected
by and in the name of the sales subsidiary, such sums
being deposited in its own name, in its own bank accounts. The subsidiary periodically remitted the proceeds of sale to plaintiff after deducting its agreed
commission of $1.00 per net ton of copper and $3.50
per net ton of molybdenite together with certain other
miscellaneous expenses connected with the sale.
As Mr. Lenz testified (Tr. 609) ( F p. 143) "It,
of course, is the duty and obligation of Kennecott
Sales Corporation to make proper contracts for the
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protection of Kennecott Copper Corporation in making the sales of Kennecott's products. It also has, as
I previously testified, to given directions to the refineries with regard to the casting of shapes, the shipping of the copper as well as the shipment of molybdenite, and Kennecott Sales Corporation in its own
name issues the bills or statements on the basis of
which payment for the copper or molybdenite is made.
Kennecott Sales also collects the money and pays over
the net thereof to Kennecott Copper Corporation."
Mr. Lenz further testified (Tr. 616) ( F p. 142)
that "The general business and the sales arrangements,
however, are carried out by the Sales Corporation."
Defendant found from this and other voluminous
testimony that all of the details of the selling activity
and the determination of the time, the place, the manner and the price of sales were solely and exclusively
all handled and determined by the sales subsidiary.
Plaintiff's New York administrative office coordinated
production with sales and determined or outlined the
general policy to be followed and was consulted by
officials of the sales subsidiary if "anything unusual"
occurred in regard to sales matters (F. p. 142), but
clearly and without doubt the business of selling was
the separate and distinct business of the subsidiary.
Plaintiff was held out to the trade as the producer
and the sales subsidiary was held out as the seller.
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The evidence made it abundantly clear and perfectly apparent that the sales of copper and molybdenite negotiated and effected from day to day during the period here involved were negotiated and effected by officials of the sales subsidiary in behalf
of the sales subsidiary. Of some interest in this connection are the minutes of the special meeting of the
Board of Directors of the sales subsidiary held on
April 15, 1942 ( F P. 49-50) which state:
"The Chairman then stated that it was advisable to continue the authorization of certain
officers of the corporation to enter into and execute contracts covering the routine, day to day
sale of copper and molybdenite.
"Thereupon, after discussion and upon motion duly made, seconded and carried, it was
"RESOLVED, that the president or any vicepresident or any assistant sales manager be and
each of them hereby is authorized to enter into
and execute in behalf of this corporation, when
acting either as principal or agent, routine day
to day contracts covering the sale of copper and
molybdenite.''
This resolution under which the officials of the
sales subsidiary were legally authorized to negotiate
and effect sales of copper and molybdenite merely confirms again that the sales were entered into and executed "in behalf of this corporation (the sales subsidiary),

when

acting either

as principal

or

agent."

The authority conferred was not to negotiate and exeDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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cute in behalf of plaintiff or some other corporation
contracts covering the sale of copper and molybdenite,
but only authority to negotiate and execute contracts
"in behalf of" the sales subsidiary.
Plaintiff argues here that the separate corporate
entity of the sales subsidiary be ignored and its operation treated as a mere "department" of plaintiff. This
argument is particularly interesting in the light of Mr.
Lenz's testimony (Tr. 618) (F p. 52) to the effect that
the very reason for incorporating and organizing the
sales subsidiary was to prevent the sales activities from
being a department of plaintiff. He testified:
"Q. Can you explain to me why Kennecott
Sales Corporation was created and why it exists ?
A. There are number of reasons. In this
way a somewhat sharper distinction is made between operations and sales than if the sales department w^ere merely a department of the operating company."
The attention of the court is likewise invited to
the historical statement (F. pages 66-68 and 105-109)
which shows that the producing function has always
been legally separated from the separate business of
selling the product. In the year prior to 1920 A. S. &
R. acted as sales agent. During the period from 1920
to 1934 Gugenheim Brothers acted as sales agent, and
since January 1, 1934 the sales subsidiary has conducted
the selling function, first, under the Guggenheim agreeDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ment for the period from J a n u a r y 1, 1934, to midnight
August 31, 1935, and thereafter under substantially the
same arrangements as are set forth in the agreement
dated September 3? 1935? between the sales subsidiary
and plaintiff, Utah Copper Company and Mother Lode
Coalition Mines Company. A copy of this agreement
and the Guggenheim agreement are attached to defendant's findings.
It likewise appeared that the sales subsidiary acts
not only in selling the Utah product but also the product
of the other three western mining divisions and Braden
Copper Company (Chile). Likewise, (F. pages 34-36),
the sales subsidiary conducted a world-wide business
of selling with branch offices or agencies in various
parts of the world, even having a wholly owned subsidiary itself in Great Britain.
In the face of all these facts and many others, plaintiff's argument (See page 43) that the sales subsidiary
sold as "agent" in plaintiff's behalf appears quite tenuous indeed. The subsidiary's sales were its own sales
in its own name and in the regular course of its own
world-wide business. When the sales subsidiary collected and deposited from customers the cash receipts
from sales it was conducting its own business in the
same way and manner that a factor or commission merchant regularly functions. The subsidiary's subsequent
remittance of the funds to plaintiff less the agreed
commission and other expenses was exactly the same
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method of doing business as that conducted by any independent factor or commission merchant.

Plaintiff

insists, however, that this cannot be true for the reason
(Page 43) that "the Sales Corporation never obtained
possession of the products sold, possession remaining
either in Kennecott or A. S. & R. on Kennecott's behalf."
The above statement appears contrary to the evidence and the specific findings of defendant. The exact
facts on this point are as follows, the Finding at page
32-33 stating:
"30. The intent of the contract between Kennecott and A. S. & R. dated November 29, 1940,
as heretofore noted as regards the Baltimore Refinery, is that refined copper shall be returned
to Kennecott as it is produced. (Ex. I l l (2) P.
13). The contract provides that final return of
copper shall be made by delivery thereof 'to Kennecott or its order/ at specified points in the refinery area. (Ex. I l l (2) (2), page 13). Also, as
heretofore noted, A. S. & R. is obligated to store
the refined copper without additional charge.
When requested, A. S. & R. is obligated to issue
transferable storage certificates for such copper
of Kennecott as A. S, & R. shall store or arrange
to store. (Ex. I l l (2) page 30). Physical possession of the copper at the refinery is thus by contract in A. S. & R. subject to Kennecott's order.
"31. By arrangements entered into between
Kennecott and the Sales Corporation which have
been accepted, recognized and followed by A. S. &
R., Kennecott has entrusted the Sales Corporation
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with authority to sell all of the refined copper
produced at the Baltimore Eefinery of A. S. &
E., or other refinery, and with the right to possess
and control such copper for the purpose of sale
and to issue instructions to A. S. & E. or others
pertaining to the casting, storage, handling and
shipment, sale or other disposition of such copper
and with the right to receive payment from the
customer of the purchase price thereof. (Tr. 168181)."
The contractural arrangements in effect between
plaintiff and the sales subsidiary are set forth from pages
59 to 66 of the Findings. Under these arrangements plaintiff has appointed the sales subsidiary its exclusive agent
for the sale on commission of the entire production of
copper of each of plaintiff's producing units and this
appointment has been accepted by the subsidiary which
has agreed to use its best endeavors to procure the highest market price for the copper produced by plaintiff.
Plaintiff has agreed to deliver to the sales subsidiary
copper of standard grade and quality. More particularly
(F. p. 64), it is stated:
"The American Smelting and Eefining Company or anyone holding any copper of Kennecott
for delivery is authorized, upon demand made
by the Sales Corporation to make deliveries to the
Sales Corporation or its order of such copper."
(Tr. 663-4).
Again ( F . p. 65):
"All premiums for special and unusual shapes
as are currently charged by A. S. & E. or other
refinery and as are paid to the Sales Corporation
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by the buyers of special shapes are paid by
the Sales Corporation directly to A. S. & E. or
other refinery which has supplied such shapes.
Allowances made by the refinery for cathodes are
received by the Sales Corporation and duly credited to the buyers." (Tr. 667).
Further, at page 74 of the Findings are shown typical specimens, following the execution of a contract of
sale between the sales subsidiary and customer, of the
shipping instructions from the sales subsidiary to A. S.
& R. The shipping and casting instructions issued to
A. S. & R. are issued by and in the name of the sales subsidiary.
On the basis of the above facts and others, defendant
found ( F . pages 143-4) t h a t :
"By appropriate directions to and arrangements with the refinery or others, all control and
the right to issue instructions as to the casting of
shapes of copper and the storage or shipment of
both copper and molybdenite to the persons having
the actual possession or custody thereof, was vested by Kennecott exclusively in the Sales Corporation."
Defendant further found (F. 147-8):
"The Sales Corporation was employed by
Kennecott as a commercial agent and vested and
entrusted under appropriate instructions and arrangements with the right of possession, disposal
and control of all copper and molybdenite produced by Kennecott for the purpose of selling such
property, at an agreed commission or compensaDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tion, in the name of and pursuant to and in the
usual course of trade or business of the Sales
Corporation and authorized to receive payment
for such sales from the purchaser thereof. We
hold and find that the Sales Corporation was in
fact and functioned as a factor or commission
merchant with respect to all sales of copper and
molybdenite during the period here involved."
There can be no doubt that these findings of defendant rest on the facts. Nor does plaintiff point to any evidence in the record to show this Court any error in such
findings. The authorities do not require a factor or commission merchant to have actual physical possession of
the goods entrusted to him for the purpose of sale. It is
sufficient and in fact the normal situation for the goods
to be held in storage under warehouse receipt or otherwise providing that the person in actual physical possession of the goods holds the goods for and subject to the
order of the factor or commission merchant. Upon production of the refined copper in the Baltimore Refinery,
A. S. & R. held the copper in its yard for the account
and subject to the order of the sales subsidiary. A. S. &
R. took no action whatsoever with respect thereto except
as specifically directed and instructed to do so by the
sales subsidiary. Upon shipment to the sales subsidiary's
customer, the sales subsidiary would be shown as shipper.
Similarly in the case of molybdenite upon production in
Utah plaintiff held this product for the account and subject to the order of the sales subsidiary. Officials of plaintiff here in Utah took no action with respect thereto whatDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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soever except as specifically instructed and directed to
do so by the sales subsidiary with the sales subsidiary being shown as shipper when the molybdenite product was
moved out of the state to market.
We move on then to plaintiff's next argument, pages
44-46 of its brief, that the separate corporate entity of the
sales subsidiary should be set aside and its activities
"taken into account to the same extent as though it were
simply a division of Kennecott."
It is now far too late in the day to ignore the separate entity of corporations in taxation as the numerous
cases cited heretofore under Point 2 clearly establish.
All of the cases cited by plaintiff at pages 44-5 of its brief
in support of its plea to ignore the corporate entity are
not pertinent precedent in a tax case. All these cases
show is the old equity rule that the corporate form cannot
be employed as a device to commit a fraud. A wholly
owned subsidiary organized and employed to defraud
creditors or improperly conceal assets can of course be
set aside. In the case at bar, however, the sales subsidiary has been organized and operated for no fraudulent
purpose but for valid business reasons and under fair
and reasonable contractural arrangements with its
parent.
Plaintiff's suggestion that the corporate entity of
the sales subsidiary be ignored for the reason that plaintiff's business of production and the subsidiary's busiDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ness of selling constitute from the economic point of view
but a single unitary enterprise has been more than sufficiently disposed of by the authorities heretofore cited
under Point 2. These cases clearly show that in the absence of fraud or an intent to syphon income out of the
taxing state to evade tax that a taxpayer is perfectly free
to separately incorporate the manufacturing function
from the selling function, and that the separate corporate
entities of each function must be recognized and respected where the intercompany arrangements are fair
and reasonable.
Plaintiff refers to and quotes from the decision of
the California

Supreme Court in Edison

California

Stores v. McColgan, which held that the taxing authorities
could consolidate the business of parent and all of the
subsidiaries owned and managed under one centralized
system, where the separate accounts of the operations
within California did not reflect the net income from the
business done within California. The Court thus applied
the same rule to the parent subsidiary relationship as had
been applied in the earlier California case of

Butler

Brothers v. McGolgam, 315 U.S. 501 (1942), affirming 111
Pac. 2d 334 (1941), which had permitted the California
tax authorities to apply the statutory formula to countrywide operations carried out not through subsidiaries but
through various branch offices, where again the separate
branch office accounts of operations carried on within
California did not properly reflect the net income from
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business done in California. In the case at bar the evidence is that the separate accounting basis of the Utah
Division clearly reflects net income from business done
in Utah. If this were not the fact, then the Butler
Brothers and Edison California Stores decisions, among
others, might permit or furnish defendant with some authority for rejecting a tax return based on the separate
accounts of the Utah Division and insisting instead of a
return based upon the formula as applied to countrywide operations. The various difficulties, however, of
attempting to consolidate under the circumstances of the
case at bar the incomes of the sales and fabricating subsidiaries not qualified to do business in Utah, are apparent from the cases heretofore fully considered under
Point 2.
We turn now to additional authorities showing clearly that the operations of plaintiff and its sales subsidiary cannot be combined and consolidated together either
on the ground of agency or ignoring the corporate entity.
On the general problem we refer the Court to an article entitled "Income Tax Status of the Wholly Owned
Subsidiary Corporation" contained in the Monthly Digest
of Tax Articles, April 1951, published by Mathew Bender
& Co. This article is a condensation of an article in 29
Texas Law Review 88 (1950). The article considers the
question whether the "one man" corporation and the
wholly owned subsidiary may be ignored for tax purposes and at whose behest—the commissioner's or the
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taxpayer's. After referring to the early income tax laws
of the Civil War period under which corporations were
treated much as partnerships are today, the article moves
on to modern Federal legislation and discusses the various decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
dealing with corporate entity under tax laws. Reference
is made to Lynch v, Turrish, 247 U. S. 221 (1918), Lynch
v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339 (1918), Southern Pacific Co, v.
Lowe, 247 U.S. (1918), Gulf Oil Corp, v. Lewellyn, 247
U.S. 71 (1918), Gregory v, Helvering, 293 U.S. 465,
(1935), Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940), Molme
Properties, Inc., v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943),
Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590
(1943), and finally the recent leading decision of the Supreme Court in National Carbide Corporation v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949). The article states:
"It is interesting to note that the Southern
Pacific and Gulf Oil cases and Lynch v. Turrish
are seemingly the only Supreme Court decisions
where a taxpayer has succeeded in an effort to
disregard his corporation so as to gain a tax benefit. Since these early holdings, any effort by a
taxpayer to employ the corporate form for business convenience and then to abandon it tax wise
has met with notable failure before the court."
Reference is made to the statement of Mr. Justice Reed
in the Higgins case as follows:
"A taxpayer is free to adopt such organization for his affairs as he may choose and having
elected to do some business as a corporation, he
must accept the tax disadvantages. On the other
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hand, the government may not be required to acquiesce in the taxpayer's election of that form for
doing business which is most advantageous to him.
The government may look at actualities and upon
determination that the form employed for doing
business . . . is unreal or a sham may sustain or
disregard the effect of the fiction as best serves
the purposes of the tax statute."
Of significance to the case at bar is the reference to the
Moline Properties case which held that the corporation
was not the agent of its sole stockholder where the corporation held title to certain mortgaged realty. The Court
held the gain taxable to the corporation but excepted the
situation where a corporation was in fact serving as an
agent. In the Interstate Transit Lines case the Court considered the agency argument to be the same as the argument of substantial identity in a different form and refused to treat the parent and subsidiary as one.
The article after referring to the National Carbide
decision summarizes the law as follows:
"The express words of the Court's opinion
leave no doubt but that a parent corporation which
organizes a subsidiary for the conduct of business
on its own account will find the earnings of the
subsidiary taxed to such subsidiary and not to the
parent."
Turning to the facts of the National Carbide case we
find three taxpayers, wholly owned subsidiary corporations of Air Eeduction Corporation (Airco), operating
under an agreement to act as "agent" for Airco in the
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manufacture, distribution and sale of various products.
Airco agreed to supply working capital, executive management and office facilities for its subsidiaries, who in
turn agreed to maintain and operate the plants acquired
by them, to manufacture and sell the products and to turn
over all profits to Airco therefrom in excess of 6% of
their outstanding capital stock. Title to all assets remained in Airco, cost of assets acquired by the subsidiaries was carried as an account payable to Airco.
Such accounts were interest free and realizable only on
dissolution. Transfers of assets between subsidiaries
were reflected on intercompany accounts at cost without the transfer of cash. Officers of Airco served the
subsidiaries in similar capacities. The subsidiaries were
under the complete domination, control and ownership
of the parent corporation, Airco.
The three subsidiaries, although showing sizable
profits, reported as income only 6% of their capital stock,
the balance being reported by Airco against which was
offset a loss sustained by a fourth subsidiary. The commissioner asserted deficiencies against the three subsidiaries, contending that the amounts paid to the parent
constituted the income of the subsidiaries. The Supreme
Court by an unanimous decision, opinion by Chief
Justice Vinson, refused to set aside the separate entity
of the subsidiaries either on the ground of agency or
substantial identity and held that the income having been
earned by the subsidiaries should be taxable to the subsidiaries.
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The Court stated:
" 'Agency' and 'practical identity', as those
words are used in the Southern Pacific case are
unquestionably opposite sides of the same coin."
Again,
"Ownership of a corporation . . . can have no
different tax consequences when clothed in the
garb of agency than when worn as a removable
corporate veil."
Again,
"So far as control is concerned, we can see no
difference in principle between Airco's control of
petitioners and that exercised over Moline Properties, Inc. by its sole stockholder. Undoubtedly
the great majority of corporations owned by
sole stockholders are 'dummies' in the sense that
their policies and day-to-day activities are determined not as decisions of the corporation but
by their owners acting individually."
We come now to that portion of the National Carbide
decision which deals with the specific issue of the case at
bar, namely, whether the sales subsidiary of plaintiff
negotiated and effected the sales of copper and molybdenite in its own behalf as defendant contends, or in
behalf of plaintiff as plaintiff contends. It is defendant's
position that the phrase "in behalf of" means and can
only mean "in the name of."
Chief Justice Vinson continues:
"What we have said does not foreclose a true
corporate agent or trustee from handling the propDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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erty and income of its owner-principal without
being taxable therefor. Whether the corporation
operates in the name and for the account of the
principal, binds the principal by its actions, transmits money received to the principal, and whether
receipt of income is attributable to the services
of employees of the principal and to assets belonging to the principal are some of the relevant considerations in determining whether a true agency
exists."
Here in specific language is precisely defendant's
point in the case at bar. The agent referred to in the
Utah statute is not the independent factor, broker or
commission merchant, but the agent who "operates in the
name and for the account of the principal, binds the
principal by its actions." In other words, it is perfectly
clear that "in behalf of" means exactly the same thing as
"in the name and for the account of." Unless the business
is done "in the name and for the account of" of plaintiff,
the business done is not the business of plaintiff.
Of general interest is the annotation in 10 A.L.E, 2d
576 entitled "Income of Subsidiary as Taxable to It or to
Parent Corporation." Attention is likewise invited to
annotation in 165 A.L.B. 996 entitled "Eight of Owner
of all Shares of Corporation or Association Taxable as
Corporation to Have Its Income Taxed as His Personal
Income." Preceding the latter annotation is the case of
Titus v. United States at page 991, 150 F d 2d 508 (CCA
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10) (1945). Here the Circuit Court refused to permit the
sole stockholder or owner of a "trust taxable as a corporation" to have it set aside for tax purposes. The opinion
by Judge Huxman states:
"But we are asked to disregard the express
provisions of the trust agreement and look to the
actualities of the situation. In substance, it is argued that then thus viewed it becomes apparent
that not only was Titus the king-bee but also that
he was the only bee in this hive. Parties are not
at liberty to say that their purpose in perfecting
an organization was different or narrower than
that which they formally set forth in their solemn
instrument of writing.
"Whether the government could challenge the
nature of the trust is quite a different question.
That matter is not before us. Titus himself cannot
do so."
As Judge Cordozo pointed out in People ex rel.
Studebaker Corp. v. Gilchrist, 244 New York 114, 155
N.E. 68 (1926):
"The subsidiary in these transactions, if it had
any genuine autonomy, . . . was either a buyer or
an agent. If in truth and in good faith it was a
buyer of the parent's products, its operations were
its own. By the very terms of the hypothesis, they
are not to be identified with the operations of the
seller."
"On the other hand if the sale is to be disregarded as nothing but a cover for an agency,
the value of the privilege of doing business in a
corporate form as agent for another is not to be
confused with the value to the principal of acting
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through the agent. The position of the subsidiary may be no better than if its certificate of incorporation had stated that the purpose of its
business was to act as factor or intermediary for
the products of the parent. The position may be
no better, but it can also be no worse."
When it is recalled that the Utah corporation franchise tax is a tax on the exercise of the corporate franchise, it is apparent that neither under the Utah law nor
under the similar New York law is plaintiff exercising
any corporate franchise in New York of selling the Utah
product from day to day to customers. Although under
its charter it has the legal authority to "sell" its metals,
it does not under this authority sell or purport to sell
or exercise any franchise to sell any product of the Utah
Division in New York. The sale of the Utah product in
New York is negotiated and effected by the sales subsidiary under and pursuant to its charter and the corporate
franchise granted by the state of New York to the sales
subsidiary. I t sells the Utah product by exercising its
own corporate franchise in New York and not the corporate franchise of plaintiff. Thus, it is apparent that
even if the existence of an administrative office of plaintiff in New York is here assumed to constitute the doing
of business in New York, the business exercised and done
is not that of engaging in sales or negotiating or effecting
in its own corporate behalf and name any sales of the
Utah product whatsoever. Frequent or periodic consultation by plaintiff's officials with the officials of the sales
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subsidiary and supervision of the activities of the sales
subsidiary does not make the activities of the subsidiary
plaintiff's activities. As stated by Judge Learned Hand
in Proctor and Gamble Co. v. Newton, 289 Fd. 1013 (1923)
"In the case at bar, it does not appear that
the organization of the plaintiff is not quite separate from that of the Proctor and Gamble Manufacturing Company and of the Proctor and Gamble Distributing Company. I must assume that
each subsidiary has its own set of officials, who
actually conduct its business."
As stated by the Court in Pacific Magnesium
Westover, 86 Fd. Sup. 644 (1949):

v.

"The difficulty with the argument is that a
corporation and its stockholders are distinct entities. And the taxpayer who has chosen to use the
corporate form for business purposes is not free
to disregard it, in order to receive the tax benefit
to which he might have been entitled as an individual."
Again, as stated in United States
Query, 19 Fed. Sup. 191 (1937):

Rubber

Co. v.

"It is the Eubber Products Company, a corporation separate and distinct from plaintif, which
is carrying on business in South Carolina; and the
mere fact that plaintiff owns the stock in that corporation and that the two have to a large extent
the same officers and directors is no reason for
disregarding the corporate entity of either."
Keference is again made here to the Palmolive case,
supra, and that part of the decision relating to the outDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of-state subsidiary known as the "Buckingham Agency"
and whose separate income consisted of collecting commissions from the placing of advertising of the parent
company with respect to the goods produced within the
state of Wisconsin, the taxing state.

Notwithstanding

that the out-of-state administrative office of the Palmolive Company undoubtedly exercised a considerable
degree of supervision over the activities of the advertising subsidiary, this was nevertheless not

suffi-

cient in the court's view to make its out-of-state business
attributable to the out-of-state administrative office of
the Palmolive Company and permit its separate income to
be included with the parent's for apportionment purposes.
The District Court's opinion states:
"Its activities were all outside of the state;
they had no connection with the manufacture, but
consisted of placing advertising of the parent
company with advertising houses and collecting
commissions thereon. No part of its income was
directly or indirectly earned in the state of Wisconsin; no part of it is taxable within the state;
and to the extent of the allocation thereof by the
tax commission to Wisconsin there should be an
injunction as prayed."

|

i

The above decision is pertinent here for the reason that

|

plaintiff insists on its right to consolidate and combine

<

the separate operations of the sales subsidiary with the

!

production and administrative operations of plaintiff and

;

thereby establish a basis of claim under our statute

j
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to apportion outside Utah net income attributable both
to the administrative work and the selling work outside
the state.
Although the facts and the foregoing authorities
definitely establish that the sales subsidiaries business is
its own business and does not become attributable to or
a part of plaintiff's separate business of producing metal,
whether plaintiff's administrative office is in Utah, Wyoming or New York, we refer the Court at this point to
a line of cases specifically holding that if plaintiff had
no administrative office in New York it would not be
doing business in New York by reason of marketing its
copper and molybdenite product in New York through
the sales subsidiary. Plaintiff would not be entitled or
permitted to assign to New York sales receipts derived
from sales negotiated and effected in New York by a
factor or commission merchant conducting the selling
business in New York.
In Irvine Co. v. McColgan, 26 Cal. 2d 160, 157 Pac.
2d 847 (1945), the Supreme Court of California had before it the question whether a West Virginia corporation
authorized to transact business in California and engaged
in California in the business of raising and preparing
for market horticultural and agricultural products could
apportion outside the state sales receipts where the products were marketed outside California through the medium of independent produce brokers, commission merchants and a cooperative marketing association of which
the taxpayer was a member.
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The Court pointed out that cooperative marketing
agreements have been generally classified in law as contracts of "agency" and definitely and expressly on the
assumption that an agency relationship in fact existed,
the Court nevertheless held that the taxpayer was not
doing business outside California and was not entitled
to apportion any sales receipts outside the state. The
Court in its opinion at page 850-1 of the Pacific Keporter
stated:
"Transactions engaged in for a foreign corporation in a state are not necessarily engaged in
by the corporation in that state. As stated in
Union Internationale De Placements v. Hoey, 2
Cir., 96 Fd. 2d 591, 592, 'business transactions
within the taxing jurisdiction for the account of a
foreign corporation do not necessarily involve the
doing of business within the jurisdiction.' Thus,
although factors or commission merchants are
agents, it has been held that their activities in a
state do not constitute the doing of business therein by the foreign principals they represent within
the purview of statutes imposing franchise or license taxes. (Citing cases) Support for this position is found in the analogy afforded by decisions
to the effect that foreign corporations are not
doing business so as to be subject to the qualification laws of, or amendable to process in, states to
which their products have been consigned for sale
and sold by factors or commission merchants.
(Citing cases) The decisions reason that since factors or commission merchants are independent
contractors, the disposition of goods in their possession in accordance with the direction of their
foreign principals constitutes a part of their busiDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ness rather than the business of the individual
or corporations whose products they sell . . . In
other words, jurisdiction of foreign corporations
for purposes of process and regulation, as well
as taxation, is dependent upon their presence or
the exercise of their corporate franchises, and the
sale of products of such corporations by independent contractors does not involve corporate presence or the exercise of corporate franchises . . ,"
"It would si-riii to follow that if a foreign
corporation marketing its products in a state
through factors is not thereby 'doing business' in
that state, it is not thereby 'doing business' outside of the state in which it engages in production
activities....
u

We are of the opinion that cooperative marketing associations are factors, or so closely akin
thereto that the question whether plaintiff was
doing business outside of California by reason of
their sales transactions in other states is governed by the foregoing authorities. Section 2026
of the Civil Code defines a factor as an 'agent who,
in the pursuit of an independent calling, is employed by another to sell property for him, and
is vested by the latter with the possession or
control of the property, or authorized to receive
payment therefor from the purchaser.' Clearly
cooperatives which market the produce of their
grower members in the manner disclosed by the
facts of this case are embraced in that definition,
and it has been so held in this state . . . Plaintiff
argues, however, that the members of a nonprofit
cooperative association in legal effect constitute
the association, that the acts of the latter are the
acts of the former, and that therefore the cooperatives in this case did not act as factors or in
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dependent contractors in selling plaintiff's produce. The argument is in reality a plea to disregard the corporate entity of the cooperatives for
tax purposes. Similar pleas in comparable situations have been rejected, as where, for example,
a foreign corporation employed a wholly owned
and dominated subsidiary as an instrumentality
to market its products in the taxing jurisdiction.

The Irvine Company case as is apparent from the
above is from plaintiff's point of view uncomfortably
close and parallel to the case at bar. Plaintiff does its
best to attempt to distinguish the case from pages 47 to
50 of its brief. Plaintiff argues that the California decision is predicated solely on the fact that the taxpayer's
only office and place of business was in California which
marketed the greater portion of its products out of California through commission merchants or factors. Plaintiff seeks to confine the ruling to the proposition that
where the corporation's only office and place of business
is in the state where its products are produced and the
factor has its authority from and responsibility to that
office, the sales will be attributable to such office in the
state of production. Conversely, it is argued that if the
corporation has an office and place of business outside
the state of production, the sales made by factor having
its authority from and responsibility to such office are to
be assigned to that out-of-state office. It is further argued that the "vital distinction" between the Irvine Co.
case and the present case is that in the Irvine Co. case,
the taxpayer's entire activities were confined to the taxDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

291
ing (producing) state, whereas, in the case at bar plaintiff admittedly has a permanent office in New York. It
is then claimed to follow that plaintiff "conducted its own
sales activities and directed and supervised those of
its agents from such outof-state office."
Plaintiffs "vital distinction" outlined above appears
to be without merit although ingenuous. All of the argumentative scenery present in the case at bar was present
in the Irvine Company case, namely, the cooperative marketing association of which the taxpayer was a member
was claimed not to be a "factor"; the marketing association and the outside produce brokers or commission merchants were claimed to be merely "agents"; corporate
entity of the cooperatives was asked to be disregarded;
the business done outside California by the marketing
association and the produce brokers and commission merchants w^as claimed to constitute sales business done hy
the taxpayer outside California so as to permit it to apportion sales receipts outside California
Both on the reasoning and on the facts the Irvine
Co. decision is squarely applicable to the case at bar.
The court points oni <ml\ too clearly that the jurisdictional problem involved is dependent upon (IK* corporation's presence or the exercise of the corporation's corporate franchise outside* (lie stale. The Court states:
" . . . The sale of products of such corporation
fay independent contractors does not involve corporate presence or the exercise of corporate franchise."
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This means and can only mean that the sale of products
is assigned to the state of production unless the corporation is present and doing business outside the state in a
selling capacity or exercising its corporate franchise to
sell outside the state. The decision stands squarely for
the proposition that the business done by the factor or
commission merchant is not the business of the producing corporation. Nothing in the opinion supports the
view that the separate business conducted by the factor
is completely identified with the "administrative office"
to the exclusion of the producing state. The existence of
an out-of-state administrative office in the Irvine Company case might have entitled the taxpayer to appropriate
adjustments in the property and payroll fractions to reflect the net income attributable to such out-of-state office
activity, but nothing in the opinion would assign to an
out-of-state administrative office sales business conducted by a separate and distinct corporation functioning
independently as a factor or commission merchant. Furthermore, the case meets squarely plaintiff's contention
here that the sales subsidiary although a factor is nevertheless an "agent" whose acts and transactions constitute
the acts and transactions of plaintiff. The Court rejected
this argument as "in reality a plea to disregard the corporate entity." Significantly the court concluded that
"plaintiff's activity in the marketing of its produce ceased
when it delivered the same to the local cooperatives in
California, and that plaintiff did not determine the manner, place or time of sale, nor the prices and quantities of
produce sold." Just as clearly in the case at bar did plainDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tiff's activity in the marketing of its copper and molybdenite cease when it loaded the same on cars in Utah for
out-of-state independent processing and sale. The sales
subsidiary and not plaintiff determined the manner, place,
time and price of sale.
In the case at bar plaintiff points h» nn iacLs whatsoever which show or even tend to show any activities
of plaintiff's New York administrative officials which
resulted in sales. All of the testimony, evidence and findings of defendant is to the effect that the only activities
which resulted in sales were the activities of the sales subsidiary. No official or employee of plaintiff's New York
administrative office conducted any activity whatsoever
in behalf of plaintiff which resulted in the negotiation,
effecting or the execution of a contract covering the sale
of a single pound of copper or molybdenite. To apportion
sales receipts outside the state, it is necessary for the
producing corporation to have its own salesmen negotiating and effecting the sales in the name and in behalf of
the corporation outside the state. Sales negotiated and
effected by factors or commission merchants inside the
state does not constitute business done by the principal
and if done outside the state does not constitute business
done outside the state by the principal.
!

: interest in the present connection we refer me

C<»iiti to the following:
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In the Matter of Markt and Hammacher

Company,

258 Appellate Div. 363, 16 N.Y. Sup. 2d 774, affirmed
283 New York 693, 28 N.E. 2d 412 (1940), the opinion
of the Appellate Division states:
"In none of this testimony, however, did it appear that the petitioner actually maintained offices or bank accounts, or operated in its own
name anyplace outside of New York State except
possibly Canada."
In People ex rel. Southern
Roberts,

Cotton^Oil Company

v.

Controller, 48 N.Y. Sup. 1028 (1898), the court

states:
u

The goods consigned to the commission merchants were in their possession and control, and
their disposition in accordance with the directions
of the relator was a part of their business, not the
business of the relator."
In Union Internationale

Be Placements

v. Hoey, 96

F . 2d 591, the Court stated:
"Independent banks and brokerage houses
within the jurisdiction transacting business, as
here, do not become such an agent merely because
the foreign corporation is one of their customers."
In Bank of America v. Whitney Central Bank, a process case, 261 U.S. 171 (1923), the Court speaking through
Mr. Justice Brandeis stated:
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"Its regular New York business was transacted for it by its correspondents—the six independent New York banks. They, not the Whitney
Central, were doing its business in New York. In
this respect their relationship is comparable to
that of a factor acting for an absent principal."
The foregoing cases holding that the business of the
factor is not the business of his principal and that when
the factor acts he acts in his own behalf and not in behalf
of his principal, we tuni t<» iln* pertinent cases involving
the construction oi* the similar statutory provisions in the
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts tax laws. We also take
up here the other branch of plaintiff's argument contained in pages 54-59 that the sales subsidiary as "agent"
was chiefly situated at, connected with, or sent out from
premises of plaintiff owned or rented outside the state.
It will be remembered that the Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Utah statutes provide for the exclusion of
receipts from the sales numerator only where the sales
are negotiated and effected by agents in behalf of the corporation and also where it appears that such agents are
connected with the corporation's out-of-state premises.
No exclusion is permitted unless both of these factors
are present.
We refer first to the leading case of Commonwealth
v. Bayuk Cigars, Inc., 345 Penn. 348, 28 Atl. 2d 134
(1942), affirmed 318 U.S. 746 (1943). This case affirmed
the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute which,
as applied, assigned to Pennsylvania receipts from sales
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negotiated and effected out-of-state by a mobile sales
force of 42 employees known as "territorial men." These
salesmen were all non-residents of Pennsylvania, devoted
their time exclusively to the taxpayer's business, performed all of their sales services outside the state and
in fact only came into the state of Pennsylvania once a
year to attend a general sales meeting. The men traveled
constantly calling on various jobbers. They were on a
salary basis with all of their traveling and hotel expenses
paid by the taxpayer. Much of their business was transacted from hotel rooms. All cigars and tobacco sold by
these territorial men outside Pennsylvania were shipped
by the taxpayer from its plant in Pennsylvania.
Although clearly and admittedly the "territorial men"
were sales employees on salary, negotiating and effecting
sales in the name of the taxpayer and performing all of
this sales activity outside Pennsylvania, the sales receipts
were nevertheless assigned to Pennsylvania for the
reason that such employees were not connected with or
operating out of premises maintained by the taxpayer
outside Pennsylvania. This is, of course, a perfect example of the somewhat restrictive effect of the Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Utah statute. Such sales activities outside the producing state would under several
states' tax statutes constitute the "doing of business" outside the state so as to require an apportionment of income
outside the state. However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, with the Supreme Court of the United States
affirming, held that out-of-state hotel rooms from which
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the sales employees mainly operated did not constitute
premises maintained outside the state by the taxpayer
and on this one ground permitted the assignment of a11
the sales receipts to Pennsylvania. The state court's opinion states:
"Appellant also 'denies that suds a tax may
be measured by income attributable to the business
activity outside the commonwealth' on the ground
of violation of due process. This contention must
be rejected for the reason clearly stated in Butler
Bros. v. McColgan . . .: 'One who attacks a formula of apportionment carries a distinct burden
of showing by "clear and cogent evidence" that
it results in extra-territorial values being taxed.' "
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed
the judgment of the state court.
.Plaintiff on pages 4647 of its brief seeks to distinguish the Bayuk Cigars case on the ground that the selling activities of the salesmen were "supervised, directed
and controlled by the home office in Pennsylvania." It is
stated that plaintiff "has no quarrel with this decision"
and that it supports plaintiff's theory that the sales are
to be assigned to the head office of the corporation from
which the selling activities are directed and controlled
and to which those making the sales are responsible. The
case, however, cannot be brushed aside so easily. It meets
squarely that part of plaintiff's argument that the sales
of copper and molybdenite should not be assigned to
Utah because the sales are made outside the state. The
case flatly holds that production within and sale without
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the state is business done entirely within the production
state. Even if plaintiff's sales subsidiary were selling
as the "territorial men" were selling, that is, in the name
of plaintiff, plaintiff still would not be entitled to assign
the sales receipts outside Utah for the reason, as we will
hereafter show, that the premises of the sales subsidiary
are maintained by itself. The Bayuk Cigars case does
not hold that administrative "supervision" over the independent selling business conducted by factors or commission merchants is business done or sales negotiated and
effected by the administrative office. The case holds
definitely that under a statute like that of Utah, if a corporation is doing business within the state producing and
manufacturing cigars therein, sales of such goods are
assignable to business within the state unless the taxpayer can fit his case squarely within the statutory exception. Plaintiff in the case at bar cannot do this. The
sales are negotiated by and in the name of its sales subsidiary and from the subsidiary's own premises.
We refer next to the case of Commonwealth

v. Minds

Coal Mining Corp., 360 Pa. 7, 60 At. 2d 14 (1948). The
following facts are quoted from page 16, Atlantic Reporter :
"The defendant is a corporation of the state
of West Virginia duly authorized to engage in
business in this state and actually so engaged during the tax year in question. It owns and operates
a coal mine in West Virginia, maintains a mine
office there, and has a mailing address at P. 0 .
Box 1086, Elkins, West Virginia. It mines no coal
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in Pennsylvania. It does, however, maintain its
only executive and administrative office at Kamey,
Pennsylvania, and two of its officers are chiefly
situated there. The defendant made a contract
with the Bulah Coal Mining Corporation, hereinafter referred to as 'Bulah/ whereby the latter
agreed to act as sales agent of the defendant.
Bulah maintains its own offices in New York,
had its own salesmen and sub-agents, and procured
sales totaling $1,585,847.27 during the year 1941.
By the contract Bulah agreed to act as sales agent
and authorized representative of defendant for the
sales of bituminous coal and to observe certain
price limitations and federal regulations. It
agreed to make contracts with purchasers; to invoice all shipments of coal direct to the customer
or other agent; to collect for sales; and to assume
the credit risk. Orders for coal were forwarded
by Bulah to the mines of the defendant in West
Virginia, where coal was allotted by the superintendent of the defendant to fill the several orders.
The coal was shipped from West Virginia, Bulah
being the consignor. The defendant billed Bulah
for the coal and paid it the stipulated commission.
Bulah alone collected from the purchaser and was
responsible to the purchaser."
Fvivin the above statement it is apparent that the
relationship between Minds < V»al and Bulah, its sales
agent in New York, was essentially the same as the sales
relationship between plaintiff and its sales subsidiary
with the minor difference, not here material, that Bulah
functioned not only as a factor bn! as a delcredere factor
by its assumption of the crodh risk. Buiah made the contracts, issued the invoic-, ••• l|<\"tf>d I'M-- the sales and in
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all respects dealt as did the plaintiff's sales subsidiary
solely and exclusively with the customer. The only difference between the facts of the two cases is as plaintiff
points out the fact that the mine was located not in Pennsylvania, the taxing state, but in West Virginia. It is on
this lone fact that plaintiff at pages 50-51 of its brief
seeks to distinguish the Minds Coal case and would have
this Court believe that "sales business" is invariably attached to the "administrative office" regardless of who
actually conducts the selling business and irrespective,
of the special and unique claim of the state of production to the sales receipts where the products are sold outof-state through independent marketing instrumentalities.
Leaving aside for the moment this fact that the goods
were produced outside the taxing state, we proceed into
the opinion of the court which after referring to the statutory provisions relating to the gross receipts factor,
stated:
"It is admitted that the appellant does not
transact all its business in Pennsylvania. By virtue of the above provision, therefore, its gross
receipts from sales of coal are assignable to Pennsylvania, unless the defendant comes within the
exception. The only sales excepted are those 'negotiated or effected in behalf of the corporation
by agents or agencies chiefly situated at, connected with, or sent out from premises for the transaction of business maintained by the taxpayer
outside the commonwealth.
(Italics ours.) The
sales negotiated by Bulah were not obtained by
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agents 'working out of premises maintained by
the defendant outside the commonwealth.
Under
the statute they are, therefore, assignable to Pennsylvania. But, says the defendant, Bulah was an
independent contractor and its activities must be
disregarded (see brief, page 9). We know of no
case where it has been so held. The Continental
Rubber case, 347 Pennsylvania, 514, 32 At. 2d 878,
879 referred to by counsel does not so hold. In
fact the opinion of the Supreme Court, in discussing the contention that sales were made by an independent contractor, stated T h i s would affect the
terms of the last twTo fractions.' We think the
difference is thus: If sales are negotiated or effected through an agency maintained by the taxpayer outside of this commonwealth they are not
assignable to Pennsylvania; but if they are negotiated or effected by other means, as for example,
by an independent contractor serving as a sales
agent in another state, maintaining its own offices
there, and having its own salesmen or subagents,
they are assignable to Pennsylvania. Without
prejudging any future case, we may say that we
definitely so hold in this instance."
The above opinion when read in the light of the lower
court's opinion and the Continental Rubber case and other
Pennsylvania cases makes plaintiff's statement on page
52 of its brief, that the Minds Coal decision assigns gross
receipts from sales to the state wThere the executive offices
are maintained and not to the state of production, clearly
incorrect and nn in accord with the decision. The other
case involving i ^
Continental Rubber Company
dealt specifically v iiii the collateral issue under the statute as to whether the out-of-state agent was negotiating
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and effecting the sales in behalf of the corporation where
such sales were made by the agent in the name of the corporation. In the Minds case, both in the lower court, 59
Dau. C. E. 95, and in the Supreme Court the decision in
favor of the commonwealth was placed on the same
ground as that in the Bayuk Cigars case, namely, that the
sales were not negotiated and effected from premises
maintained by the corporation outside the commonwealth.
The court itself italicized that portion of the statute relating to the maintaining of premises by the taxpayer outside the state. It then stated: "The sales negotiated
by Bulah were not obtained by agents working out of
premises maintained by the defendant outside the commonwealth. Under the statute they are, therefore, assignable to Pennsylvania." As in the Bayuk Cigars case
it was sufficient in sustaining the assignment of the receipts to Pennsylvania merely to show that the out-ofstate selling office was maintained by Bulah. The court
did not nor was it necessary to do so make any detailed
analysis of whether the sales negotiated by Bulah were
sales negotiated and effected "in behalf of the corporation."
Furthermore, the opinion of the court makes it quite
clear that the sales receipts were assigned to Pennsylvania, not because the sales business conducted by Bulah
was not Bulah's separate, distinct and independent business, nor that the existence of an administrative office in
Pennsylvania constituted the conduct of a selling business
in Pennsylvania, but by reason of the simple fact that
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the corporation was doing business in Pennsylvania and,
therefore, subject to tax as the statute directed. The corporation, a West Virginia Corporation, was qualified
to engage in business in Pennsylvania and was actually
so engaged. It was thus taxable in Pennsylvania. 11 was
taxable under the Pennsylvania law. This law, in the apportionment of the corporation's total net income assigned to Pennsylvania all of the sales receipts of the
corporation, unless the corporation could fit within the
statutory exception. It was unable to do this for the
reason that the sales business conducted by Bulah in New
York was not business done outside Pennsylvania by the
corporation within the purview of the Pennsylvania statute. The fact that its-mine was located in West Virginia
and the bulk of its payroll in West Virginia would apparently result in the assignment outside Pennsylvania of
a large percentage (approaching two-thirds) of its total
net income. Pennsylvania's only claim to tax under the
formula, therefore, would be based on the extent to which
the Pennsylvania statute assigned sales receipts to Pennsylvania and on the amount of administrative payroll in
Pennsylvania. If it had established a branch sales office
in New York and had negotiated and effected the sales to
customers in its own name and for its own account, Pennsylvania's tax would have been negligible, if any, because
all property, all payroll (except perhaps 3 per cent) ;MKI
all gross receipts from sales would have been excluded
from the Pennsylvania numerators of the three fractions.
The mere existence of an administrative office in Pennsylvania, in these circumstances, could at most only asDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

304
sign that small proportion of the company's total net income which would result by including the Pennsylvania
administrative payroll in the numerator of the payroll
fraction.
It is quite true as plaintiff intimates (pages 52-53)
that if West Virginia had exactly the same statute as
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Utah, all of the sales
receipts would also have been under the formula assigned
to West Virginia, the state of production. This is regrettable, of course, but only another instance of the difficulty
of using the sales factor at all. Sales receipts may be and
frequently are assigned to two or more states if the
statutory formulas are applied literally. The possibility,
however, of double taxation does not invalidate the formula. In fact to prevent the possibility of double taxation actually arising, most of the states have a provision
similar to subdivision 8 of the Utah statute, which permits
an alternative basis of apportionment if double taxation
actually exists.
If plaintiff, engaged in production activites in Utah,
had its administrative and executive offices in Pennsylvania, processed its blister copper at its own refinery in
Massachusetts and marketed the copper and molybdenite
through its sale subsidiary or an independent factor or
commission merchant in New York? the sales receipts
would be assigned to all three states, namely, Utah, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. Plaintiff's recourse, in these
circumstances, would not likely be a constitutional attack
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on the application of the tax statutes of the three states
but would be a re-arrangement of its method of conducting business or by way of a re-arrangement of the method
of keeping its accounts to permit a direct allocatioit? or
by way of an application under subdivision 8 of the three
statutes for such alternative basis of apportionment as
would not result in double taxation.
Although the Minds Coal case would appear to substantiate the claim of New York to nn assignment to
New York of all of the sales receipts of t he Utah Division
if the New York and Utah laws were identical on tin*
sales factor, it is the fact here in the cast; ai bar that no
claim or suggestion is made that even a tax on the full
100% net income of the Utah Division would result in
any double taxation. New York's statutory provision
relating to the sales factor in fact differs from that of
Utah, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts and it may only
be concluded here that by reason of this fact or by reason
of the separate accounting methods employed by plaintiff or otherwise that none of the net income which it
alleges is attributable to the activities of the administrative office in New York is so regarded for the purposes
of New York franchise tax purposes.
1 .ie decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
in Commonwealth

v. Continental Rubber Works, 347 Pa.

."d4, 32 At. ?d ^7<\ points up Hearly tin* distinction here
being urged, and pointed mn in the opinion of defendant
below, namely, "between the ea>e of sales in the name and
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property, wages and salaries, and gross receipts
of all of the subsidiary companies and add them
to the same fraction of the taxpayer."
Again,
"The statute is plain. The allocation fractions
are to be made of the tangible property, wages and
salaries and gross receipts of the taxpayer. That
does not authorize a hunt for something outside
that may have some effect upon the value of the
capital stock of the taxpayer."
Plaintiff's argument here that administrative "supervision" over the sales activities of its sales subsidiary
automatically converts the business done by the subsidiary into business done by the administrative officials is
directly contrary to the reasoning of the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania in Commissioner v. Quaker Oats Company, reported in 350 Pa. 253, 38 At. 2d 325, appeal
dismissed 324 U.S. 827 (1945). Unlike the case at bar,
the Quaker Oats case dealt with a business operation
which was admittedly unitary. The taxpayer company
engaged in (1) purchase and storage of grains, (2) manufacture of cereals and cereal products and (3) selling and
dealing in cereal products. The business of selling was
not separately incorporated or conducted by an affiliated
company, but all sales were conducted by and in the name
of the taxpayer corporation. Its principal office was in
Chicago, Illinois, and all of its manufacturing was done
outside of Pennsylvania. "Throughout the United States
and abroad it maintained a vast selling enterprise for the
marketing of its own products and the products of its subDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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•sidiaries." It maintained in Pennsylvania two sales offices, one at Pittsburg and the other at Philadelphia. The
company was thus selling in its own name and behalf
and from its own premises in Pennsylvania goods and
products manufactured outside the state. The sales negotiated by the salesmen in Pennsylvania were not finally
consummated until approval and acceptance by the outof-state home office. The company contended that the
gross receipts fraction of the formula was improperly
computed and that such sales should be assigned to the
out-of-state home office and not to Pennsylvania. The
Court stated:
"Appellant would have us construe this to
mean that sales attributable to Pennsylvania must
be only those which are both negotiated and effected within the state, using 'effected' in the
sense of consummated, or completed. Such a construction would, of course, enable this appellant,
or any foreign corporation, to eliminate a third
allocative fraction from the tax formula by so
arranging its sales machinery that all contracts
would be 'accepted' and, therefore, consummated
at the home office. This is clearly contrary to the
intention of the legislature, which was that the
gross receipts fraction should reflect that portion
of corporate activity conducted in this state resulting in gross receipts to the corporation in the
form of sales, rents and royalties. To assign to
the word 'effected' the meaning urged upon us by
appellant would controvert and frustrate the
legislative purpose. 'Effected' has no technical
meaning as a legal word of art. It is used in different senses and, often loosely in contracts and
statutes. Here, it is clear that it was intended to
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mean 'accomplished' or 'brought about': See Webster's New International Dictionary (Unabridged). Given that meaning, it is consistent with the
context and purpose of the section. The case of
Commonwealth v. Continental Rubber Works, 347
Pa. 514, cited by appellant supports this construction and opposes the construction for which appellant contends. There we held that sales negotiated by a branch sales office in Missouri but approved and accepted in Pennsylvania were assignable outside of Pennsylvania under Sec, 21 (d)
above quoted. While it is true that the legislature
excepted sales negotiated or effected outside of
Pennsylvania, it is clear that it would not have
intended the inclusion in the fraction of only those
sales which were both negotiated and technically
completed in this state, or by salesmen operating
from agencies in this state."
The above language again confirms the plain meaning of the Utah statute that only sales negotiated and
effected by salesmen in the name and in behalf of the
corporation from the corporation's out-of-state premises
are entitled to assignment outside the state.

Not en-

titled to exclusion under any circumstances are sales
negotiated and effected by independent brokers, factors
or commission merchants and not by salesmen of the corporation. J u s t as out-of-state home office control of the
local sales activity even down to the point of acceptance
and approval of individual orders does not constitute the
negotiation or the effecting of the sale by the administrative home office, so also in the case at bar even more
plainly would administrative control over the independDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ent activities of the sales subsidiary m>\ rwiistitute the
negotiation or effecting of sales by tin* administrative
office.
As to whether the sales business conducted by the
sales subsidiary is in law the conduct of a sales business
by plaintiff as parent, we invite the Court's attention
to Superior Coal Company v. Department of Fmance,
36 N.E. 2d 354, (1941) decided by the Supreme Court of
Illinois. Here a wholly owned subsidiary of a railway
company was engaged in the business of mining coal and
selling substantially all of the output to its parent company. The question was whether the subsidiary was engaged in the business of selling within the meaning of the
retailer's occupation tax law with respect to the sale of
coal to the parent corporal inn.
Bearing in mind tiiat m the case at bar plaintiff's entire output of copper and molybdenite is transferred
to the sales subsidiary for resale by the subsidiary, we
Hiioio the argument of [Hamtiff in the Superior Coal Case:
4

. . Plaintiff maintains that it is, in fact, but
a department or branch of the railway company;
that it is merely an agent or instrumentality of
the parent corporation; that coal mined by the
plaintiff for use in the railway company's business
is, in reality, mined by the railway company itself,
and that the transactions in question between the
plaintiff and its parent are no more 'sales' than
would be any interdepartmental transfer, or the
direct mining by the railway company of coal for
its own use through an agent, under any circumstances to which the law of agency is applicable."
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With respect to the close inter-relationship, we quote
the following:
"It appears that the plaintiff's office has always been maintained at the general offices of the
railway company. Fred S. Pfahler, president of
the coal company, during the period involved in
this litigation, was coal traffic manager of the
railway company. Pfahler occupies offices immediately adjacent to the railway company's statistician and near the railway company's law offices. The corporate records of the plaintiff
are kept in the office of the secretary, who is also
the secretary of the railway company, and are
part of the regular files in the office of the secretary of the railway company. Records relating to
lands are kept in the office of the railway company's land commissioner. Records relative
to taxes are kept by, and in, the office of the railway company's tax commissioner. Likewise the accounting records of the coal company are kept in
the office of the controller of the railway company. The controller holds the same position in
both companies and neither his salary nor the
salary of the accountants, bookkeepers and clerks
are paid by the plaintiff, with the exception of one
accountant paid by the coal company for ' special
work' at the mine. Plaintiff pays, in addition, $225
per month out of its funds for accountant's traveling expenses. The chief clerk of the coal company's president at Gillespie is an employee of the
coal company and paid by it. Attorneys representing the coal company are members of the law
department of the railway company. An attorney
at Gillespie is employed independently for the purpose of representing the coal company in workman's compensation proceedings . . . There are
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other instances in which the two companies are
intimately affiliated but which need not be narrated. In general, the coal company does not reimburse the expenses of the railway company departments incurred in its behalf. The plaintiff
coal company orders material and supplies from
third parties in its own name and on its own stationery, apparently obtaining credit as a separate
corporation and incurring a liability chargeable
against its own assets. In communications among
the officers of the two companies stationery
without letterheads is used, the practice which obtains in interdepartmental correspondence of the
railway company, but which is not the practice of
either company concerning outside correspondence. The fact remains, inventory, property and
funds of the two companies are kept separately,
although often in the same offices and by the
same individuals."
it further appeared that the subsidiary received
checks from the railway company and "deposits them in
its own bank account." The Court cites various authorities including that of In iv Hush Terminal Company, 93
F. 2d 661 (CCA 2), m which ihe Federal Court had permitted the City of New York to tax the gross receipts
derived from sales of steam by a wholly owned subsidiary to its parent corporatioii. The • nrt rejected the
argument of plaintiff and stated:
"Having utilized separate corporate forms
for nearly 40 years, having undoubtedly secured
financial and economic advantages as a result
during this period, and having consistently employed the legal habiliments incident to a sale in
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the transcations involved in this litigation, thereby evidencing its real intent, we are of the opinion
that the plaintiff is not now in a position to renounce its separate corporate entity and ask that
its separate corporate existence he disregarded
at the expense of the state."
Again with respect to plaintiff's contention in the
case at bar that the sales subsidiary is merely an "agent"
of plaintiff and that its business is the business of the
administrative office in New York, we invite the court's
particular attention to the case of Esmond Mills v. Commissioner, 132 F d 2d 753 (1943) (CCA 1). Here the
effort of the taxpayer was not directed at setting aside
the separate corporate entity of its sales agent subsidiary, but the separate corporate entity of its purchasing
agent subsidiary. It appeared that the Esmond Mills, a
Massachusetts corporation, located at Esmond, Khode
Island, was engaged in the business of manufacturing
and selling blankets and other products. Its wholly owned
subsidiary, the Smithf ield Company, also a Massachusetts
corporation, located at Esmond, was engaged in the business of buying cotton and wool for its parent on commission. The subsidiary "took title to the goods m its own
name until transferred to Esmond."
On transfer of title from the subsidiary to the parent,
the subsidiary was credited with the cost of the same
plus "Commissions" which was the only income of the
subsidiary and which was reported on the subsidiary's
separate income tax return for the year 1937. The market
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price of cotton and wool declining in 1937, the subsidiary
reduced the book value of its inventory by $33,904.95, but
did not deduct such amount in its 1937 tax return. The
parent, although it did not include the subsidiary's inventory as a part of its own inventory nevertheless paid
the subsidiary the above amount of $33,904.95 and deducted such amount as a loss on its 1937 tax return. The
subsidiary also in 1937 obtained the cancellation of certain contracts to buy cotton and wool, the prices in such
contracts being higher than those then existing, upon payment in 1937 to certain brokers of the sum of $31,636.19
which amount the parent advanced to the subsidiary without reimbursement. Such amount was also deducted on
the parent's tax return I'm- WCJ.
The Circuit Court upheld ike deciM»»n »•! t!:i- l>o;inl
of Tax Appeals that the parent could nor in its re I urn
deduct the losses of its subsidiary and held that the subsidiary was not an "agent" for the reason that in making
purchases of cotton and wool in its own name it was in all
respects conducting its own separate and distinct business. The Court stated at page 755:
"The Board held on the basis of the record
that Esmond and Smithfield are separate entities
for the purpose of taxation. We believe that there
is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the
Board's conclusions. It is true, as the findings indicate, that Esmond owned all of the capital stock
of Smithfield and that Smithfield's only activity
was the purchase of cotton and wool for it. The
court • I>M\\-Myv •• -il! nm disregard corporate enDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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titles merely because of a parent subsidiary relationship . . .; they will look behind the intercorporate setup only if there is evidence of a purpose
to evade a statute or to practice fraud upon
third persons . . .
"The record shows that Smithfield made purchases of cotton and wool in its own name and retained title until it transferred the same to Esmond. It carried its own inventory on its own
books; it made contracts with third persons in its
own name; it filed an income tax return in the
year in question and reported commissions from
Esmond as income, and the balance sheet included
within its return lists as inventory the wool and
cotton which it held in its own name. All of these
facts show that the petitioners were of the opinion,
and apparently good business dictated, that the
two corporations should preserve their separate
entities."
Plaintiff's argument from pages 54 to 59 of its brief
that the premises of the sales subsidiary were the premises of plaintiff appears to be clearly unsound and directly contrary to the facts of the case. Among the findings of defendant with respect to this point is the following (F. page 144):
"d. The business of the Sales Corporation
was conducted in its own name from its own
office and premises at '120 Broadway, New York
5, N. Y.', shared with its affiliated and parent company, Kennecott, under lease arrangements entered into by Kennecott with the Equitable Office
Building Corporation providing not for the exclusive use and occupancy of the premises by Kennecott alone, but for the joint use and occupancy of
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the premises as executive and sales offices for itself and subsidiaries. The Sales Corporation was
thus occupying and using the premises for an
office and a place of business at '120 Broadway,
New York 5, N.Y.', not illegally or unlawfully
but under and by virtue of a lease entitling it to
possession as a subsidiary of Kennecott. In paying and reimbursing the Disbursing Department
of Kennecott for its proportionate share of 'New
York Office expense,' including rent, separately
itemized and computed, the Sales Corporation was
paying for and renting its own office and premises
from which its own business was conducted and
transacted in its own name."
We also refer the Court to pages 113-140 of the Findings where the full and complete details with respect to
the New York premises of the sales subsidiary and plaintiff are set forth. Defendant found that the offices and
premises of plaintiff and the sales subsidiary in New
York were joint offices and premises "in and from which
the business and corporate functions of each corporation
were separately performed and conducted."
By plaintiff's Exhibit ^.~ \2), referred to in pages
46-47 of the Findings, Mr. C K. Lenz, President and
Sales Manager of the sales subsidiary, and Mr. H. E.
Westlake, Vice President and Assistant Sales Manager
of the sales subsidiary, are shown during the period involved to have held no position in plaintiff and were
officials only of the sales subsidiary. The "Disbursing
Department" of plaintiff for accounting convenience and
control handled all disbursements and records pertaining
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plies, and the other miscellaneous expenses
that usually pertain to the maintaining of an
office?
A. That is right."
In these circumstances defendant found that the sales
subsidiary was leasing and renting its own premises from
which its own separate business was being conducted.
Any other finding would have been inconceivable and at
variance with the testimony of record. Where a parent
corporation takes out a lease of premises for use by itself
and subsidiaries for executive and sales offices, where
joint offices are in fact maintained from which the separate business of each company is conducted, where the
parent immediately on paying the rent in turn bills the
subsidiary for its proportionate share of the rent and
other office expense, the subsidiary is obviously and
clearly paying its own rent and maintaining its own premises.
On Pages 57-8 of its brief, plaintiff, although admitting that the sales subsidiary was charged by plaintiff
"for its appropriate portion of the cost of such services"
and that among items p'aid each month by the sales subsidiary was an item designated as "rent", is apparently
at the same time attempting to suggest that the sales
subsidiary had no premises or office of its own from
which its own separate and distinct business was being
conducted. The sales force actually engaged in the dayto-day business of negotiating and effecting contracts of
sale of copper and molybdenite in the name and in behalf
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of the sales subsidiary was, according to the floor plan,
in a largely segregated portion of the space jointly occupied. Even so it would make little difference here that
the total office space w1as n«it dearly marked, delineated
and partitioned off between the t \\ u companies. -1 < -i nI use
and occupancy of space by iwo separate and distinct
companies, each paying their fair share of the rout, clearly does not constitute being "situated at, connected \\ iih.
or sent out from" premises of the other within the meaning of mir statute.
The liuiiai payment each month b) plamiiii of the
entire rent covering the joint use of the premises followed by the immediate reimbursement by the sales subsidiary of its share of the rent is exactly the same as if
two checks had been mailed and makes it -piite obvious
that the sales subsidiary was paying its own rent and
renting its own premises. In fact, when analyzed plaintiff's 'argument really simmers down to a plea that the
sales subsidiary in effect was a mere phantom with n<<
office or existence at

ill ij: New YorU, the premises,

offices and operations being those solely and exclusively
of plaintiff.

This is of course erroneous as Mr. Lenz

testified ( T r . 6 1 9 , F . p . I:!!)):
"Q. Where does Kennecott Sales Corporation conduct its sales?
A. Its office is, as I have previously stated, in
. New York City . . ."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

322
Bearing in mind that the payroll factor in the Utah
and Pennsylvania statutes has substantially the same
language pertaining to the owning or renting of out-ofstate premises as that in the sales factor, the Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth v. American Gas Company,
352 Pa. 113, 42 At. 2d 161 (1945), involving not the parent
but the subsidiary constitutes essentially the adjudication
of the same question involved here with respect to the
owning or renting of New York office premises by plaintiff's sales subsidiary. It will be recalled that the Utah
payroll numerator consists of "the compensation of employees not chiefly situated at, connected with, or sent
out from, premises for the transaction of business owned
or rented by the corporation outside this state." In the
American Gras case it appeared that the taxpayer was a
subsidiary of United Gas Improvement Co. In the wage
and salary fraction the Commonwealth included the figure
of $5,000 representing the "management fee" paid to the
parent company for supplying five officers to the subsidiary company, together with the personnel of the corresponding departments of the parent company, at stated
yearly compensations.
The court stated (p. 162):
"Appellant's first contention is that the
Court below erred in using the management fee
paid to the United Gas Improvement Company
as the numerator and denominator of the wage
and salary fraction. It contends that this was a
corporate expense but not a payment of wages
or salaries. The management agreement between
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the United Gas Improvement Co. and appellant
provided that the former should supply to appellant 'from its organization the following officers
for our company: vice-president (a financial executive), secretary, treasurer, controller, and
general counsel, together witli the personnel of
the corresponding departments of your company,
to perform such routine duties incident to such
offices as our company may direct,' I t was also
provided 'that no salaries are to be paid by our
company to these officers, but for their services
and the services of their departments, we agree
to pay you $5,000 per year in equal monthly installments as follows: vice-president . . . $1,500,
secretary . . . $500, treasurer . . . $750, controller
$1,000, general counsel . . , $1.L}.">().
"United Gas Improvement was also to be
reimbursed for the traveling and living expenses
of its employees while performing services for
appellant away from the Philadelphia office of
the Improvement Company.
"This agreement was a contract fm* the services of five officers and for clerical assistance.
These officers under the law were officers of
appellant, despite their relation to United Gas
Improvement
Company, who had definite statutory obligations to appellant as its employees.
The device of paying their salaries, through the
parent corporation was ingenuous but not conclusive of their status. It is unlikely that the
United Gas Improvement Co. would contend that
it is engaged in the labor brokerage business,
supplying trained personnel to other corporations. It is clear that the amounts
designated
for each of the officers of the appellant were
salaries which the officers were to receive indiDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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rectly through the United Gas Improvement Co.
The court below has held that these persons were
employees of appellant engaged in appellant's
business during the year 1935, and that the sums
paid to the United Gas Improvement Co. for
them were wages and salaries within the meaning of the franchise tax act. The record supports this conclusion and it is affirmed."
The above case constitutes clear authority for defendant's contention here under the similar language of
the sales or gross receipts factor that the rent paid by the
sales subsidiary to plaintiff each month in fact constituted the payment of rent for its own premises, just as
in the above case the annual payment of $5,000 by the
subsidiary to the parent was held to constitute the payment by the subsidiary of salaries to its employees notwithstanding that the services hired were to be performed
by officers and departments of the parent company for
the subsidiary. We emphasize also the pertinence of the
American Gas case to plaintiff's suggestion (vigorously
pressed during the hearing) that the sales subsidiary
had no "employees" of its own at all? that all of its
functions were performed by "employees" of plaintiff for
which a monthly "service charge" was billed to the sales
subsidiary, and that the "salaries" and "rent" were merely a couple of items which went into the calculation and
measurement of a "service charge". Defendant, however,
on the evidence found that the item "rent" was rent and
that the item "salaries' was salaries, particularly where
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100% of Mr. Lenz's staff and the sales force although
initially paid by plaintiff's disbursing department for
accounting convenience was immediately billed to and
paid by the sales subsidiary.
State v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 153 N W. 850
(1915) (Minnesota), is likewise direct authority for the
proposition that the work performed by plaintiff's legal,
accounting and other departments for the sales subsidiary at cost constituted the separate business of the sales
subsidiary. 111 this case it appeared that Northern Pacific, a common carrier, operated certain freight warehouses at Minneapolis and Duluth on its line of railway
using them for the purpose of receiving and transferring
freight to cars for shipment, temporarily storing freight,
and receiving freight from its cars for delivery to consignees or connecting carriers. Certain other railway
companies having lines of railway running into Hie two
cities did not have freighthouse facilities at such points
and the freight of such other companies was handled
at the freight houses of the Northern Pacific and "by
the employees and agents of" Northern Pacific. The
agents and employees of Northern Pacific assumed "to
deal ami treat with shippers as agents and employees
of the said other railway companies." The other railway
companies paid Northern Pacific "as compensation for
the use of its freight warehouses and the services of its
employees in performing such services a certain flat rate
per ton for the freight so handled." It further appeared
that M • Northern Pacific's MMMIMVC- kt:n performing
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the services and in billing and collecting charges as between themselves and the public acted as the agent of
such other companies. They reported and accounted directly to such other companies in all such matters but
were paid wages by" the Northern Pacific only. The
opinion further states:
"The flat rate per ton received by defendant
represented as nearly as possible the actual cost
of the services performed, and was agreed upon
for convenience and ease of accounting."
It also appeared that Northern Pacific owned certain
warehouses at Duluth which were situated in wharves
or piers and so arranged that Northern Pacific's cars
could be loaded or unloaded on one side of the warehouse and freight boats plying to and from the port of
Duluth could be loaded or unloaded on the other side.
Freight was sometimes temporarily stored in such warehouses. The boat companies were required to unload inbound freight and by arrangement with Northern Pacific,
the latter company employed stevedores to perform all
the manual labor of handling the freight. The boat lines
paid Northern Pacific a certain flat rate per ton for all
freight handled in delivering said freight to and from the
dock, which rate represented actual cost as nearly as
could be determined. The question in issue was whether
the sums received from the other railway companies and
from the boat companies under the above arrangements
represented gross earning to Northern Pacific from its
own business or whether being done for the other railway
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companies and boatlines constituted the separate business
of the other railway companies and the boatlines. The
opinion states at page 851:
"The state contends that the monies received
by defendant for handling freight of other roads
through its warehouses represent earnings derived from operation. Defendant asserts that such
is not the case; that the services rendered are
rendered by its agents as agents for the other
lines; that the monies by it received represents
the actual cost of the service rendered and no
more; and that in effect it is merely the hiring and
disbursing agent for the other roads."
The opinioi] quotes from State v. Union Depot Company, 42 Minn. 14L\ wherein it was stated in part as follows:
"We cannot see what difference it can make
whether they hold the depot property as tenants
in common, or put it in the name of a trustee to
hold and manage for their common use, or, as in
this case, organize a corporation for the same purpose, as a more economical and convenient method
of holding the property, managing the business,
and apportioning the expenses among themselves."
The ( Jourt further stated:
"What has been said relative to monies received by defendant for handling freight for other
railway companies through its freight depots and
warehouses applies in equal force to monies received by it under its contract with the boat companies. The defendant, in hiring the men to do the
work really acted for the boat ''c-nipanios. It paid
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for the actual cost of the work, made no profit,
and received back from the boat companies only
what it expended.
"It merely undertook, for the convenience of
all parties, to perform for the boat companies at
actual cost a duty which the boat companies owed
to shippers growing out of the operation, not of
the railroad, but of the vessels."
On page 58 of its brief, plaintiff seeks to illustrate
the "lack of substance or reasonable basis" for defendant's position on the premises question by speculating
what the decision might have been if plaintiff had owned
the building rather than leasing premises from the Equitable Office Building Company for itself and subsidiaries.
I t is claimed "in such case, the space occupied by the
employees of the sales corporation would have been in
premises 'owned by Kennecott.' " This hypothetical possibility is not involved here but even if plaintiff did own
the building and leased premises to the sales subsidiary
for the transaction of the subsidiary's sales business
therein, the premises would still be "rented" by the sales
subsidiary for the transaction of its own business and not
the business of plaintiff. The sales subsidiary's rental
of premises for its own business most certainly would
not constitute ownership of premises by plaintiff for the
transaction of a sales business in New York. Furthermore, under our statute such rent, like dividends, received by plaintiff from the sales subsidiary would be
specifically assigned and allocated to New York.
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Aside therefore from any question pertaining to the
property fraction, the payroll fraction and the assignment of receipts from sales of gold and silver outside
the state, defendant by its decision has correctly and in
every respect fully applied the statutory formula by way
of an adjustment to the separate accounts of plaintiff's
Utah Division. Defendant's decision has not assigned
to Utah any net income whatsoever which is not attributable entirely to Utah. The facts and the pertinent authorities heretofore cited by defendant clearly establish that
the sales of copper and molybdenite produced by the
Utah Division and negotiated and effected by the sales
subsidiary \v:>\->i its own offices and premises in New
York do not constitute business done by plaintiff in New
Y<>rk. Plaintiff has failed to establish that the gross
receipts from the Utah molybdenite and copper product
were within the statutory exception contained in the
Utah statute. The sales of copper and molybdenite were
not negotiated or effected in behalf of plaintiff but were
negotiated and effected in behalf of the sales subsidiary
acting in its own name and in the regular course of its
own business. Nor was the sales subsidiary chiefly situated at, connected with or sent out from premises for
the transaction of business owned or rented by plaintiff
outside Utah. Mr. Lenz and his sales force were chiefly
situated at, connected with and sent out from the sales
subsidiary's own premises for the transaction of its own
business in premises and offices rented and paid for by
the sales subsidiary. The sales of copper and molybdenite
have not otherwise been determined by the Tax ComDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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mission to be attributable to the administrative business
of plaintiff conducted at its New York administrative
office nor on the facts of the case could the separate business of the sales subsidiary in negotiating and effecting
the sales of copper and molybdenite in any way be deemed to be attributable to, a part of or represent the business of plaintiff conducted by plaintiff in its own premises. In these circumstances we ask under this Point 3
that, in any event, defendant's decision be affirmed.
Plaintiff's argument at pages 59-60 of its brief with
respect to the "long standing administrative construction" is we submit without merit for the reason that even
assuming the 1941 "settlement," covering the years 1935
to 1941, inclusive, be regarded as "administrative construction" such settlement in view of the facts now of
light in the record would be invalid and directly contrary
to the specific terms of our statute.
With respect to the 1941 settlement, we quote from
Buick Motor Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 48 Fd. 2d 801
(1931) page 803:
"It is insisted for appellant that the transactions of 1920 and 1921 between appellant and
the commission has estopped the commission from
questioning returns made in pursuance of the understanding apparently then reached. Apart from
any question of the right of the commission to
bind the state by any understanding or contract,
it does not appear that what was then done rose
to the dignity of a contract, nor that there was
a hearing and decision by the commission adjudiDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I
i
j

eating the rights of the parties. In any event, it
seems plain that at that time all of the salient
facts bearing upon appellant's income were not
before the commission."

I
;

Furthermore, as stated in New Park Mining Company v. State Tax Commission, 113 Utah 410 (1948):

I
\
!
i
[

"This is determinative of the case for even if
there were an administrative interpretation such
as plaintiffs assert, this court could not permit
such an interpretation to stand in flat contradietion to the clear terms of the statute."

i

i
|
j

Also it should be noted that there is nothing in the
record to show or in any way tend to show that plaintiff's
construction of the statute ever constituted a general ad-

i

ministrative practice or construction by defendant of the

;

Utah corporation franchise tax law as applied generally

:

to all corporations doing business within the state. In

\

fact, plaintiff's suggested construction appears to be diametrically opposed to the general construction of the law
by defendant and particularly and especially as relates to

I

the complete disregard by plaintiff of the separate cor-

;

porate entity of and the fair and reasonable intercompany

!

contracts with its sales subsidiary. Plaintiff's attempt

i

here to combine and consolidate the operations of its
Utah Division with the operations of its sales subsidiary

!

for the purpose of attempting to apply the statutory
formula to such combined and consolidated operations ap-

|

pears to be completely without precedent and opposed
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to the clear meaning and general administration of the
tax law. See: Annotation in 84 L. Ed. 28 entitled "Administrative or practical construction of statute as precedent for judicial construction."
Plaintiff's brief discussion of the constitutional aspects of the Utah statute and defendant's decision herein
contained on pages 61 to 66 of its brief, has been fully
considered and answered under defendant's Point I and
other cases heretofore cited.
POINT IV.
IN COMPUTING THE "NET INCOME FROM THE PROPERTY" IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF $243,436,508.96 FOR
DEPLETION PURPOSES, DEFENDANT ALLOCATED SOME
OF THE NET INCOME OF P L A I N T I F F S UTAH DIVISION
TO POST-MINING OPERATIONS AND IN VALUING PLAINTIFF'S COPPER AND MOLYBDENITE MILL CONCENTRATES, DID NOT ERR IN ARRIVING AT A GROSS INCOME FROM THE PROPERTY OF $621,940,441.37, NOR DID
IT ERR IN DEDUCTING THEREFROM THE SUM OF $108,653,459.48 REPRESENTING FEDERAL INCOME TAXES ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE MINE AND IN DEDUCTING THEREFROM THE FURTHER SUM OF $269,850,472.43 REPRESENTING THE COST OF MINING, MILLING AND CONCENTRATING THE ORES.

We turn now to the propriety of defendant's calculation of plaintiff's depletion deduction for the years here
involved. By its decision defendant determined that the
gross income from the property was in the total amount
of $621,940,441.37. From this it subtracted $269,850,472.43, representing the total mining, milling and conDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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centrating costs for the period, and $108,653,459.48 of
federal taxes attributable to the mine which left a balance
of $243,436,508.96 of net income from the Bingham property before depletion. The statute allowing a deduction
for percentage depletion in the amount of 33%% of the
net income from the property, plaintiff's depletion deduction as determined by defendant was in the total amount
of $81,145,502.98.
Plaintiff contends that in lieu of the net income figure of $243,436,508.96, the correct net income figure
should be in the amount of $312,647,869.44. We are thus
arguing about a difference in net income from the property to which the 33%% allowance would be applied in
the amount of $69,211,360.48. Thus, in round figures instead of $81,000,000.00 of depletion deduction actually
allowed by defendant, plaintiff contends that the depletion deduction should be $104,000,000.00. ]
Defendant's findings of fact with respect to depletion are contained on pages 168-190 of the Findings.
It is plaintiff's position that the term net income from
the property "means the gross receipts from the sale of
products less only cost and expenses," as set forth by its
Point II on page 67 of its brief. Plaintiff's position is also
set forth on pages 170-1 of the Findings as follows:
"Kennecott renews and persists in its contention, considered by the Supreme Court in Case No.
7298, 221 Pac. 2d 857, that it is entitled to depletion on the entire net income of its Utah DiviDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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sion arrived at by taking the total gross cash receipts of the refined metals sold in the market
and subtracting therefrom its total selling, refining, transportation, smelting, milling and mining
costs, including applicable federal income and
excess profits taxes. Put in another way ? Kennecott uses a formula under which the mill concentrates are valued by subtracting from the amount
realized on sales of refined metals (and molybdenite) the costs beyond the concentrating stage,
including costs of transportation to smelter, smelting, transportation to refinery, refining, selling
and delivery. This resulting figure is the 'gross
income from the property.' From the 'gross income' so computed are subtracted the mining,
transportation to mills, concentrating (or precipitating) costs, including taxes, and the balance is
the 'net income from the property.'
"The effect of Kennecott's formula of computing its depletion deductions is to place the entire profit derived from all of the operations of
mining, milling smelting, transportation, refining
and selling back on the mining property for the
depletion deduction. This method presupposes or
assumes that no portion of the profit eventually
realized on sale of the refined metals is in any
applicable or attributable to the post-mining,
smelting, transportation, refining or selling activities. All of the profit for depletion deduction
purposes is on the mining operation, none on the
post-mining operation."
In support of this position, as outlined above and
referred to in the Findings, plaintiff relies upon certain
arguments including the following:
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(A) I t hires the smelting, transportation
and refining work done by independent concerns
and any profit thereon is earned by such independent concerns.
(B) It is engaged in a unitary business and
the successive stages of producing copper and
other metal products represent mere cost accumulations, accounting wise, and no profit is realized until final sale.
(C) There is no representative market or
field price in Utah for its mill concentrates by
virtue of their enormous volume.
(D) Being mere cost accumulations there
is no profit "attributable to" the post-mining
operations and with no market price established
in Utah for the mill concentrates, the Federal
Regulation permitting the gross income to be
determined by taking the market price of the first
marketable product "minus the costs and proportionate profits attributable to the transportation
and processes" beyond the mining and concentration stage is inapplicable.
(E) The "proportionate profits" referred to
in the Federal Regulation and attributable to the
post-mining operations only means proportionate
profits if there are any, and there are alleged to
be none here. The Federal Regulation is construed
as if following the phrase "proportionate profits"
the phrase "if any" were inserted.
(F) Its construction is supported by the
legislative history of the Utah statute pertaining
to the depletion deduction.
(G) The 1941 settlement constitutes "long
administrative construction."
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(H)

Defendant used an "algebraic formula."

As stated in the New Park Mining Co. Case, supra,,
the theory behind the depletion deduction is that "wasting assets corporations are allowed a deduction for depletion on the theory that the taxpayer thus recoups its
capital investment."
On page 41 of the brief of defendant in Case No.
7298 is the following:
"1. The fair value of the property as reported by the taxpayer for corporation franchise
tax purposes for the year 1931, and upon which
the minimum tax of 1/20 of 1% of the fair value
of the tangible property in Utah was computed,
by the taxpayer and accepted by the commission,
was for all Utah property $24,587,407.00, of which
$11,419,540.00 was assigned to mining property
as such, exclusive of improvements, machinery and
equipment. (R. 95)
"2. The book value of the property as of December 31, 1930, per balance sheet submitted as
part of the 1931 Corporation Franchise Tax return was for depletive lands $8,001,786.53. The
balance sheet as of that date also shows nondepletive land in the amount of $1,566,801.62. (E.
95)
"3. The invested capital in Utah, representing the cost of Kennecott's acquisition in the year
1936 of the Utah mining properties is shown to
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be in the total amount of $108,588,198.09. (R. 118),
of which $61,873,475.00 (R. 79, 80) was determined
to be the cost assignable to the mining property.
"4. Depletion claimed on the corporation
franchise tax returns of this taxpayer for the
years 1931 to 1947, inclusive has been in the total
amount of $137,925,347.29. (R. 94)
"5. Depletion claimed and allowed for corporation franchise tax purposes for the years 1931
to 1941, inclusive, has been in the total amount
of $52,240,744.01."
If we add to the depletion claimed and allowed for
the years 1931 to 1941, inclusive, in the amount of $52,240,744.01, the amount of depletion allowed by defendant
below covering the years 1942 to 1950, inclusive, in the
sum of $81,145,502.98, we see that plaintiff has been allowed and granted a depletion deduction covering the
years 1931 to 1950, inclusive, aggregating $133,386,246.99.
We cite the above figures merely for the proposition
that if the Legislature opens the weir an inch is no
reason for defendant to let the flood come through. The
early leading cases in the field of depletion, Stratton's
Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913), and Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1916), established
that no taxpayer engaged in the mining business has any
constitutional right to depletion. The deduction is merely
a matter of legislative grace and should not be tortured
and misconstrued to the point where the allowance becomes unreasonable and contrary to the intention of the
legislature.
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The last two paragraphs of this Court's opinion in
No. 7298 containing the Court's decision and its direction
to defendant read as follows:
"In disposing of this last contention, we hold
that if Kennecott files its return on an allotted
basis that it must allocate some of its net income
to post-mining operations before computing dedepletion.
"The case is remanded with instructions to determine and enter a deficiency judgment in accordance with the views herein expressed."
The Court's opinion also stated:
"Undoubtedly, each of the post-mining processes appreciates the value of the product and this
is reflected in increasing the net income to Kennecott."
Under the Court's mandate covering the year 1942,
defendant was thus directed in computing plaintiff's depletion deduction to allocate some of its net income to
post-mining operations. Defendant has followed this
mandate and has allocated some net income to the postmining operations of smelting, transportation, refining
and selling. Upon remand of the case for rehearing defendant used the same formula which had been reviewed
by this Court in No. 7298, but merely as a means of arriving at a reasonable starting or tentative figure which
if it allocated too much net income to plaintiff's postmining operations could be at the hearing shown as
erroneous by plaintiff. Defendant's formula assigned as
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net income to the property that proportion of the Utah
Division's net income which the mining costs (including depletion and federal taxes as costs) bore to total
costs. By this formula the net income actually known
and ascertained was spread back to the costs of the successive operations. The formula because "algebraic" is
not invalid for that reason. An artilleryman is not judged
on the mathematical calculations used in firing his piece
but on whether his shell lands in the target area. Algegraic formulas are frequently used in taxation as, for
example, in the calculation of interdependent taxes. See:
Altman and Keesling, supra, where on page 221 it is
stated:
"There are other methods, however, which
may be more easily learned by those whose algebra
the years have dulled.'5'
Defendant concluded that the mining and milling
dollars spent by plaintiff did not differ in kind or purpose
from the smelting, transport, refining, selling and executive and administrative dollars spent by plaintiff. The
Findings at page 177 state:
"The contention that as the mineral product
moves through the successive stages of crude ore,
mill concentrate, blister copper, and refined
copper, only costs but no profits accumulate leads
not to the conclusion that all of the profits are
applicable to the mining costs but to the act of
final sale. If profits are to be allocated back at
all there appears to be considerably more logic
and reason for allocating them back proportionately to all costs than exclusively to the mining
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costs. We see nothing particularly unique about
the mining costs to establish their claim to all the
profits. The incurring of the other costs is equally
necessary to the ultimate realization of any
profit."
The Findings at pages 178-9 further state:
"To the known and admitted costs in the
amount of $269,850,472.43 must be added some
profit. But how much! Should a 'reasonable'
profit of say 6%, 10% or even 20% be added! The
Auditing Division in determining the gross income
from the property arrived at a value of the mill
concentrates for the period here involved of $621,940,441.37. This figure, as averaged for the period
here involved, equals 70.0091629% of the net recovered metals (after deduction for losses in
milling, smelting and refining) and the molybdenite concentrate recovered to the extent of the
actual sales of such product. The total value of
the net recovered metals as aforesaid for the nine
year period was $888,370,057.52. In other words,
the fair market value as represented by actual
sales of the finished electrolytic copper, gold, silver, platinum, palladium and molybdenite product
after mining, milling, smelting, transportation
and refining was $888,370,057.52. The Auditing
Division took slightly over 70% of this figure on
the average or $621,940,441.37 as being the fair
value of the mill concentrates back at the mining
and milling stage. Kennecott says this is unreasonable and that the increase in the cost figure
of $269,850,472.42 (exclusive of federal taxes) to
only $621,940,441.37 of fair value is not enough.
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Such increase, according to Kennecott, does not
put enough profit on the mill concentrates. Or, on
the other hand, is it possible that the figure is in
fact to high?"
Defendant carefully considered, analyzed and weighed all of the facts and various contentions of plaintiff in
arriving at the gross income and net income from the
property. The facts showed clearly that: "Undoubtedly,
each of the post-mining processes appreciates the value
of the product and this is reflected in increasing the net
income to Kennecott." The foregoing statement of this
Court carries the same idea as that expressed by the
Supreme Court of North Carolina in the Maxwell v. KentCoffey Manufacturing Co. case, supra, as follows:
"The bare fact of sale produces no income. It
is merely the act by which the income is captured."
The same thought is likewise contained in the statement
of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Underwood Typewriter Co.
v. Chamberlain, supra, where he stated:
"The profits of the corporation were largely
earned by a series of transactions beginning with
jnanufacture in Connecticut and ending with sale
in other states."
It was obvious on the facts that the "profit" of 85c
per ton of copper concentrate given by plaintiff to A. S.
& E. for smelting the mill concentrate into blister copper
could not conceivably or under any circumstances possibly
be regarded as constituting the entire or total profit atDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tributable to the conversion of a mineral concentrate into
the blister copper metal product. Nor did it follow that
as the blister copper moved on railroad cars closer to
market that the only value attributable to this closer
proximity to market was represented only by the cost of
freight. Nor did it follow that the "profit" of $1.50 per
ton of returnable refined copper given to A. S. & E. for
refining the blister copper constitute the only profit attributable to the conversion of the blister copper into its
constituent components of gold, silver, platinum, palladium and electrolytic copper. Nor did it follow that the
selling commission to the sales subsidiary of $1.00 per net
ton of copper and $3.50 per net ton of molybdenite, although fair, represent the only profit attributable to the
conversion of the finished metal products into cash proceeds. As stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis the profits
"were largely earned by a series of transactions" and
clearly if earned by a series the net income or profits are
to some extent attributable to each of the series of transactions.
Plaintiff's basic contention that the value of the
product at each stage has only been enhanced to the extent of the cost to that stage is clearly erroneous. Furthermore, plaintiff's contention is at variance with the administration of the depletion provisions by defendant
generally as applied in other mining industries such as
coal, iron, oil, gas and the various non-ferrous metals sold
to smelters on a net smelter return basis. A smelting
profit is generally recognized in the non-ferrous industry
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l

and the mere fact that plaintiff by reason of its tremendous and enormous tonnage is able to hire its smelting and refining work done very reasonably by A. S. & E.
in no way precludes a finding that plaintiff itself has a
smelting and refining profit on the work over and above
that dervied by A. S. & E.

1

The fact that the A. S. & K.'s Garfield, Utah, smelter
is practically dedicated entirely to the smelting of plaintiff's mill concentrates and that there is no other substantial production of copper ores or concentrates in
Utah also does not preclude a finding that plaintiff's mill
concentrates have a fair value in Utah to plaintiff, even
though there be no established "representative" market
or field price. Plaintiff as an integrated producer of
copper is its own market. The mill concentrates have
value to plaintiff. There is no showing in the record
whatsoever that the values determined by defendant are
arbitrary, unreasonable or erroneous.
There is also nothing in the evidence submitted by
plaintiff concerning the legislative history of the depletion provision which adds anything pertinent to what
this Court has already considered in No. 7298.
Plaintiff's argument (pages 106-116), attempting to
show the Court did not really mean to say plaintiff "must
allocate some of its net income to post-mining operations,"
is quite misleading and assumes the very point in issue.
The Tables on pages 113-114 demonstrate nothing except
that 67% of net income is the same as the sum of 67% of
each item of deduction when subtracted from the sum of
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67% of each item of income. In both computations plaintiff first assumes it is entitled to a depletion deduction of
1/3 of total Utah Division net income ($8,000,000).
In the case at bar, plaintiff cites the net proceeds and
occupation tax laws as authority for allocating 100% of
the Utah Division's net income to the "mine" for depletion purposes. Defendant, on the other hand, cites these
two laws and the federal cases involving this plaintiff as
authority for the proposition that the net income of plaintiff's Utah Division is entirely attributable to business
done in Utah by plaintiff. A reading of the net proceeds
and occupation tax laws will show that the state has
separately classified in these laws integrated mining operators conducting their business as plaintiff does here.
The separate and additional post-mining profit is in the
case of an integrated producer added back into the tax
base. In other words the legislature has said that a mine
has greater value and the mining occupaion tax shall
be greater if instead of selling his mine product at the
mouth of the mine or selling it to a custom smelter on a
net smelter return basis, the operator undertakes himself
and for his own account to carry the raw ore up through
the various stages into the finished marketable product.
Relating the profit attributable to the post-mining
operations of extracting the metal from the mineral back
to the mine or mine output rests upon a perfectly
sound constitutional basis as the cases cited heretofore
under Defendant's Point I clearly show.
The legislative wisdom of putting the metal extraction profit back in the net proceeds and occupation tax
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base in plaintiff's circumstances is not in issue in this
proceeding. The point here is that the corporation franchise tax law requires defendant in determining the net
income from the property to separate the post-mining
metal extraction profit from the profit attributable to the
mining operation for the purpose of computing the depletion deduction. The statute gives defendant no rule or
formula to follow in effecting this segregation. The
"gross" income has to be determined, in arriving at net income, because the statute says so. The problem thus is
one of fact to determine what the fair market value of
the mine product is.
The net proceeds and occupation tax laws and federal
cases involving this plaintiff, do, however, constitute very
clear and persuasive authority that the gross proceeds
from out-of-state sales less out-of-state expenses constitute the proper tax base of plaintiff in arriving at net
income from business done in Utah. J u s t as the out-ofstate enhancement of value from refining is brought back
into Utah for tax purposes under the net proceeds and
occupation tax laws, so also is it brought back into Utah
for taxation under the corporation franchise tax law, because the out-of-state enhancement of value from the refining by A. S. & B. does not constitute business done by
plaintiff or its Utah Division outside Utah. It does not
follow, however, that the recall of this out-of-state appreciation in value to Utah serves to swell plaintiff's
depletion base. This value is taxable because it is from
post-mining business of smelting and refining. It is not
depletable because it is not gross income from the mine.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

346
Plaintiff in its argument on the depletion question
cites only the New Park Mining Co. case. Reference
to the New Park Mining Co. case will show that that case
involved the sale of ores and not metals. Furthermore,
the opinion of the Court shows very clearly that net income from the property means net income from the mine
and not other income derived from and attributable to
other operations either completely independent of mining or subsequent to the mining operation itself. The
capital investment to be recouped by a wasting assets
corporation is that portion of the value which is lost by
bringing the ore to the mouth of the mine. To allow additional recoupment of capital investment in the mine with
respect to income attributable to post-mining or other
independent operations would completely thwart and
frustrate the legislative purpose. That this was the meaning of the Court is quite clear from the following on
page 414:
"But a wasting assets corporation may have
income other than that derived from the sale of
its capital. On such other income it is not entitled
to a deduction for depletion"
This Court in its opinion in No. 7298 drew the same
distinction as the federal authorities do between mining
activity and post-mining activity. This Court stated:
"Generally speaking, the phrase 'income from
the property' means the income from mining. The
latter term is usually understood to mean not
merely the extraction of ores or minerals from the
ground, but also the ordinary treatment processes
normally applied by operators in order to obtain
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the commercially marketable mineral products.
In those cases where the operator sells direct to
the smelter and payment is made on the net smelter returns, little difficulty is encountered. Here,
however, we go far beyond that as Kennecott is
the owner from the time of digging to the day of
selling."
Turning to Section 114 (b) (4) (B) of the Federal
Internal Eevenue Code we find the term "gross income
from the property" defined to mean the gross income
from mirnmg. Mining in turn is defined to include not
merely the extraction of the ores from the ground, but
also the ordinary treatment processes normally applied
in order to obtain the commercially marketable mineral
product. The term "ordinary treatment processes" is
specifically defined to include in the case of copper, gold
and silver ores, the crushing, grinding and concentration
of such ores. The smelting and refining of such ores, however, are not included but are expressly excluded as within the term "ordinary treatment processes." Thus, mining
includes extraction of the ores from the ground and milling but nothing else. Smelting, refining, transportation
and selling are surface post-mining activities not associated with mining.
The Federal Regulations, Reg. I l l Sec. 29.23 (m)
1 (f)? deals with the problem and provides in part that
where there is no representative market or field price for
the ores or concentrates there shall then be used "the representative market or field price of the first marketable
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product . . . minus the costs and proportionate profits
attributable to the transportation and processes beyond
the ordinary treatment processes."
Cases involving the federal depletion allowance in
the case of both mines and oil and gas wells all show
clearly that surface activities beyond the mouth of the
mine or well must be segregated and a gross value of
the output at the mouth of the mine or well estimated or
arrived on a basis which will apportion a proportionate
part of the total realized profit to the surface processing
activities which take place beyond the mouth of the mine
or well.
In Brea Cannon Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 11 F. 2d 67
(1935), certiorari denied, 296 U.S. 604, the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the market
value of the wet content of natural gas from the well constituted the income from the property and not the gross
proceeds derived from the sales of gasoline to customers.
The Court stated at page 68:
"Petitioner's wells, produced what is known
as casing head gasoline, that is, a very volatile
gasoline wThich comes from the well in the form of
gas mixed with the more stable gas known as
natural, or dry, gas. The mixture is called wet
gas. After separation the merchantable products
consist of casinghead gasoline and dry gas. The
respondent contends and petitioner admits, that
the process of extraction of the casinghead gasoline from* the wet gas is a manufacturing process.
The respondent, in estimating the basis upon
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which the percentage of 27%% should be allowed
for depletion took 40% of the gross receipts from
the casing head gasoline as the market value of
the casinghead gasoline content of the wet gas as
it emerged from the well, and held that the remaining 60% of the gross receipts from casinghead
gasoline was attributable to the manufacturing
process and, consequently, did not constitute 'income from the property' within the meaning of the
Eevenue Act 1926 . . .
"It is conceded by the petitioner that if the
gross proceeds derived from the sale of casinghead gasoline should be apportioned at all, the
apportionment of 40% of the gross proceeds from
casinghead gasoline as the value of the gasoline
content of the wet gas is correct. The sole question for our consideration then is whether or not
the amount actually received from the sale of
casinghead gasoline by the petitioner is subject to
the allowance of 27%% for depletion, or whether
the depletion should be estimated upon the market
value of the gasoline content of the wet gas."
The Court upheld the commissioner and held that the
plant for the extraction of the casinghead gasoline from,
the wet gas should not be regarded as a part of the property, and that the market value of the wet content of the
natural gas rather than the gross income derived from
the sale of gasoline should be used in computing the gross
income from the property for depletion purposes.
Again in Consumers Natural Gas Company v. Commissioner, 78 F. 2d 161 (1935) (CCA 2), certiorari denied 56 Sup. Ct. 157, the problem was dealt with in
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an opinion by Judge Learned Hand. The Court held that
depletion, in the case of a gas well, should be arrived at
not on the basis of the gross income from the sales of gas
to consumers, but on the basis of an estimated value of
the gas at the mouth of the well. The Court stated, pages
161-2:
"Because the formula is rude and imperfect,
we are not justified in injecting into the 'basis' the
added value imparted to the output by work done
upon it after it reaches the surface. That cannot
fail to make the deviation greater and to introduce a variable which adds a quite unnecessary
discrimination to a result arbitrary enough at best.
True, its correction involves some computations;
the sales price must be broken down into two
component parts, the value contributed by the
later services, and the remainder of the gross
price."
Again, in Greensboro Gas Company v- Commissioner,
79 F. 2d 701 (1935), the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that a taxpayer which produced and
distributed natural gas was only entitled to an allowance
for depletion based on the gross value of the gas at the
mouth of the well and not when distributed and sold to
consumers. The Court stated at page 701:
"If, as the taxpayer contends, the allowance
was based on the value of its sales of gas to its
consumers, the taxpayer would in effect enjoy an
allowance for depletion on its distributing system
which is already subject to an allowance for depreciation, and it would, since it both produces and
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distributes natural gas at retail, enjoy an unusual
advantage over the mere producer of gas in the
fields
The above cases are directly applicable to the case
at bar. This Court in its opinion in No. 7298 stated that
"Undoubtedly, each of the post-mining processes appreciates the value of the product and this is reflected in inincreasing the net income to Kennecott" and refused to
permit plaintiff to charge back as a depletion deduction
against the mining operation % of this post-mining appreciation of value. So also does Judge Learned Hand's
opinion in the Consumers Natural Gas Case refuse to permit the taxpayer to take depletion on "the added value
imparted to the output by work done upon it after it
reaches the surface." Just as this Court, in No. 7298, required defendant to allocate some of the net income to
the post-mining operations before computing depletion,
so also did Judge Learned Hand in the Consumers Natural Gas case require that "the sales price must be broken
down into two component parts, the value contributed by
the later services, and the remainder of the gross price."
Furthermore, just as defendant by its decision allocated approximately 30% of the net income to postmining or manufacturing appreciation in value, so also
in the Brea Cannon Oil Case did the Court hold that "the
remaining 60% of the gross receipts from casinghead
gasoline was attributable to the manufacturing process
and, consequently, did not constitute income from the
property."
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The Greensboro Gas Company case is particularly
significant to the case at bar by its insistence that depletion should be based on the gross value of the gas at the
mouth of the well and not on the "value of its sales of
gas to its consumers." The Court indicated that to do
otherwise would in effect give the taxpayer a double deduction on the post-mining operation, one "allowance for
depreciation" and another "allowance for depletion on its
distributing system."
Acceptance of plaintiff's contention in the case at bar
would likewise result in a double deduction, one deduction
for the full amount of the expenses incurred for smelting,
transportation and refining, and another deduction with
respect to % of the added value imparted to the mill concentrates by such post-mining expenses.
Plaintiff below and during the hearing sought to distinguish the foregoing cases on the ground that the postmining services of smelting, transportation and refining
were hired and that plaintiff itself did not own the smelter, the railroad and the refinery, so that it is not entitled
to take depreciation on the physical facilities involved
in such post-mining operation. Furthermore, it contended
that the present 85c per ton smelting fee, the $1.50 refining fee and the profit earned by the railroad on freight
represented the only profit involved in the post-mining
operations. The tremendous net income earned by the
Utah Division from its integrated operation shows clearly, however, that the smelting and refining fees and
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profit earned by the railroad by no means represented
all of the post-mining profits. The post-mining operations added values to plaintiff's Utah Division product
far in excess of the mere costs of such operation. Defendant in its decision allowed as expense all of the smelting,
transportation and refining costs, including plaintiff's
periodic amortization payments to A. S. & E. covering
plaintiff's share of capital improvements at the smelter
and refinery in connection with the smelting and refining
of plaintiff's product. Thus if, as plaintiff contends,
the allowance was based on the value of the sales of copper and other metal products to customers of the sales
subsidiary, plaintiff would in effect enjoy an allowance
for depletion on its post-mining system of operations
which is already subject to an allowance for expense
and would thus enjoy an unusual advantage over the
mere producer of mill concentrates. In fact plaintiff's
method of operation permitting it to expense rather than
depreciate the facilities of its post-mining operations,
which it has under contract, makes it even more imperative that the depletion deduction in the Utah statute be
construed fairly and reasonably and within the proper
limits. The added value imparted to the output of mill
concentrates from the Bingham Mine by work done upon
such concentrates after they reach the surface is not depletable.
See also Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Company Inc. v.
Relvering, 125 Fd 2d 42 (1941); New Idria Quicksilver
Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 144 Fd. 2d 918 (1944).
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POINT V.
WITH RESPECT TO THE YEAR 1942, UNDER THIS
COURTS MANDATE IN CASE NO. 7298, DEFENDANT WAS
NOT REQUIRED TO USE THE ARBITRARY ALLOCATION
FACTOR OF 66.926% BUT TO THE CONTRARY WAS REQUIRED TO COMPUTE THE TAX ON THE SEPARATE ACCOUNTS OF PLAINTIFFS UTAH DIVISION AND ON A
BASIS FAIRLY CALCULATED TO ASSIGN TO THIS STATE
THE PORTION OF NET INCOME REASONABLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE BUSINESS DONE WITHIN THIS
STATE AND TO AVOID SUBJECTING THE TAXPAYER TO
DOUBLE TAXATION.

By its Point I I I plaintiff contends that any allocation factor in excess of 66.926% to Utah would exceed the
mandate of this Court in No. 7298. Plaintiff states on
page 124 of his brief:
"The matter of assigning 100% of sales outside Utah for the calendar year 1942 was settled
in favor of such assignment by agreement of the
parties and its adoption accordingly by this court.
When the commission was reinvested wTith jurisdiction of that cause by the decision and mandate
of this court, a limited power was restored to the
commission to find the correct amount of depletion for that year and to do only that."
Plaintiff, it is suggested, is in a somewhat inconsistent
position in arguing that by this Court remanding the
case to defendant for a "rehearing," defendant was reinvested with no jurisdiction over any issue, and particularly the issue of "allocation," except depletion.
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The large group of authorities cited heretofore under defendant's Point I I show clearly that plaintiff's position is without merit. Both in the case of defendant and
the Tax Court of the United States when a case is remanded for "rehearing" a claim for an increased deficiency in tax may be made by either defendant or the
Commissioner of Internal Kevenue, as the case may be,
provided under the law a claim therefor is made at
the rehearing. The Utah Statute provides that the same
rules are applicable to the "rehearing" as are applicable
to initial proceedings. The only limitation on defendant's
statutory right to make an increase of deficiency at the
rehearing is that such increase should not be inconsistent with the decision and mandate of this court.
To put some weight into its argument plaintiff seems
to infer that there was some sort of "agreement" between
plaintiff and defendant with respect to the arbitrary allocation factor of 66.926% and that such factor had been
adopted accordingly by this Court in its decision in No.
7298.
It must be that plaintiff is referring to the 1941 settlement under which the years 1935 to 1941, inclusive,
were compromised by use of the 66.926% factor which assigned all sales of the Utah Division product outside
Utah. The 1941 settlement "agreement" was not regarded
by this Court in No. 7298 to be such a binding adjudication of the rights of the parties as to preclude this Court
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from making a determination on the issue of depletion
contrary to the terms of the "agreement." Such settlement should be accorded no greater dignity in the present
connection, particularly where even plaintiff admits that
such allocation factor is arbitrary and not consistent with
the true facts even on its own theory of the case. For example, in its brief before defendant below plaintiff stated
at page 3:
". .. the taxpayer's contention as to the correct
determination of the tax is set forth in Schedule 2
of petitioner's Exhibit 56 (2)."
This exhibit shows plaintiff using for the year 1942 an allocation factor of 64.676%. A review of the record in No.
7298 which is contained as Exhibit QQ (2) in the present
proceeding fails to disclose any "agreement" with respect
to the allocation factor of 66.926%. Page 16 of the record
shows no specific decision or determination by defendant
with respect to such factor. Furthermore, the Agreed
Record stipulated to by counsel for both plaintiff and defendant, states as follows (pages 109-110 Exhibit QQ
(2) ) :
"IV.
"As to Allocation of Kennecott's Income to Utah,
"1. Section 80-13-21 requires a taxpayer engaged in business in several states to assign a portion of the net income of its total business to business done within the state of Utah. A formula
for determining this allocation is provided with
authority under subsection (8) for the commisDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sion to depart from this formula, where its application is deemed unfair or inequitable, and to
'make such allocation as is fairly calculated to assign to this state a portion of net income reasonably attributable to the business done within this
state and to avoid subjecting the taxpayer with
double taxation/
"2. The principles under which Kennecott
was to make its allocation of part of its Utah
Copper Division net income to the state of Utah
were a specific issue in the controversy settled by
the mutual agreement of May 27, 1942. By that
settlement it was agreed that 66.926% of Kennecott's Utah Copper Division income alone was
to be assigned to the state of Utah. These principles were applied to the tax returns through and
including 1941, and Kennecott has consistently
followed these principles in its returns for the
years 1942,1943 and 1944.
"3. Inasmuch as the commission will not now
accept for the year 1942 the corporation franchise
tax return of Kennecott on the same basis accepted prior to 1942 and as established by the
agreement of May 27, 1942, Kennecott now asserts its right to file its returns for its entire operations, and to allocate income to Utah on the
basis of the allocation formula of Section 80-1321."
The stipulated record thus shows on its face that
defendant did not "accept for the year 1942 the corporation franchise tax return of Kennecott on the same
basis accepted prior to 1942 and as established by the
agreement of May 27, 1942." It is therefore apparent
that the figure of 66.926%, although it may have been
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used at one stage by defendant as many other figures
were used in the calculation of the deficiencies, can have
no greater binding force or precedent than any other
figure and if wrong stood to be corrected. The basis,
furthermore, on which Case No. 7298 was presented to
this Court was that not "figures" but only "principles"
were in issue. As stated in plaintiff's brief:
"The parties hereto have cooperated below in
endeavoring to shape an inherently complicated
tax record in such manner that there could be presented concisely for the determination of this
court six questions of principle. The mathematical
results to follow when these principles are determined may then be worked out without, it is
expected, subjecting the court to such detail."
Or as stated by defendant in its brief:
"If we attempt to arrive at tax liability for
the year in question in terms of dollars and cents,
we may find that the legal principles at issue
would become obscured by reason of the multitude
of accounting problems involved. However, as
indicated in plaintiff's brief we are concerned with
the establishment of principles and, thereafter, a
correct mathematical result can be arrived at by a
correct application of those principles."
Also as stated by this Court in its opinion:
"Because of the arithmetical difficulties to
be encountered in computing the final tax, the parties have assumed the responsibility of making the
final determination based on the principles we enunciate."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The issue on allocation was stated by this Court in its
opinion to be whether the statute "would permit Kennecott to allocate to Utah a proportionate

part of its total

income from all sources as distinguished from allocating
a proportionate

part of the Utah Division's income to

this state." This first assignment of error was considered
by the Court and in over-ruling plaintiff's contention,
the Court held that the tax should be computed not on
the basis of the Utah statutory formula, but on the basis
of the Utah Division's separate accounts under the authority of subdivision 8 of the statute. The decision of
the Court when read in connection with the specific provisions of subdivision 8 show that the remand required defendant to determine what, if any, "proportionate p a r t "
of the net income of the Utah Division was attributable
to business done outside Utah. Nothing in the decision
appears to approve, sanctify or adjudicate the validity
of the arbitrary allocation factor of 66.926%. Nothing
in the opinion even suggests that if upon the rehearing,
additional facts came to light which showed the complete
error of the arbitrary allocation factor, that the true
and correct factor could not be used by defendant. All
that was decided or that this Court directed defendant todo was to calculate the tax on the basis, not of the statutory formula, but on the basis of the Utah Division's
separate accounts and by reference to subdivision 8 of the
statute to make such allocation of the net income, separately computed of the Utah Division, "as is fairly calcu-
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lated to assign to this state the portion of net income reasonably attributable to the business done within this state
and to avoid subjecting the taxpayer to double taxation."
POINT VI.
THE WAIVER BY DEFENDANT OF STATUTORY INTEREST ON ANY DEFICIENCIES TO BE FOUND HEREIN
WOULD UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES HERE DISCLOSED
CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF STATUTORY DUTY AND PUBLIC TRUST.

Although Section 80-13-58, U.C.A. 1943, authorizes
defendant upon making a record of its reasons therefor
to waive in its discretion any interest provided in the law
or to compromise the same, there is in the present proceeding no showing whatsoever of undue hardship or
other adequate grounds for a waiver of statutory interest.
If the tax is owing it should have been paid and if paid
now should be paid with interest as provided by law.
Defendant below found (F pg. 191):
"72. We find that there is no showing of
undue hardship or other valid reason which would
properly justify this commission to waive or reduce the interest imposed by the statute on the tax
deficiencies determined herein."
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully requested that the decision of defendant should either be affirmed or modified by recomDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

361
puting the tax on the basis of the full 100% net income
shown and reflected on the separate books of account of
plaintiff's Utah Division as to the Court may seem right
and proper in the premises.
Respectfully submitted,
C. M. GILMOUR
F R A N K A. JOHNSON,
DEY, HOPPAUGH, MABK, JOHNSON
& GILMOUR

Attorneys

for

Defendant
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